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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1800 and 1850, the United States built a continental empire that stretched from 
the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific Ocean.  As scholars have come to realize over the past three 
decades, this expansion was not a peaceful movement of American settlers into virgin 
wilderness.  Instead, it involved the conquest and subjugation of diverse peoples in Louisiana, 
Florida and the northern provinces of Mexico, and forced the United States to interact 
aggressively with the European empires of Great Britain, France, Spain, and eventually Mexico.  
My work helps to explain how Americans in the early republic reconciled this militant expansion 
with their professed democratic and republican values.  By studying the rhetoric of American 
expansion, I found their justifications rooted in the unexpected person of Napoleon Bonaparte.  
Americans often saw similarities between continental expansion in the old and new worlds.  
Both the United States and Bonaparte’s France started as republics, and both actively expanded 
beyond their borders during the first decades of the nineteenth-century.  Even after the expansion 
of Bonaparte’s France was halted prematurely after the battle of Waterloo in 1815, Americans 
continued to use him debate the merits of an imperial republic.  In other words, they asked if a 
nation could retain its republican principles and still engage in continental conquest.  In the early 
era of American expansion—between about 1800 and 1820, Napoleon served as a bogeyman, a 
negative example, which first expansionists and then anti-expansionists both used to justify their 
positions.  But by the 1820s, as more sympathetic material flooded American print culture, his 
image changed.  By the end of the Mexican American War in 1848, Bonaparte had been elevated 
into the perfect prototype for Americans to follow in their quest for continental domination. 
Bonaparte had largely become a positive symbol of military and national greatness. 
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CHATPER 1 INTRODUCTION:  THE AMERICAN PROTEUS 
 In 1797, the most popular article regarding the new republican hero of France was the 
extract of a letter that ran in newspapers from New Hampshire to Georgia.  Though we cannot be 
certain, it was probably read by tens of thousands of Americans anxious for news from war-torn 
Europe.  In this article, a “gentleman” in Paris identified only as “C” wrote excitedly to his friend 
in Philadelphia.  “C” explained that he had enclosed two copies of the latest portrait of General 
Napoleon Bonaparte and then provided what he knew was stunning, and what he hoped was 
joyful news.  Napoleon was not, as first reported, from the French held island of Corsica.  No, 
said “C,” the promising general was, in fact, an American from Middletown, Connecticut!  
Bonaparte was an assumed name; his given family name was Shaler.1 
 The Philadelphia newspaper where this story first appeared added that this was 
“doubtful.”  Regardless, the story was reprinted up and down the eastern seaboard and according 
to at least one newspaper, it produced, “no small degree of curiosity.”  Only several months later 
did a few retractions start to appear.  These, however, never came close to rivaling the number of 
times the story had been printed.  Even the retractions that did make it into print were 
disappointed rather than apologetic in tone. The New Jersey Journal took an entire column to 
carefully explain that while the original letter from Paris had been authentic, Americans 
unfortunately could not, in fact, “claim the honor of having produced the great Buonaparte.”2 
                                                      
1 “Buonaparte,” The Argus (New York, NY), December 29, 1796; also see titles of the same headline in, The 
Philadelphia Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), December 31, 1796; The Federal Gazette (Baltimore, MD), January 3, 
1796; The Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), January 4, 1797; The New Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), 
January 4, 1797; The Connecticut Courant (Hartford, CT), January 9, 1797; The Connecticut Journal (New Haven, 
CT), January 11, 1797; The Political Gazette (Newburyport, MA), January 13, 1797; Woods Newark Gazette 
(Newark, NJ), January 18, 1797; other commentary on the letter can be found in, Loudon’s Register (New York, 
NY), February 1, 1797. 
2 Ibid; “Buonaparte from the Albany Register,” The New Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), February 8, 1797, 
similar edited articles were printed in The Argus (New York, NY), February 3, 1797; and The Weekly Oracle (New 
London, CT), February 18, 1797. 
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 As this story shows, even early in Napoleon’s career, Americans could make the general 
turned consul turned emperor into whatever they wanted him to be—even an American from 
Connecticut.  And they did.  Napoleon’s name—which Americans could not even agree how to 
spell—and his image appeared in paintings, books, cartoons, wax museums, speeches, toasts, 
busts, pillows, cake decorations, and hundreds of other items from the late 1790s to his death in 
1821.3  Even after his death, Bonaparte lived on.  Some of this was simple hero worship; some 
was that morbid fascination with the lives of the rich and famous which continues in our own 
day.  Often enough, Napoleon was used consciously as rhetorical device to define certain 
American qualities, which may sound odd to modern Americans who think of our identity as 
inherently unique.  Napoleon was equally a symbol of military genius and political tyranny, 
depending on how politically-motivated Americans appropriated his image to address a wide 
range of issues during the antebellum period. 
 In this work, I am going to explain how Americans refashioned Napoleon to fit their 
ideas about national expansion and empire between about 1800 and 1850.  In a simplistic way, 
Americans often saw similarities between continental expansion in the old and new worlds.  
Both the United States and Bonaparte’s France were republics (or at least started that way), and 
both actively expanded beyond their borders during the first decades of the nineteenth-century.  
Even after the expansion of Bonaparte’s France was halted prematurely after the battle of 
Waterloo in 1815, Americans continued to use him debate the merits of an imperial republic.  In 
other words, they asked if a nation could retain its republican principles and still engage in 
                                                      
3 This was not entirely their fault.  The original Corsican version of the name was Napoleone Buonaparte, but once 
the general attached himself to the French Revolution he Frenchified the name to Napoleon Bonaparte.  Then, after 
he took the title of emperor, he (like most monarchs) began to refer to himself by only the first name.  All three 
versions of the name were used by Americans well into the 1820s.  For simplicity, in my work I will use either 
Napoleon or Bonaparte. 
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continental conquest.  In the early era of American expansion—between about 1800 and 1820, 
Napoleon served as a bogeyman, a negative example, which first expansionists and then anti-
expansionists both used to justify their positions.  But by the 1820s, as more sympathetic 
material flooded American print culture, his image changed.  By the end of the Mexican 
American War in 1848, as Americans acquired what would become the states of California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, parts of Colorado and Wyoming, Americans had elevated 
Bonaparte into the perfect prototype for Americans to follow in their quest for continental 
domination. Remarkably, Bonaparte had largely become a positive symbol of military and 
national greatness. 
 Few modern scholars have noticed, let alone carefully analyzed the significance of 
Bonaparte’s symbolism.  Scholars have probably dismissed the pervasive use of his imagery as 
so obvious that they have dismissed it as empty rhetoric.  There are, however, a new generation 
of historians who have begun to address this gaping chasm in the scholarship.  The work and 
methodology of Rachel Hope Cleves is probably closest to my own.  In her The Reign of Terror 
in America, she tied the violent American imagery and rhetoric of the French Revolutionary 
Terror to the emergence of anti-slavery rhetoric in New England during the 1820s.  Cleves’s 
work provides an excellent example of how key word searches in electronic databases can 
produce impressive results.  My own work builds on her methodology but shifts the focus 
thematically and chronologically.  Where Cleves looked at violence done to individuals—the 
violence done to slaves by their owners, for example—my own work looks at the role of 
collective national violence, or the threat of it, aimed at other nation states.4 
                                                      
4 Rachel Hope Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America:  Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Anti-Slavery 
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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It has almost become cliché for historians to tell their readers that their topic is 
understudied.  I have no such luxury.  Trying to explain how the Americans of the early republic 
reconciled aggressive geographic expansion with their professed beliefs in republicanism and 
democracy has occupied historians for over a century.5  In general, historians have focused on 
two main causes.  The first was ideological.  Historians have adopted the term, “manifest 
destiny” to describe a peculiar American sense of quasi-religious duty to spread liberal 
democracy across the continent—and, depending on whom you asked, across the world.  
Traditionally, historians dated this concept to the Jacksonian period, but in the 1990s, historians 
like Frank Owsley and Gene Smith began to argue that the roots of this ideology could be found 
in the actions of the Jefferson administration.  Anders Stephanson even argued that an American 
sense of “choseness” linked to expansion could be found as far back as the Puritan migration to 
the North America in the seventeenth century.  Whenever it started, the key element is that 
manifest destiny is an inherently aggressive offensive ideology.6 
Other historians see expansion as motivated less by ideology and more by fear stemming 
from national security concerns.  They suggest that American expansion is best seen as a 
defensive measure designed to protect liberal democracy.  In The American Union and the 
Problem of Neighborhood, for example, James Lewis suggests that as the Spanish empire in the 
new world collapsed, Americans justified their expansion into the chaotic borderlands between 
                                                      
5 A good introduction to the topic is Mary Ann Heiss, “The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and the U.S. National 
Identity,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 4 (Fall, 2002), 511-540. 
6 Manifest Destiny as a historical concept first appeared in Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny:  A Study of 
Nationalistic Expansion in American History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); and 
Weinberg’s conclusions were largely corroborated by Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American 
History:  A Reinterpretation (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1963); Frank Owsley and Gene Smith, 
Filibusters and Expansionists:  Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa, AL:  University of Alabama 
Press, 1997); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny:  American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York:  Hill 
and Wang, 1995); for another “long view” of ideology in American foreign policy see Walter McDougall, Promised 
Land, Crusader State:  The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (New York:  Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 
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1783 and 1829 by defining it as a national security interest.  Similarly, Thomas Hietala argued 
that American fears over domestic and economic instability stimulated the aggressive expansion 
of the late Jacksonian period.  Another example of this is Richard Anderson’s explanation of the 
long history of American foreign policy in Empire for Liberty.  Like Anders Stephanson, 
Immerman argued that the roots of American expansion could be traced back to its colonial 
beginnings, but where Stephanson saw Americans acting out of an aggressive, offensive 
ideology, Immerman saw Americans acting aggressively, and often unwisely, to defend an ever 
expanding geographic area from perceived threats to “liberty.”7 
Two problems continue to hamper our understanding of early American expansion.  First 
is compartmentalization.  In 2007, Sandra Gustafson lamented what she saw as the split between 
historians of the Jeffersonian period and those of the Jacksonian period and suggested that the 
split hid important connections between American democracy and American Imperialism.  A 
quick glance at works on early American expansion shows that historians have indeed missed the 
importance of continuity by focusing on distinct historical periods instead of taking a longer 
view of the antebellum era.  Many scholars have exaggerated the meaning of the peaceful 
acquisition of Louisiana in 1803 as the defining moment of Jeffersonian diplomacy and 
expansion, while using the Mexican American War to paint the Jacksonian era as a period of 
greater military aggression.  What is missing here is the continuation of ideology that bridged the 
two periods that drew heavily on European ideas and practices of empire-building.8 
                                                      
7 James E. Lewis Jr., The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood:  The United States and the Collapse 
of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Thomas Hietala, 
Manifest Design:  American Exceptionalism and Empire, revised ed. (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2003); 
Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty:  A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul 
Wolfowitz (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2010). 
8 Sandra Gustafson “Democracy and Empire,” American Quarterly 59 no.1 (March, 2007), 107-133. 
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The second problem is one of focus.  The last forty years have seen an odd divergence in 
early expansionist studies.  On one hand, some historians continue to focus heavily on presidents 
and policymakers at the highest levels of government.  This is understandable since many of 
those most interested in American imperialism are diplomatic historians who traditionally deal 
with treaties and national strategy.  On the other hand, since the 1980s, an increasing number of 
historians have focused their efforts on giving voice and agency to those in the borderlands 
whose lives were most changed by national policy:  native peoples, Spanish creoles, local 
officials, African slaves, and Mexican citizens, for example.  This new emphasis is a necessary 
corrective.  Men and women living in these contested areas were not merely pawns in the 
diplomatic gamesmanship of policymakers in Madrid, Paris, or Washington. What is also needed 
is greater attention to how public opinion was shaped–and played a crucial role in both defending 
and criticizing expansionist policies.  For example, why did Americans rally around President 
Polk’s war policy which necessitated the invasion of a sovereign republic?  Polk needed an army 
of volunteers, which meant that support for conquest already was widely accepted in the 
American public.  How that imperialist ideology was framed in newspapers and print culture is a 
vital part of process of expansion.9 
                                                      
9 For examples of good recent bio-diplomatic histories of American expansion see Peter Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire:  
The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville, VA:  University of Virginia Press, 2000); Robert W. 
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty:  The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); J.C.A Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American 
Frontier (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Charles Edel, Nation Builder:  John Quincy Adams and 
the Grand Strategy of the Republic (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2014); and Robert Merry, A 
Country of Vast Designs:  James K. Polk, the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (New 
York:  Simon and Schuster 2010); for relevant examples of the work that highlights the agency of those on the 
borders see, Anne Hyde, Empires, Nations and Families:  A New History of the North American West, 1800-1860 
(Lincoln, NE:  University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Peter J. Kastor, “’Motives of Particular Urgency’: Local 
Diplomacy in Louisiana,” William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 4 (October 2001), 819-848; Julien Vernet, Strangers 
on their Native Soil: Opposition to United States Governance in Louisiana’s New Orleans Territory (Jackson, MS:  
University of Mississippi Press, 2013); Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812:  American Citizens, British Subjects, 
Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2010); Timothy Henderson, A Glorious Defeat: Mexico 
and its War with the United States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). 
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 Study of the anti-expansionist currents in American society is a more recent phenomenon 
and thus less developed.  Unfortunately, it is somewhat hampered by the same periodization and 
lens foci that make histories of early American expansion less than complete.  Those historians 
who study anti-imperialism generally focus on it as a reactionary anti-war movement and not as 
a deeply rooted ideology.  Thus, while we have historical snapshots of Whig anti-war 
movements during the Mexican War and Federalist anti-war movements during the War of 1812, 
there is no study that links the ideology of these two movements together or that connects them 
to the anti-expansionist ideas that surrounded the Louisiana Purchase.10 
This is why the symbolism and rhetoric attached to Napoleon is so important.  His 
shifting image revealed how average Americans thought about expansion and ties the two 
periods of early American expansion together.  As a trope of military expansion, he forced 
commentators to more carefully define the principles of republicanism, the legitimacy of using 
military force, and the concentration of power in the executive branch.  Using Napoleon made 
public critics clarify the distinctions between wars for conquest and defensive wars and to think 
more clearly about expansion based on treaties, natural limits (territorial or continental 
boundaries), and national security concerns.  It also bears noting that the individuals who 
comprised the American reading public were not automatons who mindlessly opposed or 
supported every policy of Jefferson, Madison, or Polk, either out of spite or partisan loyalties.  
                                                      
10 The best modern work on anti-Imperialism is Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, Empire’s Twin:  U.S. Anti-Imperialism 
from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), though this collection 
of essays includes only one chapter that covers the antebellum period; several good monographs exist on anti-
imperialism after 1898, but one of the problems of developing coherent theories of early anti-imperialism is that the 
comprehensive works tend to be collections of independent essays, see for example, Samuel Eliot Ellison, Frederick 
Merk and Frederick Freidel, Dissent in Three American Wars (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1970); 
also see John Schroeder, Mr. Polk’s War:  American Opposition and Dissent (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1973); Michael Morrison, “New Territory vs. No Territory:  The Whig Party and the Politics of 
Western Expansion,” Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 1 (February, 1992), 25-51; Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked 
War:  Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 Invasion of Mexico (New York:  Alfred Knopf, 2012). 
 
 
 8 
Then, as now, their knowledge was always limited and their opinions were never totally 
objective.  It was quite common for elected officials to write for the newspapers during the early 
republic, and often disguise themselves by using pseudonyms.  The word of print was fractious 
and never a level playing field.  But writing for the reading public required a different pose than 
arguing in halls of Congress.  It did create a forum for rational debate, even if this was 
imperfectly achieved. 
 The chief benefit of my own work is in its ability to project a much-needed sense of 
thematic and chronological continuity into debates over American expansion between the 
Louisiana Purchase and the end of Mexican War.  I demonstrate that there was both continuity 
and change in the American understanding of expansion during the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  In part, I demonstrate that the artificial division between expansion to 1820 and after 
1820 has merit.  Pro and anti-expansionist arguments based on national security that proven quite 
effective during the Louisiana Purchase and the War of 1812 lost much of their power after 
1815.  I suggest that a large reason for this was that after 1815, the chief symbol upon which this 
rhetoric was built—Napoleon—could no longer be made into a viable national security threat.  
Yet, Napoleon’s symbolic place in the American rhetoric of expansion continued through 1850, 
albeit in a different form and with different results. 
The other value of my work is that it brings into focus the expansionist (and anti-
expansionist) views of a surprisingly neglected group: middle-class Americans from the core of 
the United States.  As a decentralized democratic republic with a laughably small military, 
American national policy had to correspond to the will of the white, male electorate to be 
effective.  The editor of the New Hampshire Patriot perceptively wrote of expansion in 1832, 
“no physical force can carry [the government’s] mandates into effect, for if the people approve 
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them they will be obeyed.”  However, if the American public did not approve of their 
government’s actions, “they will not fight against their own consciences, their own convictions 
of right, to enforce what they deem unjust.”  American military commanders confronted this 
democratic and local resistance during the War of 1812 when militia sometimes refused to cross 
the Canadian border.  In fact, the process of debating in the newspapers both contributed to the 
growth of nationalism and exposed its fragile reach across a country where state and regional 
identification was often more important to average citizens.11 
I also show that the traditional “anti-war” label for anti-expansionists needs greater 
nuance.  A few of those who I study could fit the traditional “anti-war” model and opposed all 
war for its human and economic waste as well as for what they saw as the inevitable immoral (or 
unwise) geographic expansion that went with it.  However, this was a rare position.  Others were 
vigorously opposed to offensive wars of “conquest” while supporting “defensive” wars and the 
means to fight them.  Another subgroup was genuinely opposed to all expansion beyond the 
“natural limits” of the United States no matter the means.  There were even those who opposed 
expansion via treaty and who saw military conquest as the only legitimate means of expansion.  
Of course, there was much gray area within each of these positions as well.  It also bears noting 
that these men and women did not mindlessly oppose every policy of Jefferson, Madison, or 
Polk out of spite.  They were reasonable citizens who had genuine concerns about the actions of 
their nation. 
 To explain how I do this, a short introduction to my methodology is in order.  Anyone 
who takes the time to scan my bibliography will note that I have used published sources almost 
exclusively and this deserves some explanation.  Americans were a remarkably literate society 
                                                      
11 New Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), March 19, 1832. 
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by 1800 and became increasingly so as the nineteenth century wore on.  Pamphlets, newspapers, 
books and magazines circulated widely and I work from the assumption that these both 
accurately reflected and helped to shape public opinion.12  Americans used these printed sources 
to learn everything they could about Napoleon.  On the Niagara frontier during the first decade 
of the nineteenth century, young Eber Howe remembered the excitement generated by the 
postman bringing the local paper and “with what avidity the family circle would gather round to 
hear my father read the wonderful doings of that great human butcher, [Napoleon Bonaparte].”  
By 1830 even modest families living on the fringes of American settlement usually owned a 
bible, a hymnbook, an almanac and biographies of Washington and Bonaparte.  Families that 
could not afford books accessed the life of Napoleon through libraries.  According to literary 
historian Scott Casper, Americans checked-out biographies of the French general more than any 
other type of book during the mid-nineteenth century.13 
 Because of the American print obsession with Napoleon, researching his impact on 
American discourse is more like a feast than a famine.  For example, running the name 
“Bonaparte” through the Readex America’s Historical Newspapers database between 1800 and 
1850 will return over 3,000,000 hits; and these results only cover the newspapers!14  In order to 
turn these results into usable data, I was forced use rely on keyword proximity searches. For 
example, asking the database to only retrieve results that include both “Bonaparte” AND 
“Louisiana” brings the total number of hits down to a somewhat more manageable level.  In 
                                                      
12 I make this unsurprising assumption based primarily on the work of, Jeffrey Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers:  
Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville, VA:  University of Virginia Press, 2002); and 
Trish Loughran, The Republic in Print:  Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 2009). 
13 Quoted in Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution:  The First Generation of Americans (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2001), 100; Scott Casper, Constructing American Lives:  Biography and Culture in 
Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 27, 81-82. 
14 By way of comparison, Rachel Hope Cleves noted 50,451 hits in the same database doing similar work on the 
impact of the French Revolutionary Terror in the American mind—see Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America, 283. 
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general, I searched for Napoleon’s names and the geographic areas that Americans were 
interested in annexing.  However, as I continued my research, I was able to include important 
“code words” that virtually all Americans associated with Napoleon—“sister republics,” 
“usurper,” and “ambition” among others.  Using this approach probably does mean that a few 
pieces of data slipped through the cracks, but after analyzing over 1,000,000 newspaper articles 
in conjunction with dozens of biographies, pamphlets and other printed material, I am reasonably 
certain that I understand the structure of how Americans used Napoleon in their debates over 
expansion. 
 A final note on my methodology:  critics have been suspicious about the usefulness of 
symbols and rhetoric in reconstructing the past for many years.  Public rhetoric, in particular, 
seems particularly difficult to take at face value.  In his monograph, Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, historian Michael Hunt addressed this issue. “The cynical,” he wrote, “would contend 
that carefully staged public appeals are occasions not for frank and nuanced expression, but for 
cant intended to fool the gullible and mask true intentions.”  Yet, he pointed out, for public 
rhetoric to be effective at all, it must appeal to “values and concerns widely shared and easily 
understood by its audience.”  In my work, I have done my best to ensure that the printed material 
I use had a wide circulation, or at least reflects larger trends in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century print culture.  Rhetoric needs to taken seriously as a source for defining the boundaries 
of American discourse on expansion.  It was the glue that bound Americans together as a nation, 
because rhetoric provides a common vocabulary for defining national identity.  Ultimately, this 
is the fundamental truth that undergirds my entire work.15 
                                                      
15 This paragraph is heavily paraphrased from Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, reprint ed. (New 
Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2009), 15-16. 
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 Americans first became aware of the Corsican-born general around mid-1796 in the wake 
of his appointment to command the Republican Army of Italy.  Within weeks, newspapers were 
full of his exciting dispatches from the front lines.  By the end of the year, one Federalist 
newspaper from Baltimore noted with some concern the degree to which “the public mind in 
America is wrought up to a high state of anxiety” over Napoleon’s series of stunning victories 
against the Austrian empire in Italy.16 
 The victorious general almost immediately became a political football in American 
debates about the just conduct of republics.  Jeffersonian Republicans—who tended to be 
sympathetic the principles if not always the means of the French Revolution—hailed Napoleon 
as a brilliant general whose victories spread the promise of liberty to those oppressed by despotic 
European monarchies.  As part of the traditional Independence Day toasts made by the New 
York Democratic society in 1797, twenty-two cheers were made in support of “Gen. Buonaparte 
and the brave officers and soldiers of the French armies,” who were engaged in “securing the 
liberty, peace and happiness of mankind.”  Tellingly, in the same series of toasts, the memory of 
the July 4, 1776 only received six cheers.17 
 While Republicans cheered as newspapers brought new reports of Bonaparte’s victories 
in Italy, the opposing party in power, the Federalists, urged caution.  They were never 
comfortable with the violent social anarchy caused by the revolution in France and liked it even 
less when it spilled over the French borders.  One Federalist newspaper sarcastically asked what 
the difference between the Goths and Napoleon’s Army of Italy was.  The editor provided the 
answer using italics to emphasize his point:  “The ancient conquerors were despotic princes—the 
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and Jefferson (New York:  Random House, 2010), 253-257; also see Joseph Shulim, “Jefferson views Napoleon,” 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 60, no. 2 (April, 1952), 288-304. 
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modern conquerors of Italy are despotic republicans.”  At the heart of the Federalist unease was 
concern over whether it was legitimate for republics to conquer their neighbors, even in the name 
of liberty.  In many ways, this question has been at the heart of American foreign policy ever 
since.18 
 In 1798, Bonaparte and his army were ordered to pacify Egypt to prepare the way for an 
eventual invasion of British India.  Commentators then and now have suggested that the real 
reason the French Directory—the five-man executive council that ended the Terror and ran 
Revolutionary France with some semblance of order from 1795-1799—sent Bonaparte to the 
fringes of the Ottoman Empire was to get the increasingly popular (and thus increasingly 
dangerous) general away from France.  The campaign was only marginally successful from a 
military perspective, but it did help Napoleon in at least one way.  It meant that his American 
reputation was not tarnished by the souring of Franco-American relations that occurred in the 
wake of the XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War (1798-1800).19  American public anger at the French 
demand for tribute and the ensuing naval skirmish was overwhelmingly aimed at the French 
Directory and central government instead of Bonaparte. 
 Thus, for many Americans, it came as a relief when Napoleon abandoned his army in 
Egypt, returned to France, and engineered a coup that toppled the hated Directory.  In its place, 
Bonaparte established a government of three consuls with himself as First Consul.  Shortly after 
assuming office, Napoleon adopted a more conciliatory diplomatic stance toward the United 
                                                      
18 “Republicanism:  The Latest Fashion,” The Federal Gazette (Baltimore, MD), September 9, 1796; Stanley Elkins 
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19 Americans were deeply outraged by French government officials’ (identified in the American newspapers as 
agents X, Y, and Z) demand for a bribe to begin negotiations over American and a non-declared naval war ensued 
with both sides seizing each other’s merchant and naval ships.  See William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair 
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States, which led to the Convention of 1800 that ended the naval war in September of that year.  
Yet, even with the war over, maritime disputes between the two nations continued for the next 
fifteen years.  More troubling to at least some Americans though was the nagging sense that with 
the ascension of Bonaparte, France had become a Republic in name only.  While some diehard 
Jeffersonians continued to hope that Bonaparte’s near dictatorial powers would be only 
temporary, most Americans expressed relief that they were separated from the First Consul by 
the Atlantic Ocean and wondered where his ambition would take him next.20 
 Though Americans did not know his plans yet, Napoleon did.  He had his sights on 
Louisiana—a territory roughly defined as the area dominated by Mississippi River and its 
tributaries west to the Rocky Mountains.  Louisiana was no stranger to the byzantine world of 
imperial politics by the time the Bonaparte turned his gaze there at the end of the eighteenth 
century.  Spanish conquistadores were the first Europeans to traverse the gulf coasts of Florida 
and Louisiana.  Several disastrous expeditions in search of gold—most famously by Hernado 
DeSoto in 1541—led the Spanish government to lose interest in Louisiana and focus their 
attentions on the fabulously wealthy silver mines of New Mexico.  The Spanish, however, did 
maintain a tenuous hold on Florida, which, by their reckoning, ran the length of the gulf coast to 
the Mississippi.  They did this mainly to keep other covetous empires out of the area in order to 
protect Spanish shipping.  Meanwhile, the French moved into the Mississippi valley from their 
possessions in Canada.  In 1682, the French adventurer Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle 
officially claimed (and named) the territory for Louis XIV, but the colony never prospered.  For 
almost a century it struggled.  With far more prosperous islands in the Caribbean attracting most 
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Relations, 1804-1815 (Washington, D.C.:  Potomac Books, 2005). 
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of the willing French settlers, only a handful of disgruntled “undesirable” persons from France 
made Louisiana their home—usually they had no choice in the matter.  In addition, their 
existence was constantly threatened by hostile relations with vastly more numerous native 
peoples that actively courted the African slave population as allies.  In the end, the French did 
manage to fortify the mouth of the Mississippi River at New Orleans and set up numerous fur 
trading posts around the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers.21 
 The first half of the eighteenth century saw a series of imperial wars between France and 
England that continued with only short pauses until 1765.  In the last of these wars, known in 
Europe as the Seven Years War, Louisiana again became an imperial football.  As the tide of the 
war turned against the French, they sought the support of the neutral Spanish by promising to 
cede the territory of Louisiana.  Spain, concerned about the possibility of an energetic Anglo-
American empire bordering their wealthy provinces in Mexico, took the bait and entered the war 
on behalf of the French.  However, Spain proved to be a less than valuable ally and France was 
soon forced to sue for peace.  The final settlement of the Treaty of Paris (1763) redefined the 
imperial map of the Americas.  France lost all of her possessions in continental North America—
Canada to Great Britain, and Louisiana went (as promised) to Spain.  For her part in supporting 
the French, Spain lost East and West Florida to the British.22 
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 Yet, the imperial roulette game was not yet over.  Within a dozen years of the Treaty of 
Paris, the British imperial bureaucracy pushed her thirteen original mainland North American 
colonies into open revolt.  Seeking allies, the infant American republic sought recognition and 
support from Britain’s old enemies of France and Spain.  Looking to avenge their embarrassment 
at the hands of the British during the Seven Years War, both powers eventually entered the war 
on the side of the Americans, though Spain was particularly cautious about overtly supporting a 
nation that they realized would be their major rival in North America.  Looking to their own 
interests, Spain took advantage of weakened British power in the gulf coast region to reassert 
their control of the Floridas and, most importantly, New Orleans.  Another Treaty of Paris (1783) 
ended this civil war which had expanded into an international conflict with the British colonies 
achieving their independence.  The treaty defined the new nation’s boundaries as all territory 
west to the middle of the Mississippi River, south of Canada and north of Florida, though the 
exact northern boundary of Spanish Florida was left unclear.23 
 The Mississippi River and its tributaries loomed large in the minds of the newly 
independent Americans.  In an age when the only way to transport goods to market economically 
was via water routes, Americans living west of the Appalachian Mountains depended upon the 
free flow of cargo down the Ohio to the Mississippi then through New Orleans to the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Realizing this, the Spanish exerted economic pressure on the western regions of the 
United States by closing the port of New Orleans shortly after the conclusion of the American 
Revolution.  They also quietly supported the occasional separatist movements that sprang up 
among the western territories by holding out the promise of free navigation along the Mississippi 
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to any areas willing to submit to Spanish authority.  The American Confederation government 
sought a diplomatic solution to the problem, but failure to secure the basic right of frontiersmen 
to use the port of New Orleans caused enough outrage amongst southerners and westerners to 
derail ratification of Jay-Gardoqui Treaty (and almost the Constitution) in 1786.  The two powers 
continued to warily eye each other as American settlers swarmed into territory claimed by Spain 
as northern Florida.24 
 Ten years later, however, the situation changed with the outbreak of the French 
Revolutionary Wars in Europe.  Perceiving that the United States was growing closer to Great 
Britain under Federalist Party rule, Spain, as an ally of revolutionary France, came to the 
bargaining table.  Westerners rejoiced when the United States finally concluded Pinckney’s 
Treaty with Spain in 1795.  This treaty, also known as the Treaty of San Lorenzo, clarified the 
boundary between the United States and Florida as the 31st parallel of latitude—which 
essentially acknowledged the fact that the United States had de facto control of the northern parts 
of what the Spanish claimed as Florida.   Both nations agreed to allow each other unimpeded 
access to the Mississippi.  The treaty also provided Americans a “right of deposit” in New 
Orleans, which allowed Americans to transport and store their goods in New Orleans without 
having to pay a duty to the Spanish empire.25 
 Though the French gave up Louisiana at the end of the Seven Years War, they never lost 
sight of their imperial ambitions.  In 1793, the French ambassador, Citizen Genêt, received 
instructions from the Girondin government to “germinate the principles of liberty and 
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independence” in Louisiana and then find a way to transfer the independent territory to France.  
Genêt took this to mean that his government wanted him to wage a war of liberation and began 
recruiting an army of western Americans to do the job.  This scheme fell apart when Genêt fell 
afoul of the American government and was recalled to France.  The Directory, laid plans to 
reestablish France’s hold on Louisiana through more diplomatic means.  They quietly opened 
negations with Spain for the retrocession of Louisiana, but for several years the Spanish 
government proved remarkably intractable on the issue.  As we will see, however, Bonaparte 
would not be dissuaded so easily.26 
What follows is broken into four chapters aligned geographically around a very broadly 
defined Louisiana.  In chapter one, I cover how Napoleon entered the American lexicon of 
expansion during Mississippi Crisis of 1802-03, which resulted in the Louisiana Purchase.  I 
show that the American public saw Bonaparte as negative symbol, in which both pro and anti-
expansionists used to define their own positions and attack their opponents’ positions.  At this 
time, all parties agreed on one point: Napoleon’s approach to expansion was one best not 
followed by an independent republic.  Chapter two discusses how Americans used the rhetoric of 
Napoleon in the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase, which in its early years was treated as 
colonial possession. 
 Chapter three illustrates how Federalists used Napoleon to create an effective, nationwide 
anti-expansionist (though not anti-war) argument by linking aggressive expansion in East and 
West Florida to the War of 1812.  Lastly, in my final chapter, I demonstrate how Americans both 
celebrated Napoleon as a democratic military genius while claiming to despise his ambitious 
politics.  The Janus-faced image was solidified by the avalanche of Napoleonic printed material 
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that appeared in the United States beginning in the 1820s.  And, as I contend, helped to lay 
popular support for the Mexican-American War, which was the most aggressive display of 
imperial expansion in the antebellum period.  I conclude with some cursory observations of why 
the highly-charged rhetoric about Napoleon fell off steeply during the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER 2 ANCIENT LIMITS AND NATURAL BOUNDARIES: THE MISSISSIPPI 
CRISIS 
 
 During the first few months of 1803, an anonymous author published a long pamphlet 
sporting the delightfully grandiose title, “An Address to the Government of the United States on 
the Cession of the Louisiana Territory to the French and on the Late Breach of Treaty by the 
Spaniards, including the Translation of a Memorial on the War of St. Domingo, and the 
Cessation of the Mississippi to France.”  The author—who was the novelist Charles Brockden 
Brown—claimed to have translated a secret memorandum from a “French Counseller of State” 
to the First Consul of the Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte.  In the “translated” document, the 
supposed diplomat argued persuasively that Bonaparte ought to immediately occupy the 
Louisiana Territory, which had recently been begrudgingly ceded to him by his Spanish allies.  
Translation of the “memorandum” completed, Brown made an appeal to his own government.  
With French military occupation of the territory apparently inevitable, he argued for an 
American military occupation of Louisiana before the French could officially take possession of 
the area.  Yes, he admitted, this would mean a foreign war waged against Spain under dubious 
pretexts, and it would eventually require that the inhabitants of the conquered territory to be held 
in a state of vassalage.  Yet, he argued, the danger of allowing Bonaparte to militarize the 
western boundary of the United States was worth all these consequences.  Brown had to know 
that his means would have sounded downright Napoleoneque to his readers, indeed, he 
practically demanded the comparison. Incredibly enough, however, Brown was only one of 
many voices calling for a preemptive military invasion of Louisiana.27 
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 Every story has a beginning.  In the case of American expansion this beginning was 
Louisiana—a territory loosely defined by the Mississippi River and its tributaries that stretched 
west to the Rocky Mountains.  When through a remarkable set of international circumstances 
Napoleon Bonaparte sought to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States in 1803, it was 
the first opportunity for the embryonic nation to burst through the boundaries defined by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1783.  Yet, the road to what most Americans remember as the greatest land 
deal in United States history was not a simple one.  It involved fear and hyper-partisan political 
bickering that almost developed into America’s first foreign war involving land forces.  This 
chapter closely examines the emergence of Napoleonic rhetoric—specifically the idea of ancient 
limits and natural borders—during the Mississippi Crisis of 1800-1803. 
 Compared to the Louisiana Purchase that followed, the Mississippi Crisis has received 
scant attention from historians.  For most of the twentieth century, the diplomatic and political 
historians who gave it any serious thought used the episode as a barometer for judging the 
Jefferson administration’s foreign policy acumen.  More recently, however, a few historians have 
placed the Mississippi Crisis into the larger context of early American expansion in the Spanish 
borderlands.  Two schools of thought have emerged.  One argues that American policy in the 
region stemmed from an ideology of what Frank Owsley and Gene Smith called “proto-manifest 
destiny” in their 1997 book, Filibusters and Expansionists.  According to this interpretation, the 
American government regularly acted in a deliberate and aggressive manner toward its Spanish 
neighbors and the Mississippi Crisis was simply a precursor to more aggressive action in the 
region later.  “The entire episode,” they write, “demonstrated that Jefferson strongly supported 
westward expansion and that he understood the Mississippi River’s importance to its 
development.”  Such militant acts, say these historians, fit comfortably into what later 
 
 
 22 
generations would call the ideology of Manifest Destiny—the unashamed conquest of territory 
from a neighbor unable to resist.28 
 Other historians have argued that it is anachronistic to see the Mississippi Crisis in terms 
of Manifest Destiny.  Instead, these historians argue that American policy was actually dictated 
by national security concerns and thus ultimately defensive in nature.  In James Lewis’s 1998 
work, The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood, for example, Lewis argues that 
the American response to the Mississippi Crisis, “always reflected a concern with the effect on 
French control over the river on the integrity of the union.”  Even more recently, Donald 
Heidenreich completed a detailed political examination of the crisis in which he concluded that, 
it should be understood primarily as “a young republic’s quest for national security.”  
Heidenreich took Lewis’s argument one step further and argued that the national security 
concern was so prevalent in the politics of early American expansion that Jeffersonians and 
Federalists put aside their party differences and reached a “consensus” on the necessity of 
possessing Louisiana.29 
 While the basic story of the Mississippi Crisis is well established, by placing the rhetoric 
of Napoleon into the crisis, my own work complicates the existing narrative.  First, it clearly 
shows that a portion of the American public—if perhaps not the Jefferson administration—saw 
the crisis as a referendum on the just application of military power and not solely as a diplomatic 
event.  Second, it demonstrates that while the Lewis, Heidenreich interpretation of seeing the 
crisis in terms of a national security issue is correct it is ultimately too simple.  In the first case, 
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the rhetoric aggressive expansionists used changed over time and reflected the American public’s 
discomfort with militant expansion.  In the second place, while there was a general agreement 
between most Americans of all political stripes that the United States needed possession of at 
least a part of Louisiana to protect its national security, there was no consensus on how this was 
to be accomplished, what portion of Louisiana was a vital national security interest, or even 
where the boundaries of Louisiana lay. 
The Mississippi Crisis introduced Bonaparte as a negative symbol in American debates 
over expansion.  Pro-expansionists argued that the military threat of a Napoleonic Louisiana 
justified a preemptive strike that would expand the United States to its natural boundaries—or at 
least prevent France from returning to her ancient limits.  To be in favor of aggressive expansion, 
Americans had to believe that French control of the Mississippi River was a legitimate national 
security concern.  At the same time, an ideological anti-expansionist argument began to form 
around the idea that military expansion would make the United States no better than imperial 
France.  Anti-expansionist rhetoric was most effective when authors demonstrated the 
uncomfortable similarities between the military expansion of the United States and that of 
Napoleon.  Fundamentally, both groups shared the assumption that aggressive militant expansion 
in the mode of Bonaparte was illegitimate.  This common understanding forced pro-
expansionists to explain why their own views were based on national security interests and not 
simply overt and unprovoked military expansion. 
When Napoleon overthrew the Directory in 1799 and established the three-man 
Consulate government with himself as First Consul, he inherited a long-established French desire 
to rebuild their western empire.  As early as 1793 the Girondin government attempted to 
destabilize Spanish Louisiana by subterfuge through the machinations of Citizen Genêt.  A few 
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years later, the Directory opened diplomatic talks with Spain with the goal of convincing the 
Bourbon government to return Louisiana.  The Spanish proved intractable and the Directory 
government fell before anything came of the negotiations.  When Napoleon came to power, he 
quietly redoubled pressure on his ally Spain to retrocede Louisiana to France in exchange for 
territory in Italy.  Under enormous political and military pressure, Spain backed down.  Not 
unhappy to be rid of the financial drain on their economy and happy to use France as a buffer 
between New Mexico and the United States, the Spanish government secretly acceded to 
Napoleon’s demands in October 1800 after securing a verbal agreement that the French consul 
would allow no third party to possess Louisiana.  Well aware of the firestorm that the 
retrocession would cause in the United States, both powers attempted to keep the deal secret until 
Bonaparte had the ability to solidify his control of the province.30 
Eager to realize his dream of recreating a North American empire, Napoleon concluded 
his wars in Europe—at least temporarily.  The Peace of Lunéville pacified Austria in February 
1801; then, eight months later, he ended hostilities with the British in the Peace of Amiens.  The 
result of these treaties was a much enlarged French state—mostly at the expense of Austria.  It 
also freed France from fear of the British navy.  In January 1802, Americans read that a large 
French expeditionary force under the command of Napoleon’s brother in law, Charles Leclerc, 
was on its way to North America to assert the First Consul’s control over his western empire.  
This action confirmed the worst fears of many Americans—especially the more Franco-phobic 
Federalists.  Rumors of the Spanish retrocession of Louisiana to France had been circulating in 
diplomatic circles since the end of March and in the American press since at least June, but the 
                                                      
30 Treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1800, The Avalon Project online, (http://avalon.law.yale.edu); Alexander 
DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York, Scribner, 1976) 91-96. 
 
 
 25 
sailing of the French fleet for the Americas left no doubt in the mind of the American public that 
they would have a new neighbor on their western border.31 
Even before Bonaparte’s fleet sailed, the Jefferson administration was working to resolve 
the developing crisis.  Thomas Jefferson and his followers embraced a transcontinental American 
empire of connected republics.32  While the decaying Spanish empire held Louisiana, most 
assumed that their imperial holdings in North America would, in the course of time, simply fall 
into the lap of the United States as Americans settlers moved farther west and either imparted 
republican values to the inhabitants or came to dominate the area simply through sheer numbers.  
Bonaparte’s increasingly autocratic and powerful France threatened that vision by re-inserting 
the most militant nation in Europe onto the American continent.  The administration reacted with 
hostility when rumors of the retrocession were all but confirmed by their European diplomats in 
May 1801.  When questioned, however, the French chargé de affairs in Washington coyly 
refused to acknowledge that any transfer had taken place.  Besides, he told the administration, 
even if it had, it would not concern the United States—unless, of course, she intended to expand 
past the boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris.33 
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Stymied, Secretary of State James Madison sent a long set of instructions to the new 
Minister to France, Robert Livingston in September.  The president, he said, wanted Livingston 
to confirm if the retrocession had taken place, and if so, what the extent of it was.  Specifically, 
the president wanted to know if Florida was included in the deal.  Furthermore, he added, if the 
French were in possession of Louisiana and Florida, Livingston was instructed to persuade the 
French to sell New Orleans and the Floridas—and if they were not, then convince the French to 
pressure their Spanish allies to sell those strategic points.  The delicate diplomatic negotiations 
that followed took over a year and have been well chronicled in other places.  Jefferson was 
willing to wait—at least for a while—but not all of his countrymen were so patient.34 
By 1801, the Federalist Party was a minority party in most places in the nation, but they 
were still an extremely vocal opposition.  Many were outraged by news of the retrocession and 
demanded a strong response from Jefferson’s administration.  In general, Federalists were less 
concerned about the ideological empire of republicanism that animated Jefferson.  Where 
Republicans looked west to what Jefferson called an “Empire of Liberty,” Federalists looked east 
to protect a commercial empire of merchants and bankers.  They were focused on building a 
nation state that would be taken seriously by European powers.  The Genêt mission, the XYZ 
Affair and the raiding of American commerce showed the Federalists exactly how little the 
belligerents thought of a divided and militarily weak nation that hugged the eastern seaboard of 
North America.  The major theme of early Federalist opposition to the retrocession was outrage 
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that the French sought to check American expansion—essentially an affront to American honor 
and greatness.35 
In June, several Federalist papers announced that France had, “exerted her diplomatic 
skill to seize Louisiana, Florida and Canada, and enlisted her GENETS to enlist men in our 
backcountry to occupy them.”  To the American reader at all familiar with geography, French 
control of those three key territories would make further American expansion impossible.  This 
was nothing new, the article explained to its readers.  As early as 1783 the paper noted, France 
was, “adverse to our aggrandizement.”  While this article explicitly tied France to the future of 
American expansion, it stopped short of directly employing Napoleonic rhetoric to make its 
points, instead choosing to use the specter of Citizen Genêt.  This began to change as Americans 
began to discuss the ramifications of the Peace of Amiens and place their own empire within the 
context of the Napoleonic one.36 
When considering the American perception of the French Revolution’s ideological 
undertones most historians have focused on the Federalist fear of radical Jacobin ideas infecting 
the United States from within rather than on French territorial ambitions.  Rachel Hope Cleves in 
The Reign of Terror in America, writes that the Revolution’s “pervasive and persistent images of 
bloodshed deeply affected American beliefs about the legitimacy of violence within American 
politics and society,” and she credits these images with encouraging American abhorrence to 
violence in domestic issues like slavery.  In The Age of Federalism, Stanley Elkins and Erik 
McKitrick contended that “the real drama of the French Revolution in America…was one not of 
foreign policy but of domestic partisanship.”  Emphasizing partisan divisions obscures where 
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two parties were in agreement: both feared French territorial aspirations in North America, 
especially after Napoleon’s successes in the wars of the First and Second Coalitions 
demonstrated that the French armies not only could win battles, but win wars, and occupy 
foreign territory.37 
Americans greeted the outbreak of European peace in 1802 with mixed feelings.  Many 
were thankful that the end of war would allow the free flow of American goods to their favored 
trading partners.  Some idealistically welcomed the end of bloodshed and anarchy.  Others were 
more wary.  In a widely reprinted series of articles titled, “Reflections on the Peace,” the author 
attempted to explain how peace would affect the nation.  He concluded with what he saw as the 
most dangerous part of the peace, the European acceptance of the retrocession of Louisiana to 
France.  “If this key to our western country should be placed in the keeping of so powerful, so 
enterprising, so adroit a nation” the author warned, Americans should “anticipate evils of 
enormous magnitude, and of the most mischievous tendency.”  This article shows a gradual shift 
toward the rhetorical use of Bonaparte in discussions of American expansion.  Though the article 
uses the word “nation,” the words used to describe the French nation were ones generally 
associated with Bonaparte by the end of 1802.  One newspaper described Napoleon as “powerful 
as any sovereign in Europe.”  Another claimed that he was “active, enterprising, [and] able.”38 
As the First Consul consolidated his power, Americans increasingly associated his 
personal character with the character of France.  The American Minister to France, Robert 
Livingston, for example, complained that in France, “One man is everything.”  It is worth noting 
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that in the political cartoons of the day, the United States is usually represented as the female 
figure, Columbia, Great Britain the rotund character, John Bull, while France is Bonaparte 
himself.  Thus, when the author of “Reflections on the Peace” worried about a “powerful,” 
“enterprising” and “adroit” nation on the western border of the United States, he was really 
casting American expansion in terms of Napoleon.  This trend accelerated and become more 
explicit as Americans grappled with difficult questions raised by the Peace of Amiens.39 
Peace in Europe began a new chapter in American discussion over territorial expansion.  
In a second article, the author of “Reflections on the Peace” commented on the extension of the 
French state.  If Bonaparte were to establish a legitimate constitution, “adapted to the character 
and circumstances of the nation…[his] acquisitions would form the basis of substantial and 
durable greatness.”  Otherwise, the author concluded, the new territories would “flit away like 
the painted forms on a magic lantern.”  A permanent and stable form of national expansion was 
only possible as long as a just government prevailed.  The author failed to comment on whether 
this would also be true in the case of a French Louisiana—perhaps he was even hoping that 
Louisiana would “flit” away from the clutches of an unjust Bonaparte.40 
The Treaty of Lunéville and Peace of Amiens also brought the idea of “natural 
boundaries” to the front of American discourse about expansion.  The enlightenment concept of 
national borders being defined by reason and nature (mountain ranges, oceans, and rivers for 
example) became part of the French discourse during the halcyon days of Louis XIV, though 
French military reverses during the eighteenth century called the idea into question.  As early as 
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1793, the French revolutionary leader Danton revived the idea.  It was Napoleon Bonaparte, 
however, who finally made these limits a reality through his dramatic victories over the 
Austrians in the Wars of the First and Second Coalitions (1792-98 and 1799-1802).  The Treaty 
of Lunéville extended the borders of France to the Rhine, and created French client states in 
Northern Italy, Holland, and Switzerland.41 
These were not new concepts to Americans.  They lived in a world system governed by 
the system of international law envisioned by Emmerich Vattel—a Swiss political philosopher 
who published his immensely influential diplomatic treatise, The Law of Nations in 1758.  Vattel 
argued that peaceful relations between nations relied on maintaining a balance of relative power 
between theoretically equal independent states as a response to the threat of a naturally despotic 
“universal monarchy.”  Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, when Vattel wrote of a “Universal 
Monarchy,” he was thinking of the Charles V or the Louis XIV.  After 1800, Americans 
increasingly associated the threat of “universal monarchy” with Napoleon.  Daniel Lang and 
Peter and Nicholas Onuf have demonstrated convincingly that the American political class took 
Vattel’s balance of power theories to heart.  Indeed, they contend that virtually all of their major 
political and diplomatic decisions between at least 1776 and 1815 reflected the Vattelian 
worldview.42 
Yet, the popular expansionist rhetoric that developed during the Mississippi Crisis 
demonstrates that the while the middling classes of American society might not have understood 
the intricacies of Vattel, they understood his basic premises.  One problem with Vattel’s 
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worldview, however, was that he never explained how to measure state power.  This led to 
Americans of all classes and political stripes disagreeing on exactly what constituted a natural 
boundary.  The Peace of Amiens and the rise of Napoleon showed a new threat to the European 
balance of power and provided Americans with a new development that fleshing out the limits of 
legitimate expansion. 
Americans took note of the new, extended, French borders, but reactions were mixed.  An 
editorial from South Carolina happily commented that Bonaparte had no further cause for war as 
France had reached her “natural limits.”  The author (and the French government) defined these 
limits as that territory bounded by “the Rhine, the Pyrannese [Pyrenees], the Alps, the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic.”  For this author, peace was contingent on a nation extending to 
its natural boundaries—a clear nod to the Vattelian worldview.  It was good and natural for an 
empire to extend to the boundaries defined by nature because once accomplished, this would 
prevent the need for further conflict by preserving the appropriate balance of power.43 
 Other Americans were not so sure.  One wrote a satirical commentary on the peace 
negotiations.  The author likened the carving up of Europe to a family dinner and painted a vivid 
word picture of the scene that ensued.  Bonaparte, as the most successful power broker, sat at the 
head of the table and ate first.  The whole European family knew him as a “monstrous pie eater.”  
After all, at the “banquet of Campo Formio, whole Italian fricassees and all the Flanders’ bacon 
liked not to have satisfied him.” 44  His enormous appetite was compounded by his apparent 
fasting of late in Egypt.  The author warned the Russian emperor, who sat across from the First 
Consul, to keep a wary eye, lest Bonaparte “claim a little more than his share.”  This observer 
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raised the issue of “appetites,” something that might not be contained by natural boundaries.  
Nations might be greedy, driven by other impulses, beyond the enlightened principle of balance 
of power.  In this way, Bonaparte (as a symbol) seemed to giving the logic behind expansion a 
more human psychology.45 
 As early as 1802, pro-expansionists were invoking the name of Napoleon and the idea of 
natural boundaries within the context of Louisiana.  One of the first and most eloquent arguments 
was made by David Humphreys (1752-1818).46  In many ways it should come as no surprise that 
Humphreys introduced these tropes to the American discourse on expansion.  In 1802, 
Humphreys was fifty-two and had amassed an impressive and long record of public service.  
Born in Connecticut, he graduated from Yale with distinguished honors at the age of nineteen.  
During the War for Independence he proved an able soldier, rose to the rank of colonel, and 
became one of George Washington’s most trusted aides.  After the war, the Confederation 
Congress appointed Humphries to serve on a delegation sent to broker commercial treaties in 
Europe in France and Great Britain.  Intent on shaping public opinion, he attempted to write a 
biography of George Washington.  This project was cut short by his appointment as the 
American minister to Portugal in 1791 and then Spain in 1796.  Humphreys was on hand in 
Europe to witness the dramatic expansion of France and the crumbling of Spanish power at the 
hands of Napoleon.  His military and diplomatic experiences made him sensitive to the emerging 
geopolitical developments on the continent.  Thinking about the role of Washington in the 
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American Revolution probably led Humphries to measure major historical developments through 
the lens of “great men” and their opposite, dangerous dictators.47 
 After witnessing the opening of the Napoleonic Wars, Humphreys returned to New 
England to raise merino sheep.  Yet, the old soldier still found time to write.  In January 1802, he 
penned an incredibly popular article which ran in several widely-read New York and New 
England papers under the pseudonym Coriolanus.  Coriolanus warned his readers that with the 
accession of Bonaparte the geopolitical situation had dramatically changed.  All of the First 
Consul’s military and diplomatic maneuvering demonstrated a policy of expanding France to its 
“ancient limits.”  In other words, said Coriolanus, Napoleon intended to repossess all of the 
territories lost by the French monarchy in previous wars.  As evidence, Coriolanus pointed to the 
French repossession of Guiana with “expanded and almost limitless boundaries.”  He also noted 
French occupation of the Rhine valley and the transalpine regions of Italy.  Humphries 
demonstrates a subtle shift in American thought on expansion with this essay.  Instead of leading 
France to her divinely appointed and thus legitimate “natural” boundaries, Napoleon was 
ambitiously expanding beyond this sphere to France’s “ancient” boundaries.  With this 
established, he then turned his attention to Louisiana.48 
 “In the possession of Spain,” he observed, “Louisiana was a clearly defined territory.”  
Under the “all grasping hand” of the First Consul, however, “its limits are undefined.”   A survey 
of history, he argued, showed that if Napoleon continued his policy of extending France to its 
“ancient limits” then he would apply the same principle to North America.  Humphries predicted 
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that with control of these areas, Napoleon would soon detach the trans-Appalachian region from 
the union by promising the western settlers free passage along the Mississippi.  After painting 
this dire picture, Humphries provided the remedy.  He recommended that a force of western 
militia move down the Mississippi to preemptively seize a Spanish territory along the river 
before Napoleon could officially take control of it.  This, would demonstrate to Napoleon and the 
world that if the “conqueror of Europe” sought to interfere with “just career of a free and 
enlightened people,” Americans would assert their rights.  Exactly what “rights” Napoleon was 
infringing upon Humphries hinted at in the last part of the article.49 
 Coriolanus ended his bellicose essay with a strident defense of American-led 
imperialism.  “All empire,” he noted, “is traveling from east to west.”  Thus, he postulated, 
empire would achieve its greatest height in the United States.  There would soon come a time, he 
continued, when America would include vast peoples and lands west of the Mississippi.  That 
river, he contended, was “never designed as the western boundary of the union.”  God had never 
intended the “best part of his earth” to be populated by subjects of a French “usurper.”  America, 
in other words, had no natural boundaries such as those of France.  God himself had designed the 
American nation to be different than Napoleon’s France.  In time, Coriolanus predicted, all 
European held dominions in the Americas would become part of an immense, “free and 
sovereign empire.”  An American empire, he imagined, that would “unfold the doors of liberty” 
to millions yet unborn.  His decidedly pro-expansionist position defied natural and ancient 
boundaries, instead relying on divine Providence to justify the United States imperial 
ambitions.50 
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 The classical name, Coriolanus, also invoked Bonapartian overtones that the nineteenth 
century audience would have recognized immediately.  In both Plutarch’s biography and the 
Shakespearean play, the tragic character of Coriolanus is a brave and successful republican 
general who becomes embroiled in Roman politics.  When he opposes democratic reforms in the 
Roman Senate, he is tried by the plebeian rabble and exiled from Rome.  Angered and 
overwhelmed by pride he joins forces with the barbarian enemies of the republic and leads them 
in a successful military campaign to the gates of Rome.  He is dissuaded from sacking the city by 
tearful entreaties from his wife and his mother.  In some versions of the story, he is eventually 
assassinated.51 
 Two things about this story would have stood out to an American reader in 1802.  First, 
they would have recognized the story of Coriolanus as a cautionary tale against the excesses of 
democracy.  This was a powerful message to broadcast at a time when Federalists felt that they 
had been thrown out of power by Jefferson’s democratic mob of Jacobins.  Second, they would 
have seen the story as a warning against the dangers of ambitious pride.  Certainly they would 
have noticed the similarities between Coriolanus and Bonaparte.  Both men proved successful 
republican generals and were extraordinarily ambitious politicians.  On the surface, both men 
appeared principled, but not far beneath the surface lurked bloodthirsty ambition.  In essence, 
simply by choosing the pseudonym, Coriolanus, the author was asking his audience to consider 
the dangerous consequences of Bonaparte’s overreaching ambition in Louisiana. 
On the surface, Coriolanus’s essay clearly supports the arguments of those historians like 
Frank Owsley and Gene Smith who suggest that that an aggressive Manifest Destiny ideology 
guided American expansion from the very beginning.  The essay has obvious overtones of an 
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irresistible, divinely sanctioned, westward movement of Americans across the continent at the 
expense of those too weak to resist.  The Coriolanus essay still must be read in the context of the 
other arguments circulating in 1802 and 1803.  Popular though it may have been, the Coriolanus 
argument was an easy target for anti-expansionists, and those in favor of boundless expansion 
found that they had to refine their arguments to make them more palatable to the American 
public.52 
Concerns about Louisiana increased during 1802.  What had changed was a new French 
military presence in the Caribbean.  In January, the army that left Europe in the wake of the 
Peace of Amiens suddenly landed in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue, 
considered the jewel of the old French colonial system in North America.  It produced that most 
valuable commodity of sugar and the price of this luxury was an oppressive slave system.  A 
bloody slave uprising began in 1791, which toppled the white regime; after several chaotic years 
of civil war, the rebels established a new power structure under the charismatic leadership of 
Toussaint L’Ouverture. 
At first, the Federalist Adams administration continued to trade with island as a way to 
economically punish France during the Quasi-War.  This included shipments of firearms and 
ammunition—a fact not lost on the French government or Napoleon.  But, fearful that the 
revolutionary ideology of the slave rebellion might travel to the United States, the Jefferson 
administration refused to recognize the Haitian government.  At first, Jefferson and his secretary 
of state James Madison wanted England, France, and the United State to work together to 
overturn the new Haitian state.  They were even willing to tolerate France’s efforts to use 
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military force to bring Saint-Domingue back into the French orbit.  Such cooperation quickly 
evaporated as Americans worried that Napoleon would move next into Louisiana.  Bringing 
Saint-Domingue back into the French orbit was the key to the reestablishment of Bonaparte’s 
empire.  In fact, Napoleon largely saw Louisiana simply as a granary for his far more precious 
Caribbean colony.  At first, things seemed to go quite well.  Taking advantage of internal 
divisions amongst the black leadership, the French commander (and Napoleon’s brother in law) 
Charles Leclerc made steady progress in the reconquest of the island.  By the end of May 1802, 
he had crushed what resistance did develop and arrested L’Ouverture.  With Saint-Domingue 
seemingly back under French control, most Americans anticipated that French expeditionary 
force’s next move would be north to New Orleans.53 
 Also troubling to pro-expansionists was the publication and wide circulation of an article 
from Bonaparte mouthpiece, Gazette de France in June.  According to the article, “the idea of re-
attaching Louisiana to the domain of France is perhaps, of all political conceptions, the wisest 
and most important.”  Noting the rapid population and economic growth of the American 
republic the Gazette asserted that a European barrier was needed to prevent the expansion of a 
people “whom nature has promised the empire of half the world.”  If unchecked, the author 
opined, Americans would soon spread from “the North to the South, cover Mexico, the West-
Indies [and] Canada.”  Spain was too weak to prevent Americans from spilling over of their 
“present limits.” Here, the article stated unequivocally that a French colony that could provide an 
effective barrier to American expansion. 54 
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 Read within the context of American assumptions about natural borders, the torrent of 
bellicose editorials that followed the publication of this article should come as no surprise.  Most 
Americans would have agreed with the Gazette’s dim assessment about the ability of Spain to 
hem in American expansion.  That was the point, of course.  Under Spain, the colony was 
sparsely populated and weakly held—James Madison likened Spanish rule to that of an old 
woman.  Under the Jeffersonian theory of natural expansion, private American citizens would 
simply move in to fill the vacuum left by the decrepit and effeminate Spain and come to 
dominate the area through natural increase.  For those Americans of a Jeffersonian persuasion, 
this had the twin attraction of being “peaceful” expansion—as opposed to conquest, and not 
expanding the power of the national government.  To many Americans, the Gazette (presumably 
with the nod of Napoleon) was suggesting that France impede the legitimate, peaceful process of 
American expansion to its natural boundaries.  This threat of a barrier was also interpreted as a 
challenge, raising the possibility of a war with France.55 
 The words in the Gazette article combined with the presence of a French army only a few 
hundred miles from New Orleans in Saint-Domingue made Bonaparte’s threat to American 
expansion very real.  Then in October 1802, the headstrong Spanish Intendant of New Orleans 
exacerbated an already tense situation when he revoked the American right of deposit promised 
by the Pinckney Treaty of 1795.56  With western commerce chocked off, easterners began to 
wonder how long residents of Kentucky and Tennessee would remain in a union if their 
navigational and economic rights were endangered.  Suspicious Americans immediately (but 
incorrectly) saw the nefarious hand of Bonaparte behind the port closure and a plot to detach the 
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frontier states from the eastern seaboard.  Though Bonaparte had nothing to do with the port 
closure, the fears of these Americans were not entirely without merit.  In early 1803, for 
example, Francis Flournoy, a Kentucky farmer writing under the penname “A Western 
American,” suggested ominously that “the interests of France, Spain and Western America 
would go hand in hand.”  When Americans looked west, they increasingly saw Bonaparte and 
his legions not only preventing the expansion of their empire, but dismembering it.57 
 The furiousness of the debate over American expansion that occurred in the wake of the 
publication of the Gazette de France article and the closure of New Orleans was astonishing.  In 
December, the original Coriolanus letter was reprinted in various newspapers across New 
England.  It was soon followed by two others that were so popular the editor of New York’s 
Morning Chronicle had to make excuses when he could not publish them fast enough to keep up 
with demand.  By mid-January 1803, eager readers were buying a pamphlet of the collected 
letters of Coriolanus for 50 cents at their local bookstore.58 
 At this point, the anti-expansionists finally entered the public debate.  Taking aim directly 
at Coriolanus, one anti-expansionist fired back in explicitly Bonapartian terms in the January 13 
edition of The American Citizen.  The author began by commending Coriolanus for his “fine 
painting of the universal domination at which the first Consul aspires.”  He applauded 
Coriolanus’s harsh rebuke of Napoleon’s “aggrandizement” at the expense of “independent 
empires.”  Coriolanus was no doubt correct, the author continued, when he claimed that the 
peace and prosperity of nations depended on their ability to “remain satisfied within their limits.”  
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However, the author continued, it was just as important for the United States to constrain its 
expansion to the natural boundary provided by the Mississippi as it was for France to remain on 
the south of the Rhine.59 
 Coriolanus had “marked out a path for the United States,” wrote the American Citizen, 
“which he censures when trodden by the First Consul.”  After all, when Coriolanus described the 
American empire as containing “millions of souls west of the Mississippi,” asked the author, 
what was he contemplating other than a war of conquest in the manner of the Bonaparte?  The 
author was particularly disturbed by Coriolanus’s justification for such a war.  First was 
Coriolanus vague notion that since all empire traveled from East to West, the seat of the greatest 
empire would undoubtedly be in the United States.  What was this, asked the author, other than a 
Bonapartian ploy to justify American seizure of New Orleans and the Floridas?  More 
concerning, to the American Citizen, however, was Coriolanus’s suggestion that the God of 
nature had never intended the Mississippi to be the western boundary of the United States.  How 
was this different, he asked, than the French insistence that the Rhine, and then the Netherlands 
was their own divinely appointed boundary?  The author then turned his gaze back to the 
Americas.  Where exactly, he wondered, did Coriolanus see the boundaries of the United States?  
The mines of Mexico?  The Isthmus of Panama?  Cape Horn?  The author finished his essay with 
a final biting comparison.  The Coriolanus essay had envisioned the empire of the United States 
throwing open the “doors of liberty” to those whom it conquered.  The American Citizen 
concluded sarcastically, “Just so, Bonaparte went to Egypt to unfold the doors of liberty and 
happiness to the Turk; and, if we believe him, his benign incursion was perfectly in conformity 
to the God of nature.”  The American Citizen article demonstrated just how flexible Bonapartian 
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language was in the hands of a skilled author and unsheathed a potent rhetorical weapon in the 
arsenal of anti-expansionists.60 
 Despite the sentiments expressed in the American Citizen, many Americans were gravely 
concerned about the prospect of French influence in Louisiana.  To them, it appeared that 
America would be subjected to the same ravages that Europe had endured during the Wars of the 
French Revolution.  Based on the Gazette de France article, many expected Napoleon to use his 
soldiers in Saint-Domingue to eventually set up a military colony in Louisiana as a buffer to 
American expansion.  Few, however, believed that the restless veterans would remain content in 
the “bogs and marshes of the seaboard.”  One Massachusetts writer in The American Oracle used 
history as a guide.  French conduct over the past thirteen years, he suggested, indicated that it 
would only be a matter of time before Bonaparte would find some excuse to encroach on 
American territory.  “What pretense,” asked the writer rhetorically, had Bonaparte to “destroy 
several free republics” in Europe?61 
 Others worried less about open warfare and more about the economic and political 
pressure that Napoleon could bring to bear when in possession of Louisiana.  An article first 
published in the ubiquitous American Citizen worried that by shutting down trade on the 
Mississippi, Napoleon could pursue a “subtle policy” by which he could induce westerners to 
“shake off their allegiance and become subjects of the ‘Great Nation.’”  Like the Coriolanus 
essay, this article was originally published in mid-1802, but was republished in heated rhetoric of 
early 1803.  This author did not fear open warfare with Bonaparte, but he did fear the proximity 
of a nation so “dreaded for its subtle intrigues.”  In some ways, this pro-expansionist rhetoric was 
a subtle change from the writings of Coriolanus.  For Coriolanus, the United States had been 
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exceptional—a nation uniquely free from the boundaries that constrained the politics of Europe.  
The expansionist rhetoric that developed over the spring of 1803, on the other hand, painted the 
American republic as fragile and subject to the same dangers that Europe had endured at the 
hands of Bonaparte.62 
 With this rhetoric of fear came new concerns about how the French interpreted their 
“natural” boundaries in the Americas.  Prior to the Louisiana retrocession, Americans had largely 
assumed that it was beneficial for empires to spread to their limits.  Coriolanus had expressed 
concern about Bonaparte’s policy of expanding France to its “ancient” limits, but that, after all, 
was a deviation from what was natural.  In the winter and spring of 1803, newspapers began 
running articles that highlighted this fear.  For example, several widely circulated pieces 
reprinted an old article from a 1797 edition of the New York Journal in which the author had 
expressed the belief that it was “the right of Republics to correct the errors of their former 
Kings.”  The 1797 author had made this comment within the context of French expansion in 
Europe.  With the French poised to occupy Louisiana, however, the article was used as a cudgel.  
“I have no French maps,” an author identifying himself as “Sidney” wrote sarcastically, “nor can 
I, at this moment, precisely ascertain the limits of the former claims of the French Kings.”  
However, Sidney continued, he was certain that those claims “included nearly one half the 
present territory of the United States.”  After reading the same 1797 article and noting that the 
original author believed that France had been unjustly deprived of Canada, A.B.C. wondered 
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“how far the United States would be affected, if the First Consul of the French Republic should 
apply a prompt corrective of the procedure.”63 
 With undefined boundaries in the Americas, an article published in a London paper 
attracted extensive comment from the editor of the Virginia Gazette.  The London article 
purported to quote from a French travel narrative in which the author maintained that, “the 
natural limits of Louisiana extend to the sources of the Mississippi and Missouri.”  
Understandably, this caused the editor a great deal of consternation since describing the natural 
limits of Louisiana in this manner indicated that Kentucky and Tennessee were both part of 
Bonaparte’s claim to Louisiana.  According to the Gazette, the London article then suggested 
that Bonaparte would undoubtedly interpret the Spanish retrocession as including the “utmost 
extent of [Louisiana’s] natural limits.”  These articles grew out the new concern that Bonaparte 
was bringing the problems of Europe to the shores of North America and caused many 
Americans to demand a forceful response.64 
 The meeting of the seventh Congress in late 1802 brought vigorous debates about 
expansion—American and French—to the American capitol.  The American public followed 
many of these debates through their newspapers.  Federalist pro-expansionists demanded military 
action to resolve the Mississippi crisis that echoed ideas already simmering in many parts of the 
country.  One of the first of the outspoken critics was forty-one-year-old Senator James Ross of 
Pennsylvania.  By February 1803, the former lawyer had served in congress for almost a decade, 
and had served as President pro-tempore of the Senate during the fifth Congress.  In what would 
be one of his last acts as a public official, Ross introduced resolutions that authorized the 
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President to call out as many as 50,000 militia from Mississippi and neighboring territories to 
seize New Orleans from the Spanish; he also called for the appropriation of appropriation of five 
million dollars to finance this military expedition.  Ross defended his measures as a defensive 
necessity brought about by Bonaparte.  He warned that after negotiation with the First Consul 
inevitably failed, westerners would never forget who allowed such a “powerful and ambitious” 
despot to take control of the West and would likely strike the best deal they could with Napoleon 
at the expense of their eastern brothers.  Perhaps, he continued, they might even seize the 
territory themselves and then establish a separate nation.65 
 Ross was not only thinking about the present.  He was also concerned about the future of 
the United States.  In his mind, nations had to have defensible frontiers and the Spanish had 
provided the United States a golden opportunity to legitimately seize what had been denied her.  
“The possession of the country on the east bank of the Mississippi,” he told his colleagues, “will 
give a compactness, an irresistible strength to the United States.”  Owning this real estate would 
render the nation dreaded in “all future wars,” and force European governments to treat the 
United States with more respect than ever before.  It is interesting to note that the word “natural” 
does not appear in Ross’s speech—or at least in the newspaper versions that remain today.  For 
Ross, expansion was a simply a matter of military expediency and pragmatism.66 
 New York Senator Gouverneur Morris advocated adoption of the Ross resolutions in a 
popular speech that made its way into numerous newspapers.  Morris was no light-weight in 
politics and when he spoke, his constituents listened.  He had served in the New York provincial 
congress, the Continental Congress, briefly as an officer in the New York militia and drafted the 
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preamble to the Constitution.  He had also served as minister to France during the initial chaos of 
the French Revolution.  Morris was less concerned with future wars and more with what he saw 
as current political reality.  Dealing with Bonaparte, he argued, required strong action.  As a 
usurper, Bonaparte’s legitimacy was tied to military success.  “Impelled by imperious 
circumstances, he rules in Europe,” Morris explained, “and he will rule here also unless you set a 
bound[ary] to his power.”  Bonaparte’s France had to expand or wither, he argued.  Bonaparte 
had nowhere left to expand in Europe, therefore he had to expand in the Americas.  French 
control of strategic coastal locations like New Orleans and Florida was “dangerous to other 
nations, but fatal to us.”  Thus, for Morris, American expansion was a pragmatic response to the 
future threats to national security.67 
 Yet, like Coriolanus had before him, Morris conceived of Florida and New Orleans as a 
“natural and necessary part of our Empire.”  With this established, Morris turned back to the 
means of obtaining them.  Morris wondered at Jefferson’s attempt at diplomatically resolving the 
crisis. “On what grounds do you mean to treat?” he asked his colleagues rhetorically.  Napoleon, 
he pointed out to the Congress, “wants power.  You have no power.  He wants dominion.  You 
have no dominion.”  No, he argued, when dealing with such men as Napoleon, the only question 
worth asking was, “how many battalions have they?”  Despite the “pacific nature” of the United 
States, expansion to Morris was a defensive necessity driven by the character of Napoleon.68 
 Pro-expansionist Americans repeated the basic argument of pragmatic, militaristic 
expansion throughout the spring and into the summer of 1803.  One particularly popular piece 
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purported to be an extract of a letter from a “gentleman at Natchez.”  He bristled at what he saw 
as the disrespect the “reptile Spaniards” showed toward Americans in New Orleans and 
denounced the president’s insistence on going through all the “ceremonies and etiquette of the 
courts of…Bonaparte.”  He, like Morris, saw expansion in pragmatic means justified by the very 
real military danger of Napoleon.  “I say start and [drive] them with the spring flood, and then 
negotiate” he wrote.  “We can now get the whole province without the loss of one drop of 
blood.”  “Let the French get here,” he warned, “’twill be otherwise.”  Not only did this 
“gentlemen” took a pragmatic view of expansion, but he also provided a pragmatic view military 
of the relative military balance between the French, the Spanish, and the Americans.69 
 In another article, and author writing as “Pericles” warned that because Bonaparte sought 
to expand France to its “ancient limits,” his policy demonstrated a “manifest and great danger” to 
the union.  “Pericles” was almost certainly the head of the Federalist party, Alexander Hamilton.  
The Pericles article is particularly instructive.  Hamilton, unlike most Federalists, had once been 
sympathetic to Napoleon.  As late as April 1801 he gave a widely reprinted speech in which he 
eloquently defended Bonaparte’s coup by arguing that the radical excesses of the Jacobins could 
only be held in check by the strong arm of the First Consul.  But that was 1801, and by 1803 the 
times and the geopolitical landscape had changed.  He, like Morris and the “gentleman” from 
Natchez counseled seizing Florida and New Orleans in order to negotiate with Bonaparte from a 
position of strength.  He warned that Bonaparte would never negotiate to sell New Orleans or 
Florida, and therefore Americans would have to fight for it in any case.  Taking New Orleans 
from the Spanish before Bonaparte’s veterans arrived from Saint-Domingue and fortified the 
place only made sense.  In the end, according to many pro-expansionist Americans, a 
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preemptive, defensive strike in the name of empire would cost less American blood, treasure and 
honor in the long run.70 
 There were differences between what these militant expansionists saw as the ultimate 
goal of a military strike on Louisiana.  Ross, for example—the ultimate pragmatist—only wanted 
to fight for New Orleans and the east bank of the Mississippi.  Pericles and Morris, on the other 
hand, saw all of Florida as within the natural boundaries of the United States.  Underlying all 
their arguments was a fear that Bonaparte’s occupation of Louisiana would bring the intrigue and 
warfare of Napoleonic Europe to the Americas.  During the Wars of the French Revolution, 
alliances shifted with dizzyingly regularity and secret deals (such as that which led to the 
Louisiana retrocession) were frighteningly commonplace.  In addition, 1802-3 saw Napoleon 
completely redraw the map of Europe for the first of several times during his reign.  Americans 
watched nervously as the Piedmont was unceremoniously annexed to France so that Napoleon’s 
Great Republic could control the vital passes through the Swiss Alps.  Farther north, the ancient 
Holy Roman Empire was broken up and reorganized in a manner that supported Bonaparte’s 
national aims.  With such breathtaking changes occurring to the borders of Europe, it seems little 
wonder that Federalist expansionists tended to worry that having Bonaparte as a western 
neighbor would break up the American union entirely.71 
 Few Americans made this fear as explicitly plain as an author purporting to speak for 
“Ten Thousand Freemen of Connecticut,” in March of 1803.72  Let Bonaparte set up a military 
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colony in Louisiana, he warned, “and one of two things must invariably take place.”  In one case, 
under economic and military pressure from Bonaparte, the western states would shift their 
allegiance from the eastern United States and become mere colonies of France.  Eventually an 
economic rivalry would lead to an “interminable war with the eastern states.”  If this first 
scenario did not come to pass, then the author expected the west to seize New Orleans without 
the sanction of the United States government and thus drag the United States into a war with 
France that it was ill-prepared for.  The threat from Bonaparte’s navy would compel the United 
States into an alliance with Great Britain and thus trigger a Napoleonic war of cataclysmic 
proportions on the North American continent.  The reason the threat of Bonaparte held so much 
power over so many Americans in 1803 was that they were familiar with the results of a decade 
of revolutionary warfare and intrigue in Europe.73 
 Such pragmatic concerns illustrate that anti-expansionists had forced pro-expansionists to 
refine their arguments by 1803.  Coriolanus had argued for aggressive military expansion backed 
by a divine mandate to spread republicanism across the continent.  Pericles and Ross took a 
different approach, arguing that American expansion was a national security concern. This does 
endorse one theme in the existing scholarship.  James Lewis and Donald Heidenreich have 
concluded that the Mississippi Crisis must be understood primarily as “a young republic’s quest 
for national security.”  Federalists, too, put aside party politics and reached a “consensus” on the 
necessity of possessing Louisiana.74 
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 The formulation of a bipartisan “consensus” in response to the crisis is too simple, 
however.  In general, Americans did agree on the necessity of obtaining New Orleans, though 
not necessarily all of Louisiana. The public debate in the newspapers revealed that crucial issues 
were not settled.  Not only was the amount of territory in question, but many disagreed over what 
the natural boundaries of the United States actually were. 
 Administration allies valiantly attempted to push back against these fears, but the rhetoric 
of Bonaparte was a slippery and often unconvincing symbol in the hands of Jeffersonians.  An 
author writing under the name “De Witt” penned a piece that originally appeared in the 
Kentucky Guardian of Freedom, but was picked up in several other eastern papers.  The United 
States had little to fear from Bonaparte’s control of Louisiana he argued.  After all, the value of 
Louisiana was in its commerce, and therefore “attempts then on the part of France to interrupt 
the peace of this country would be attended with the destruction of that commerce to promote 
which is the object of Louisiana.”  In other words, out of self-interest Bonaparte could be 
expected to maintain good relations with the United States.75 
 In any case, continued De Witt, it was folly to look to the French Revolutionary Wars for 
examples of what to expect from Bonaparte.  Instead, Americans ought to look to their own 
history.  During the War for Independence, he explained, Americans had prevailed without a 
head of state, a currency, or a central government that could establish either.  Now that the 
United States had these things, any attempt by Bonaparte to subjugate America would certainly 
end in disaster De Witt concluded.  A French army that chose to attack along the Mississippi 
would have its supplies cut off.  It would be subjected to attacks by small bands of Americans 
who would cause havoc then quickly melt away into the wilds of the western forests.  In 
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describing this hypothetical conflict, De Witt was actually not far off from the wars that did 
ultimately undo Napoleon in Spain and Russia, however, in 1802, few agreed that a conflict with 
Napoleon could devolve into such a state.76 
 This was simply too easy of a target to pass up.  The retired, but still feisty Federalist 
Fisher Ames took De Witt to task for his complacent attitude.  The former Massachusetts 
representative sneered at the naïve suggestion that United States could expect any special 
treatment from Bonaparte because we were a “sister republic.”  Not long ago, Ames wrote, 
“Europe had many free republics,” but “alas! they are no more.”  War had turned them all into 
slaves of Bonaparte.  In fact, he suggested that since Bonaparte had come to power, it seemed 
that France had been paying special attention to republics.  “She has considered them, not as 
associates, but as victims.”  Ames went down the sad list, “Venice she has sold to the emperor.  
Holland she taxed openly for her own wants…From Switzerland she drained her youth to be 
food for gunpowder.”  No, Ames said, the United States had to be ready to defend itself against 
its “sister republic.” America’s French sister was more of an assassin than a loving relative.  
Under Bonaparte rule, to “depress, plunder, and destroy republics, has been the sure and 
experienced consequence of French domination.”77 
 Perhaps no one put all these fears together as coherently and creatively as Charles 
Brockden Brown.  Later regarded as one of America’s first great novelists, in 1803, Brown was a 
marginally successful author and editor of two literary magazines.  At the height of the 
Mississippi Crisis, he anonymously authored a pamphlet on the crisis that was successful enough 
to be republished in several editions throughout the United States.  This pamphlet, sporting the 
wonderfully long title, An Address to the Government of the United States on the Cession of 
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Louisiana to the French and on the Late Breach of Treaty by the Spanish explicitly used the 
specter of Bonaparte to discuss the problem of American expansion.  Brown ingeniously restated 
most of the points that pro-expansionists had made before, but he also assigned value judgments 
to a “Napoleonic” vision of expansion, which gave the essay greater significance in developing a 
subtler understanding of the influence of international politics on the American continent.78 
 Most of the lengthy pamphlet purported to be the translation of a confidential 
communiqué from a minor French diplomat to Napoleon on the subject of Louisiana.  Brown 
gave this letter a fake pedigree and set it within a fictionalized story of a stolen letter smuggled 
into the United States by concerned citizens in Paris.  It began with the assumption that Europe 
would soon be dominated by Bonaparte and that it was time to consider the enlargement of 
Bonaparte’s power in other places around the globe.  The diplomat professed to be an 
enthusiastic supporter of the empire, yet he was concerned about the means of extending French 
influence.  He was particularly distressed at what he saw as the wasting of valuable French lives 
and treasure on costly military incursions.  The conquest of Saint-Domingue was a case in point.  
Was it prudent, he asked, for a nation to continue wasting valuable lives and money on the 
conquest of a “fortified rock” containing a well disciplined and numerous populace that had 
sworn to defend it to the death, when it had the opportunity to secure a wealthy province 
containing a compliant population virtually unopposed? By framing the debate like this, Brown 
tapped into an already well established perception that Americans had of Bonaparte—that he 
carelessly threw away lives in his battlefield victories. 79 
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 One of the most common American critiques of Bonaparte in his early career was the 
number of casualties he incurred.  In 1798, the Otsego Herald identified Napoleon as that 
“infamous general, commonly called The Butcher.”  In 1801, the Virginia Argus noted of 
Bonaparte’s wars, “the quantity of property and blood which have been expended...would have 
been sufficient for founding a colony more populous and powerful than the United States 
collectively.”  The editor of the Argus made it plain that colonial expansion was preferable to the 
bloody warfare of conquest.  Thus, even though Napoleon won victories, Americans like Brown 
argued that cost in blood that Napoleon was willing to pay for the expansion of France was 
unworthy of a republic.  Monarchs and despots threw away the lives of their subjects in vain 
wars of ambition, but the free men of a republic deserved better.80 
 Brown’s diplomat spent a great deal of time on the cost of conquest.  Indeed, he spent 
several pages explaining to the First Consul that the reason France had lost the initial race for 
colonization to the British was because Louis XIV had spent too much blood and treasure on 
European continental wars instead of on colonizing North America.  According to the diplomat, 
France’s “stupid rage of ambition could see nothing desirable but what our neighbors already 
possessed.”  “Imagine, then,” he encouraged Bonaparte, “that the thousands sent to perish under 
the walls of a German fortress, the arms, the amunition [sic], the tools, the various apparatus 
provided for such an expedition, had been sent to America.”  The diplomat went on in words 
strikingly similar to those of the Virginia Argus: “Had the minister Richlieu81 applied one year’s 
subsidy of Gustavus, or the treasures expended in one siege or one campaign in Flanders, in 
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founding a settlement on the Delaware or Chesapeake all that part world which is now English, 
would have been French.”82 
 Ultimately, that was the rub.  Not only had bloody, ambitious conquest frittered away 
valuable lives, it had cost the French most of their empire to the hated English in the end.  
Brown’s diplomat bravely suggested to Napoleon that the British mode of expansion was worth 
considering.  How had they built their empire?  Put simply, they had done nothing.  They sent 
“poor fugitives” into the empty wilderness of North America and left them alone.  Left to their 
own devices, according to Brown’s diplomat, these original English settlers had multiplied of 
necessity and become a “numerous, civilized and powerful people.”  The lesson in all this was 
clear enough, “These miracles were not wrought by the sword.  It was not wars and victories that 
have added five millions of civilized men to the human race and the English name.”  Wars and 
victories he continued, “may rob millions of their happiness and independence; millions they 
may easily destroy; but they cannot call into existence; they cannot compel to change their 
language, manners, or religion.”  War—or at least foolish, arbitrary conquest—was not an 
effective means of expansion according to Brown’s diplomat.83 
 While Brown’s diplomat spent pages providing abstract arguments for legitimate 
expansion, his main concern was providing practical solutions for the extension of the French 
empire.  His first piece of advice to the First Consul was to call off the conquest of Saint-
Domingue.  Far better, he argued, to give up dreams of a military conquest of the “fortified rock” 
and draw the island into a profitable economic relationship with France.  The former slaves 
would be happy to ally with the society which had provided for their freedom, and would be 
drawn into the French economic orbit, thus allowing France to reap the benefits of conquest 
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without the cost.  “We shall gain their gratitude, their friendship, and every benefit which one 
nation can confer upon another,” the diplomat wrote to Bonaparte.  “The products of the island, 
the fruits of commerce, the luxury of millions, and the industry and subsistence of thousands of 
our countrymen, we shall gain.”  Echoing the theories of Thomas Paine, Brown’s diplomat 
argued that economic alliance with a lesser power was a legitimate form of national expansion.84 
 The diplomat’s second piece of advice to Bonaparte was the one that Brown hoped would 
do the most to arouse his American audience.  The diplomat suggested that the resources saved 
from the conquest of Saint-Domingue should be spent on obtaining and re-colonizing Louisiana.  
Of course, as the diplomat pointed out.  It would not even really be “re-colonizing.”  Louisiana 
was already established and doing reasonably well with a population that was only one 
generation removed from being French.  The Spanish could pose little resistance.  The weak he 
Spanish militia and compliant population would make for an easy and profitable conquest.  
Indeed, the diplomat suggested coyly, Louisiana would likely be a jumping off point for further 
expansion in North America.  The road to California and the mines of Mexico was “easy and 
direct,” he insisted.  “They are wholly defenseless. The frontier has neither forts, nor loyal 
subjects.  A detachment of a few thousands would find faithful guides, practicable roads, and no 
opposition between the banks of the Mississippi and the gates of Mexico.”  For the diplomat, this 
final argument was crucial: expansion through conquest was legitimate only if it was done in the 
national interest and increased rather decreased the wealth and power of the empire.85 
 At this point, Brown broke back into his story.  Lest anyone think that the diplomat’s 
musings on the legitimacy of expansion through conquest and coercion were simply “French” 
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militarism, Brown noted that, “It is evident that the author is a military enthusiast, but a passion 
for arms does not blind him to the peaceable means of distinction; and his schemes of enlarging 
power, by the multiplication of people, and by territories won from the waste[land], are not 
unworthy of praise.”  In other words, Brown was saying that the diplomat was not entirely wrong 
in his assessment of the legitimate means of national expansion.  Actually, there was not much 
difference between Brown himself and his invented diplomat.  The last pages of the pamphlet 
Brown’s rousing call to action in his own voice.86 
 “We have a right to the possession,” Brown told his readers bluntly.  “The interests of the 
human race demand from us the exertion of this right.”  Brown was convinced that the national 
government had for too long “looked on in apathy while European powers toss[ed] about 
amongst themselves the property which God and nature have made ours.”  “America is 
ours…therefore Louisiana is ours.”  Natural right to possession and national security went hand-
in-hand for Brown.  The United States in control of the territory meant peace whereas French 
control meant war and the evils that attended armed conflict.  To introduce a violent neighbor 
like the French—a people who “measured their success on the ruin of their neighbors”—onto the 
continent would invariably lead to an “insuperable mound” to American progress as well as sow 
the seeds of “faction and rebellion.”   It was as simple as that for Brown.  He felt this so obvious 
that he did not see the need to elaborate greatly on it.87 
 With the stakes so high, what should be the response of the United States?  Brown 
admitted that under normal circumstances the United States would expand gradually by “erecting 
new communities as fast as the increase of the increase of those settlements requires it, and 
sheltering them all under the pacific wing of a Federal government.”  These were not normal 
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times.  “Far be it from me to sanctify the claim of conquest,” he wrote, but that was exactly what 
he demanded.  Yes, he admitted, to dislodge Bonaparte from Louisiana would cost Americans 
“some anxiety, some treasure, some lives.”  In fact, he admitted that Americans would probably 
not even be welcomed as liberators.  Peace and national security demanded a rapid military 
occupation of Louisiana, even if that meant having to “treat its present inhabitants as vassals.”  
He argued that eventually the population of Louisiana would see American interests aligned with 
their own and then, presumably, they could be integrated fully into the United States.  This was 
perhaps the most explicit defense of a Bonaparte-like conquest, occupation, and colonization of a 
neighboring territory that any American was willing to proffer in 1803.88 
 Writing in the winter and spring of 1803, Brown and other militant pro-expansionists 
could not have known how radically the geopolitical situation had changed by April.  For 
months, Livingston had no luck in achieving Jefferson’s goals of obtaining New Orleans and 
Florida for the United States.  As Senator Morris had correctly assessed, the American 
government possessed very little that interested the First Consul and American military might 
was no match when compared to the French.  What no one had counted on, however, was the 
stunning reversal of fortune that beset the French expeditionary force in Saint-Domingue during 
the second half of 1802.  When the black and mulatto population found that Napoleon had given 
secret orders to reestablish the old power structures (including slavery) on the island, they rose 
up against the French occupiers in the summer of 1802.  In the guerrilla war that followed both 
sides seemed eager to outdo each other in terms of ghastly cruelty.  Even more deadly than the 
insurgency was the yellow fever epidemic that decimated the French army during the fall and 
winter months.  Despite the belated arrival of reinforcements in early 1803, it became 
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increasingly clear that the survivors would not be able to bring the island back under French 
control.89 
 As Bonaparte received the disastrous reports out of Saint-Domingue, he is supposed to 
have growled, “Damn sugar, damn coffee, damn colonies.”  Even if the quote is apocryphal, the 
attitude it conveyed was not. Saint-Domingue was a lost cause and with it died Bonaparte’s 
American dream.  Though he was clearly disappointed, he quickly sought to turn the situation to 
his favor.  After all, Napoleon was nothing if not a pragmatist.  Bonaparte knew that Americans 
were already dominating the economic life in New Orleans and violently hostile to the idea of a 
French neighbor.90  Bonaparte also had European concerns on his mind.  He knew that another 
war was imminent in Europe and that he needed quick cash more than he needed sugar.  
Furthermore, Bonaparte reasoned that when war erupted in Europe the British navy would make 
French control of North American colonies impossible, and that neutral American control of 
Louisiana would be far better than surrendering the province to his British enemies.  Offering 
Louisiana to the United States had the benefit of drawing the Americans into the French orbit—
or at least away from Great Britain in the coming war.  In early April, Bonaparte notified his 
foreign minister and his closest advisors that he planned to sell the entire territory of Louisiana to 
the United States.91 
 Between 1801 and 1803, the Mississippi Crisis introduced Napoleon into the American 
debate over the legitimate means and limits of national expansion.  His reshaping the borders of 
Europe through the Treaty of Lunéville encouraged a discussion of natural boundaries in the 
United States.  His threatened occupation of Louisiana drove these debates into high gear. 
                                                      
89 Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 280-292. 
90 Livingston had, in fact, presented the French government a copy of the debates surrounding the Ross resolutions 
in an attempt to convince the First Consul that war with America was the likely result of his possession of Louisiana. 
91 DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana, 154-156. 
 
 
 58 
Jeffersonian expansionists worried that a powerful French presence would prevent the peaceful 
expansion through natural increase.  Federalist expansionists, on the other hand, were most 
concerned that introducing the diplomatic intrigues of Europe into North America would cause 
the breakdown of the union.  Some expansionists sought a military solution to the crisis, but 
others warned that a preemptive strike on New Orleans made the United States no better than the 
increasingly despotic Bonaparte.  The debates also demonstrated a reluctance on the part of 
Americans to accept an unquestioned “Manifest Destiny” approach to expansion.  Early calls for 
a military response to the crisis were easily and effectively answered by anti-expansionists, 
forcing pro-expansionists to make the crisis into a national security issue.  Napoleon’s decision 
to sell Louisiana in the spring of 1803 did not bring an end to the debate. It only made Bonaparte 
a more entrenched symbol in American public discourse on continental expansion. 
  
 
 
 59 
CHAPTER 3 THE COSTS OF PEACEFUL EXPANSION:  THE LOUISIANA 
PURCHASE 
 
 On June 30, 1803, the Boston Independent Chronicle broke the news.  Within a week, 
reports had reached Charleston and by the end of July even those in the far reaches of Kentucky 
knew.  The First Consul of France had agreed to cede not only New Orleans, but the entire 
territory of Louisiana to the United States.  “This is a proud day for our nation,” gushed the 
editor of one Federalist-leaning newspaper, “Louisiana is ours!”  Yet, the treaty still had to be 
ratified by the Senate and money for the purchase allocated by the House of Representatives.  
Changing his tone dramatically, the editor urged caution on the part of the policy makers in 
Washington.  “Let them not be too hasty,” he warned.  “Let us see with what stipulations the 
cession of that country is clogged.”  In particular, the editor wanted to know exactly what price 
Bonaparte had extracted for his North American empire, and, just as important, how the cession 
agreement would affect American foreign policy with regards to Europe.  Certainly this was a 
fair question in mid-1803.  Printed next to this column was another that proclaimed the renewal 
of war between Great Britain and Napoleon’s France.92 
 The occupation of Louisiana was neither easy nor uncontroversial.  It raised a host of 
basic questions about American expansion and administration of empire that the fledging 
government of the United States was not immediately prepared to answer.  In attempting to find 
solutions to these problems, Americans continued to turn to the most ambitious imperialist they 
knew: Napoleon Bonaparte.  After Napoleon crowned himself emperor in December 1804, few 
Americans were willing to openly express support for him (though there were still a few).  Yet 
they could not escape how successful he appeared to be at empire building.  Between 1803 and 
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1806, Napoleon steadily strengthened his imperial grip on Europe through a complex system of 
direct rule, alliances and friendly proxy states.93 
Americans of all political stripes castigated Napoleon for his immoral imperial 
aggrandizement while simultaneously trying to replicate his successes and learn from his 
failures.  By the end of 1806, Americans had largely accepted Napoleonic aggrandizement as the 
moral and ideological stick by which to measure their own decisions about expansion.  Based on 
the example provided by Bonaparte, they agreed that military governments were unsavory and 
that military occupation was undesirable.  Even so, an increasing number of pro-expansion 
Americans were willing to accept such aggressive imperial measures by their own government 
despite the opposition characterizing such actions as Bonapartism.  At first, the pro-treaty faction 
responded to these attacks, but once the treaty passed, instead of continuing to counter attacks 
point by point, pro-expansionists appropriated the language of Bonaparte and pointed to the 
Louisiana Purchase as an example of how the allegedly peaceful, diplomatic expansion of the 
United States into Louisiana was unlike the military expansion of Napoleon.  In essence, 
Americans became increasingly comfortable with their own ideology of military expansion and 
administration when it was contrasted with that of Bonaparte. 
The historiography of the Louisiana Purchase can perhaps best be seen as a tug-of-war 
between eastward and westward looking historians.  One side argues that it ought to be seen 
from the perspective of the East—meaning a diplomatic and political struggle between the 
United States and Europe.  Those on the other side argue that it should be seen primarily from a 
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Western viewpoint—in other words a process by which the United States either altered or was 
altered by conditions in Louisiana.  Like most other events of the early republic, the first 
histories of the Louisiana Purchase were exclusively diplomatic and nationalistic in nature.  
Henry Adams, great grandson of one president and grandson of another, penned the first 
narrative history of the Purchase in his mammoth History of the United States during the 
Administrations of Jefferson and Madison.  In so doing, he set a standard that stood until the late 
twentieth century.  His analysis generated a basic political and diplomatic narrative that has yet 
to be significantly revised.  He also used the event as a measure of the Jefferson administration’s 
diplomatic acumen—a technique that many historians of Jefferson have used since.  Finally, he 
argued that the political debate over the Purchase treaty fundamentally altered the American 
understanding of the Constitution, by allowing for the creation of a much stronger central 
government.  This basic assertion has also been echoed by many scholars in various forms down 
to the present.94 
While Adams wrote of the Purchase from the perspective of the East, two of the early 
twentieth century’s great historians, Frederick Jackson Turner and Eugene Bolton, saw the 
Purchase as a phenomenon of the West.  Turner saw American expansion in terms of settlers 
filling an “empty” western frontier and touted this as the defining characteristic of American 
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democracy.  While Turner did not make the connection between Louisiana and the frontier 
explicit, his disciples did.  As late as the mid-1970s, John Keat and Marshall Sprague placed the 
Purchase into a blatantly Turnerian teleological model that heralded the opening of the west as 
the catalyst of American democracy.  Turner had his critics, though.  Most important of which 
was Eugene Bolton.  Bolton argued that American engagement with the Spanish borderlands was 
a more accurate description of western expansion rather than Turner’s empty frontier thesis.  
Historians at least partially influenced by Bolton have gained the upper hand in more recent 
years.  Diplomatic historians James Lewis and J.C.A Stagg, for example, both placed the 
Louisiana Purchase within the troublesome context of Spanish American relations between 1780 
and 1830.  Their work, as does mine, sees the purchase as part of a larger diplomatic narrative 
that included East and West Florida as well as Texas.  It is important to note, however, that while 
they disagreed on fundamental points, both the Turnerians and Boltonians saw Louisiana as an 
event best described in terms of the West.95 
While the diplomatic and high-political stories of the Purchase continue to attract their 
share of historians, the most innovative recent work has been done by historians like Peter Kastor 
and Julien Vernet and tends to focus on how the incorporation of Louisiana into the union altered 
the American nation.  These historians also argue for a more western approach to Louisiana.  
They suggest that our understanding of the Purchase cannot be limited to diplomatic negotiations 
between Madrid, Paris and Washington.  Louisiana was not simply an imperial football, they 
suggest, but an amorphous geographic and demographic zone of contact and conflict between 
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indigenous peoples, Anglo-Americans, French, Spanish, Africans and mulattos.  All of these 
groups struggled to take advantage of the new social and political reality as the American 
government attempted to establish their claim on the territory.  Thus, the peoples of Louisiana 
were far from passive receptors of imperial edicts coming out of national capitals.  They did 
what they could to exert control over their own affairs and in some ways changed their imperial 
rulers as much as those rulers attempted to change them.  In The Nation’s Crucible, for example, 
Peter Kastor argues that incorporating the diverse peoples of Louisiana into the United States 
transformed and redefined what it meant to be an American citizen.96 
This chapter builds on the ideas that Kastor developed in The Nation’s Crucible.  Where 
he focused on the idea of citizenship and nationhood in the republic, I focus on how the purchase 
and occupation of Louisiana changed the American ideology of military expansion.  Ironically, 
for someone claiming intellectual decent from Kastor, I do this by refocusing the lens of the 
Louisiana Purchase back eastward rather than westward.  Not because the stories of the 
American and French political elite need another retelling, but because the overwhelming 
majority of Americans of all political persuasions and socio-economic groups were absorbed by 
the cataclysmic duel of European empires across the Atlantic Ocean.  They worked what they 
saw (or rather read) into their ideology of expansion and empire.  Thus, I contend that to fully 
understand what the Louisiana Purchase, and ultimately expansion itself, meant to Americans—
especially those not directly on the Louisiana frontier, we have to understand the ideological 
framework they developed by looking east to Napoleon’s empire. 
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 It is critical to remember that the American military occupation of Louisiana took place 
within the context of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.  As the article quoted in the first paragraph 
showed, Americans followed both events with equally great interest.  Following the Peace of 
Amiens in 1802, the French position in Europe was formidable.  The extended French republic 
stretched from the Rhine River in the north, through the annexed territories of Luxemburg, 
Belgium and the Rhineland and across the Alps into Nice, Savoy and Piedmont.  Beyond this, 
Bonaparte dominated the foreign and domestic policies of a chain of “sister republics,” which 
included the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as the Italian, Ligurian (Genoese), and 
Cisapline Republics.  Bonaparte could also count on Spain as an ally (if a somewhat unwilling 
one) as well as friendly relations with some of the powerful states in the eastern Holy Roman 
Empire, most notably Bavaria.97 
 While Napoleon strengthened his hand in Europe, his arch-rival Great Britain worked to 
rally the anti-Bonapartist empires on the continent.  The War of the Third Coalition (1803-1806) 
broke out in May 1803 when Bonaparte aggressively backed Britain into an impossible 
diplomatic position.  Yet, while the Royal Navy ruled the seas, the British needed continental 
alliances to be successful against the French Grande Armée.  To paraphrase the memorable 
words of Charles Esdaile:  the British whale had gone to war with the French elephant.  For most 
of first the two years of the war, the two powers glowered at each other from opposite sides of 
the English Channel.  However, by mid-1805 the British—thanks largely to heavy-handed 
foreign policy of Bonaparte—had cobbled together an anti-French alliance that included Austria, 
Naples, Sweden, and, most surprisingly, Russia.  The international stage was thus set for the 
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opening round of a titanic clash of empires that would last with only short interruptions until 
1815.98 
 While the great powers dueled for supremacy in Europe, the United States witnessed the 
climax of their own bitter ideological struggle that had begun with the French Revolution in 
1793.  While Americans overwhelmingly shared an assumption that society should be based on a 
basic Lockean liberal view of individual natural rights, they disagreed vehemently on exactly 
what this meant and how society ought to implement this vision.  Federalists generally looked 
east toward Europe and sought to fashion the United States into a great commercial and 
economic empire that would be respected by the world.  They saw Great Britain as the best 
example of a liberal imperial system that the world had yet seen—one that championed the 
economic freedom of its citizens but had enough checks in the system to prevent it from 
becoming a tyrannical despotism.  When it came to expansion, Federalists envisioned a stable 
central government that could efficiently administer its imperial holdings.  For most Federalists, 
physical expansion was part of an ideology of economic expansion—land simply for the sake of 
it was useless, and could even be dangerous to the political unity of a republic.  There had to be a 
commercial purpose for the expansion.  This explains why many were adamantly in favor of 
possessing New Orleans, but either apathetic or hostile about possessing the entire Louisiana 
territory.99 
 The violent social disorder occasioned by the revolution in France was anathema to the 
Federalists.  A popularly elected government that executed its citizens on a whim and deprived 
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them of their property at will was merely despotism of the democratic mob—just as bad, if not 
worse than the despotism of a monarch.  Federalists were particularly troubled when the French 
Revolutionary government made it explicit policy to spread the revolution—a policy never 
disavowed by Napoleon.  They looked askance at Americans congregating in Jacobin clubs all 
over the new nation cheering every bloody success of Bonaparte.  In every boatload of 
immigrants that arrived in Philadelphia they imagined subversive French agents disembarking to 
infect the American people with plots overthrow the central government that could only end in 
disunion and the establishment of a revolutionary despotism.  In response to these fears, a 
Federalist controlled Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 which made it illegal 
to print items judged to be of a seditious nature against the Federal government and gave the 
President broad discretionary power to deport suspicious foreigners.  This proved a gross 
overreach of Federal authority, however, and cost the Federalists enough popular support to lose 
the presidential election of 1800.100 
 At the other end of the American political spectrum were the Jeffersonians.  Just as the 
Federalists, the Jeffersonians had no “party platform” as we would recognize it today.  They did 
have a set of ideological principles on expansion that set them in clear opposition to their 
political rivals.  They envisioned a sprawling agricultural empire of large and small commercial 
farmers who tilled the fertile American soil far from the money and corruption of large cities.  
The availability of cheap land and cheap labor in the form of slavery was absolutely critical to 
this vision for the American future.  Control of the Mississippi River was also vital to export 
valuable agricultural products like tobacco and cotton to Europe.  The preferred method of 
expansion would be through peaceful conquest.  In their imagination, American settlers simply 
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would move into the vacuum left by a decaying empire—Spain usually—and through 
demographic increase eventually come to dominate the region.  Many Jeffersonians were not 
even terribly concerned about the possibility of acquiring territory so quickly that it outpaced the 
ability of the Federal government to effectively administer it.  If the Trans-Appalachian region 
eventually found that its interests were not being represented by the federal government, they 
argued, let the population there form their own nation.  After all, the new country would share 
economic and kinship ties, an American form of government and a common language with the 
United States.  It seemed inconceivable that republics with so much in common could ever 
become enemies.101 
 The other governing principle of the Jeffersonians was the fear of centralized economic 
and political power—which they associated with the corrupting influence of cities.  In Great 
Britain, they saw everything they hated:  large metropolises containing a corrupt, moneyed elite 
and a strong centralized bureaucracy.  Better by far, they argued, was the popular—if chronically 
unstable—French revolutionary government.  Where Federalists mourned the loss of social 
stabilizers such as the Catholic Church and the Bourbon Monarchy, Jeffersonians cheered the 
abolition of what they saw as corrupt institutions that facilitated the concentration of wealth and 
political power.  Most tempered their enthusiasm somewhat when the revolution devolved into 
the Terror; even so, many Jeffersonians saw France as less of an ideological threat than Britain.  
After all, they argued, it seemed far more likely that the corruptions of the British system would 
infect the United States through pro-British trade policies made by the Federalists such as the Jay 
Treaty (1794) than through France—especially once she was removed from Louisiana.102 
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 As much as some might have wished it during the Napoleonic Wars, Americans found 
that they could not avoid Europe.  The Federalist vision for the future required Americans to 
become enmeshed in a highly profitable world of Atlantic trade whereas the Jeffersonian vision 
had Americans literally bumping up against the still expansive, if decaying, European colonies in 
the Americas—especially along the Gulf Coast and the lower Mississippi River.  Every foreign 
policy choice that the first four presidential administrations made was interpreted to benefit 
either one or the other of the major belligerents.  Ultimately, the question that faced the first 
generation of Americans was whether the revolutionary disorder of France or the aristocratic 
order Great Britain was more of an ideological threat to the infant United States.  On this answer 
would hang the future of American expansion during the first fifteen years of the nineteenth-
century.103 
 It is vital to recall that in 1803, Americans had no guide to establishing a successful 
republican empire.  When they opened their history books, they found that republics (especially 
large ones) invariably became corrupt and degenerated into despotism. Madison’s famous 
Federalist No. 10 tried to assure readers that an expansive republic was critical to maintaining 
political balance in society.  In 1803, however, this was simply theory, and there seemed to be 
plenty of evidence to the contrary.  After 1792, Americans had exactly one contemporary 
republic to which they could compare themselves: France.  There, with the rise of Bonaparte, 
many saw confirmation of their worst fears about the sustainability of large republics.  Before it 
seemed possible (at least to the Jeffersonians) that France and the United States could stand as 
twin bastions of liberalism, but by 1804, France seemed far more likely to infect those with 
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whom she interacted with the contagion of despotism.  When the opposition—both Federalists 
and splinter factions of Jeffersonians—denounced the actions of their ideological enemies as 
supporting Napoleon’s France, they were not simply using hyperbole to score political points.  
They were arguing over, as one historian has put it eloquently, “the soul of the republic.”104 
 By 1803, the Federalists were a divided and decidedly minority party.  However, from 
their urban strongholds in New England they provided an extremely vocal opposition to what 
they saw as (borrowing a phrase usually associated with Napoleon in 1803) the Jeffersonian 
“usurpation” of the national government.  Per the terms of the Louisiana treaty, both 
governments had to ratify the document within six months of receiving it.  Though Congress was 
out of session and not set to reconvene until November, Jefferson called for a special session 
scheduled for October 17, 1803 to debate the treaty and allocate the money required to actually 
purchase the territory.  Though the odds were long against them, the anti-treaty Federalists 
determined to not simply roll over.  Through the summer and into the fall of 1803, they turned 
their rhetorical guns on the Louisiana treaty through the newspapers.  They used a wide variety 
of arguments to protest adoption of the treaty, but as diverse as these arguments were, they all 
ultimately revolved around ideological objections to how the United States dealt with Napoleon 
Bonaparte.105 
 Probably the most common critique of the treaty was its cost.  Anti-treaty Federalists 
immediately expressed concern over the amount of money required to purchase Louisiana.  The 
price agreed upon was $15 million.  This was astronomical sum for the fledgling United States, 
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which, though in the midst of an economic boom thanks to the French Revolutionary Wars, had 
only just emerged from under the debt previously owed to France for their assistance during the 
American War for Independence.  The hefty price-tag itself was not the anti-treaty faction’s main 
complaint, though.  Those who focused on the monetary aspects of the deal generally appeared 
far more concerned with the ideological implications of the spending the money than on the sum 
itself. 
 The best example of this position ran in a series of five widely reprinted articles 
originally published in Boston’s Columbian Centinel by an author writing under the pseudonym, 
Fabricius.  In his essays, Fabricius expressed disbelief that the United States would pay an 
exorbitant sum for what he saw as a vindication of American rights.  He professed to have no 
problem paying to protect the economic interests of westerners.  “Let us cheerfully spend our 
blood and money for them,” he wrote.  “It is right that we should do it when necessary, without 
inquiring or regarding HOW MUCH.”  It did not follow that the Louisiana Purchase “was a fit 
end or a right mean to be chosen” when protecting American national security.  After all, he 
continued, Americans had been wronged by the Spanish violations of the Pinckney Treaty.  “It is 
a glorious thing,” he wrote sarcastically, “for a nation to suffer injuries and then buy redress—to 
be kicked and then pay damages.”  How the United States responded to such a threat would have 
long standing diplomatic ramifications.106 
 New Orleans could have, and should have been obtained by military force, Fabricius 
insisted.  Like the new kid on the school playground, the United States had to stand up to the 
bully (France) that would take its lunch money.  The Kentucky militia—80,000 of them—had 
been ready to move, Fabricius sighed wistfully.  They could have made short work of the New 
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Orleans garrison and vindicated American rights to the world.  Fabricius could only think of one 
reason why New Orleans had not been seized immediately, and that was the Jefferson 
administration’s servile fear of the despot Bonaparte.  He was thoroughly disgusted by the idea 
of a free republic engaged in diplomatic negotiation with the likes of Napoleon and drew a vivid 
picture of Ambassador James Monroe “crawling like a reptile at the First Consul’s feet.”  Any 
American who was not ashamed by this image, he suggested, ought to “send to Algiers or 
Botany Bay, and ask the honor of an act of citizenship.”  Paying a great deal of money for a 
territory that the United States could have had for nothing, argued Fabricius was nothing more 
than “tribute” and brought the United States into “common cause” with the French empire just as 
they were going to war with Great Britain.  Likening of the United States to a tributary state of 
Napoleonic France proved a rhetorical device that gained increasing power as the decade 
continued.107 
 Others against the treaty were a bit easier on the Jeffersonian administration.  Instead of 
seeing Jefferson kowtowing in servile fear of Bonaparte, they saw a naïve philosopher president 
hopelessly outwitted by the hardnosed political and military scheming of the First Consul.  
Ideological opponents had long cast Jefferson as an idealist whose policies sounded good, but 
could not work in the real world.  Until he was president, however, these attributes had been 
more amusing than dangerous.  In a series of essays that ran in a wide variety of papers from 
June to October 1803, an author writing under the appropriate pseudonym “Calculator,” laid out 
the case against the purchase in economic terms that painted the administration as being 
hopelessly outclassed by Napoleon at the negotiating table. 
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 Calculator’s first objection to the Purchase was the type of land that Napoleon had sold 
the United States, sight unseen.  Quoting heavily from a document that American ambassador 
Robert Livingston had presented to Bonaparte on the folly of maintaining a colony in Louisiana, 
Calculator described Louisiana as a vast “western wilderness.”  It contained no “mines of gold or 
silver” and would take years and untold amounts of money to make profitable.  Why, Calculator 
asked, should the United States pay an exorbitant sum for a piece of property that our own 
ambassadors had just told Bonaparte was worthless?  This was a common critique of the treaty.  
Fabricius, who had an acerbic comment for nearly every aspect of Louisiana, memorably called 
the territory an “untrodden waste for owls to hoot and wolves to howl in.”  It was, he continued, 
the “realm of alligators and catamounts.”  Another anti-treaty writer guffawed at wondrous tales 
of a mountain of salt somewhere in the interior of Louisiana.  He sarcastically wondered if 
Bonaparte would have consented to part with the territory if only he had known how rich it was 
in salt and rocks.108 
 For Calculator, the timing of the Purchase also demonstrated the naiveté of Jefferson and 
his followers when confronted by Napoleon.  They were so blinded by an irrational ideological 
need for expansion, he argued, that they forgot basic laws of economics and diplomacy.  
According to Calculator, “it cannot escape notice that the purchase of Louisiana was negotiated 
at a juncture the most favorable which could possibly happen for obtaining that wilderness on 
cheap terms.”  Everyone knew that Bonaparte was planning to renew his war with England, 
Calculator pointed out, and without an effective navy he could not have long maintained his hold 
on Louisiana.  “The territory he put on sale,” wrote Calculator, “he was effectually barred from 
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possessing; and was also in the utmost danger of losing.”  Thus, Calculator concluded, “This 
circumstance tends to increase the public astonishment at the enormous price which has been 
pledged.”  In other words, Bonaparte had sold on a buyer’s market and the ambassadors should 
have taken advantage of that fact in their negotiations.  Instead, they had allowed Bonaparte to 
hoodwink the administration by playing to their naïve Jeffersonian ideology of expansion at any 
cost.109 
 The discussion of natural borders which had played such an important role during the 
Mississippi crisis the year before did not disappear entirely from the American conversation 
during this period, but it did take a back seat to other arguments.  For example, Calculator saved 
his commentary on natural borders for his last article.  Even then it only occupied a small part of 
his larger argument.  Louisiana, he suggested, was a foreign territory because it lay beyond the, 
“the vast body of water which till very lately has been considered as the ultimate limits of the 
United States.”  Why then, he asked, should Americans transgress this clear “ordination of 
nature.”  Indeed, for Calculator, the Mississippi River appeared to be the very voice of the 
Divine, “which has seemingly said, ‘Hitherto ye shall come, and no further.’”  This supernatural 
argument probably still had some power in Congregationalist New England, but by 1804 most 
Americans had moved to a position that sought a more worldly understanding of borders.110 
 The more secular concern was that breaking the boundary of the Mississippi would 
shatter the wall which held Americans to their natural boundaries.  Only nations keeping to their 
natural limits could restore order in the chaotic world created by Bonaparte.  In many ways, this 
was a fall back to the American formulation of natural borders discussed in the first chapter 
which argued that national expansion to natural frontiers (and no farther) was good because it 
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preserved peace.  In the fall of 1804, numerous Federalist papers reprinted an article originally 
from London.  The author suggested that before the Purchase, the Mississippi had provided an 
“unequivocal boundary” to both Spain and the United States, but with that natural border 
transgressed, only an “imaginary” boundary remained.  Lured by the riches of Mexico and Peru 
with no natural border to arrest their movement, what would stop aggressive American 
expansion into those places?  The article suspected that the selling of Louisiana would ultimately 
lead to the “total loss of Spain of its South American dominion.”  Even worse, the article 
continued, the nations of Europe could not sit idly by and watch this happen.  Unchecked 
expansion by the United States, the article concluded, would thus also probably lead United 
States into war eventually with Great Britain, France, or both.111 
 The pro-treaty faction, on the other hand, celebrated America’s freedom from the natural 
borders which had constrained her in the past.  In an “Address to All Monarchists,” an author 
writing under the pseudonym “The Old Soldier” roundly condemned the Federalists for their 
opposition to the Purchase Treaty.  In his closing he brought up the idea of boundaries by 
extolling the virtues of the new, sprawling American empire:    
when I consider the almost boundless extent of the United States, including the all important 
acquisition of Louisiana, a territory stretching from sea to sea, or from the great river, Mississippi, to 
the ends of the earth, and from near the tropic of cancer...to the polar circle; when I consider the 
sublime grandeur, magnificence and potency of a monarch commanding such an unbridled kingdom, 
and sole sovereign of such an immense territory, in comparison of who the emperor of China and the 
Great Lama of Tibet dwindle into subalterns, Bonaparte and the Kings of Europe are very little 
things… 
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The contrast between these two positions is instructive.  For many Federalists, crossing the 
natural boundary of the Mississippi would lead to the United States becoming enmeshed in an 
endless series of border disputes with European powers—an odd line of argument for a party 
who claimed that they wanted to see the United States within a European context.  For the Old 
Soldier, however, the extent of America’s boundless empire proved its greatness in comparison 
to the rest of the world.  In the end, arguments about borders became less important once the 
treaty was actually received by the Congress.  Shifting the argument away from natural 
boundaries seems to indicate that Americans largely agreed that their nation should expand.  The 
question became how this expansion ought to take place.112 
 Even if most Americans had made peace with the idea of expansion, the pro-treaty 
faction had difficulty responding to the other criticisms leveled by their opponents.  The fact that 
they felt the need to respond at all is illustrative of how effective the rhetorical assaults from the 
Federalists actually were.  In this case, what the pro-treaty faction did not say about the 
document is just as instructive as what they did say.  When they responded, most conspicuously 
avoided using the words “Bonaparte” or “Napoleon” and opted for less polarizing words like 
“France.”  Clearly they understood the uncomfortable optics of dealing in real estate with the 
likes of Bonaparte and realized how powerful of a symbol he had become to the American 
populace.  Even so, some did attempt to weave the rhetoric, if not the name, of Bonaparte into 
their defense because he was such an effective symbol. 
 When treaty advocates did use the rhetoric, if not the name, of Bonaparte to support the 
purchase, it usually took the form of a commentary on what they saw as hypocritical war-
mongering on the part of the Federalists.  For example, “Curtius” pointed out the hypocrisy of 
                                                      
112 “An Address to all the Monarchists,” The Political Observatory (Walpole, NH), August 8, 1804. 
 
 
 76 
Federalists who had demanded war to seize New Orleans over the winter of 1802-03 but now 
criticized a treaty in which territory was gained through peaceful negotiation.  Federalists, he 
wrote, had been prepared for the “sacrifice of our national character upon the shrine of 
ambition,” during the Mississippi crisis.  He sincerely hoped that the Federalists would not fool 
themselves into thinking that their “warlike and bloody resolutions” had frightened Bonaparte 
into selling Louisiana.  The fact that Curtius felt the need to highlight those words indicates that 
he chose them—and the word “ambition”—for their rhetorical power.  In this case, he knew full 
well that Americans would associate those words with everything they found distasteful about 
Napoleon.113 
The force of Curtius’s argument came from his appeal to a deep seeded American 
paranoia about the ambitious accumulation of power.  There was nothing particularly new in an 
appeal of this sort—Americans had been using “ambition” in their rhetoric since before the War 
for Independence.  What was innovative was that by 1803, when Americans like Curtius used 
words like “warlike” and “ambition” were no longer simply describing the abstractions of Locke 
or Plutarch’s long dead Julius Caesar.114 
Starting after his coup in 1800, an overwhelming majority of Americans began to 
associate these words with Napoleon.  In December 1802, for example, a typical article in the 
New York Morning Chronicle warned that “Universal domination appears to be the object of 
[Bonaparte’s] all grasping ambition.”  The author continued by explaining that the First Consul 
had at his command one of the, “most warlike nations of the earth.”  Bonaparte thus became the 
                                                      
113 “A Vindication of the Purchase of Louisiana,” The Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), September 14, 
1803; a lovely list common of epithets for Napoleon can be found in, The Patriot (Utica, NY), November 7, 1803.  
An incomplete list includes, “military despot,” “ambitious tyrant,” and “Corsican usurper.” 
114 For American rhetoric about “ambition” and its links to the American Revolution see Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1992) 344-347, 368-
69. 
 
 
 
 77 
living, breathing embodiment of bellicose ambition.  In April 1803, the New York Morning 
Herald reported, “we perceive no bounds to the ambition of Bonaparte.”  Using a simple 
keyword search in the Readex America’s Historical Newspapers database, a startling trend 
emerges.  Between 1800 and the end of 1803, the word “ambition” appeared in the major 
newspapers of the United States 9,154 times.  Of these times, the word was linked to Napoleon 
in almost twenty-five percent of the articles.  As Bonaparte consolidated his power, his name 
became synonymous with “ambition.”  This was even more so once he established himself as 
hereditary “Emperor of the Gauls” in December 1804.  By using words like “ambition,” Curtius 
could link Federalist policy to Napoleon without even using his name.115 
 In September and October, the Spanish minister in Washington attempted to protest the 
treaty on the grounds that French troops still occupied the Italian province promised to Spain as 
part of the original retrocession.  In other words, Napoleon had sold the territory under false 
pretenses.  The Jefferson administration ignored the petition, but this almost became a serious 
hiccup in the process of taking possession.  Federalists in the House of Representatives briefly 
attempted to hold up further votes until copies of the Treaty of San Ildefonso could be obtained 
to verify that Napoleon did, indeed, have a legitimate title to Louisiana.  Apparently even 
administration supporters in Congress had qualms, for the resolution requiring the copies of the 
treaty was voted down by only two votes even though Jeffersonians enjoyed a 3-1 majority in the 
House.  Based on the newspaper accounts, the public did not get wind of these events until 
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November when Federalist congressmen started write home to their constituents, but when they 
did, it resulted in another rhetorical salvo from the anti-treaty faction.116 
 Some interpreted the episode as further evidence of the Jefferson administration’s naiveté 
in dealing with Bonaparte.  For example, an anti-treaty writer identifying himself only as “N” 
wrote a satirical piece in a New Hampshire paper that criticized the Jefferson administration’s 
lack of forethought when it came to imperial matters.  The national debt might well be a “mortal 
canker” on the young country “N” opined, but, a great deal was a great deal when it came to 
western real estate.   It was a shame that the United States had such “shortsighted rulers,” he 
wrote sardonically.  For “a few trifling millions more, Bonaparte would have added…the 
exhaustless mines of Peru and Potosi, and with them a tract of the country, in value above all 
price.”  Now was the time to buy, “N” pointed out, since once all of Europe was at the foot of 
Bonaparte, he might not be willing to make such excellent bargains.  The point of the piece, of 
course, was that Bonaparte would be happy to sell anything (no matter who actually owned the 
legal title) to the starry-eyed Jeffersonians.117 
 For “N” the American response to the Spanish objection showed more about Jefferson’s 
naïve willingness to blindly follow his expansionist ideology, but for other writers it showed just 
how corrupt the United States had become in dealing with Bonaparte.  One furious letter posted 
in a New England paper called Napoleon the “arch-swindler” who had stolen Louisiana from his 
Spanish allies.  “I view,” he went on, “the U. States as no better than confederates with a gang of 
thieves—and as receivers of stolen goods.”  Another widely circulated letter made a similar 
point.  “The Spanish minister's remonstrance,” the anonymous author wrote, “is treated with as 
                                                      
116 Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st Session, 1803, vol. 13, 385-418; William Plumer, William Plumer’s 
Memorandum of the Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803-1807, ed. Everett Brown (New York: 
Macmillan, 1923), 3-5;  DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana, 189-90. 
117 DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana, 199; “Louisiana Title,” The Courier of New Hampshire, November 23, 1803. 
 
 
 79 
much contempt as Bonaparte would treat a remonstrance from the Landamman of Switzerland.”  
The anti-treaty faction had struck a chord—though not quite hard enough to derail American 
expansion.  By directly linking American expansionist policy to the morally ambiguous imperial 
policies Bonaparte, suddenly the Louisiana Purchase did not look like such a triumphant affair.  
The event shows just how flexible the rhetoric of Napoleon had already become by 1804—even 
amongst similarly minded factions.118 
 Pro-treaty partisans felt like they needed to respond to this accusation.  They bypassed 
the moral ambiguousness of the deal, and focused directly on the legal aspects.  The editor of the 
Charleston Courier put it in simple terms for his readers, “What then has the government of the 
United States, a bona fide purchaser, to do with conditions on which the province was sold to 
France?”  He continued by making an analogy that his readers would be familiar with.  “If I buy 
a horse from Titus, which Caius had sold and delivered to him, taking his bond or note as a 
security for the payment of the stipulated price, what should we say, if Caius, finding his security 
to be worthless, should come to me and beg of me not to buy the horse?”  The legal answer was 
simple, if perhaps hard on poor Caius.  “We should be apt to tell him that he had now nothing to 
do with the horse and that if he was displeased with his bargain, he had only to upbraid his own 
folly in giving credit to whom he ought to have known better than to trust.”  Translated to 
Louisiana, the author was saying that it was Spain’s own fault for doing business with an 
unsavory character like Bonaparte.  Understandably, the author neglected to explain the wisdom 
or the ethics of the United States doing business with the same questionable character.119 
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 There were also rumblings from anti-treaty types about the legal ramifications of making 
real estate deals with Bonaparte’s government.  Most of these revolved around the question of 
the Consulship’s legitimacy.  Since Bonaparte had come to power in a coup some anti-treaty 
authors asked, was his government really the legitimate government of France?  If it was not, did 
the treaty hold any legal standing?  The easiest answer to these questions was provided by 
Senator James Jackson.  Jackson was a long serving English-born senator and one-time governor 
of Georgia.  In a speech that was reprinted in Jeffersonian papers from his home in Georgia to 
Vermont Jackson explained the consulate was, indeed, the legal government of France.  Jackson 
argued that no matter what misgivings he had personally of the French government, “Bonaparte 
by the consent of the nation is placed at its head.”  Jackson here referred to the mostly legitimate 
plebiscite that had named Bonaparte “First Consul for life” in August of 1802.  “No nation,” 
Jackson continued, “had the right to interfere with rule or police of another.”  The acts of 
Bonaparte, then, were the genuine acts of the nation of France.  Jackson, like other pro-treaty 
advocates, thus simply ignored the question of whether Americans should deal with Bonaparte 
by simply saying that they could deal with him.120 
 Other Americans, however, disagreed with Jackson’s assessment of Bonaparte’s 
legitimacy.  This, then, led to the uncomfortable question of whether the government of the 
United States could, or should, make legitimate treaties with his government.  As before, 
expansionists tended to quietly side-step the second half of the question and focus simply on the 
legal reality of the situation.  One congressional speech that made its way into the Aurora—
probably the mostly widely read American newspaper of the time—was that of Representative 
James Elliot.  Elliot was a first term congressman from the politically divided state of Vermont 
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and he attempted to thread the needle of legality when it came to Bonaparte.  “I believe,” he 
began, “there is not within these walls an admirer of the present government of France.”  But, he 
continued, “we all know the distinction between a king or government de jure and de facto.  If 
Bonaparte be not the rightful ruler of the French republic, he is the present possessor of the 
powers of government, and can bind the nation by treaties.”  This meant, he argued, that even if 
Bonaparte died before the ratified treaty made it back to France, it would still be binding upon 
the French people.  Americans would continue to use the difference between de facto and de jure 
governments to their advantage as they expanded later in the century.121 
 Despite the heated rhetorical battle in the press, the final outcome was hardly in doubt.  
Congress reflected the growing Jeffersonian influence in the nation and the Louisiana vote 
showed it.  With remarkably little debate on the floor, the Senate voted to accept the treaty a 
mere two days after receiving it by a margin of twenty-four to seven.  One New Hampshire 
Federalist griped, “the Senate have taken less time to deliberate on this great treaty than they 
allowed themselves on the most trivial Indian contract.”  Only one Federalist—Jonathon Dayton 
of New Jersey—crossed the aisle.122 
 Despite the lopsided result, the heated debate reveals some important insights into the 
ideological thought behind American expansion and anti-expansion during the first decade of the 
nineteenth century.  Arguments over expansion was a genuine ideological battle even when it did 
not directly involve military force.  Over the years, historians have suggested a wide variety of 
explanations for Federalist opposition to the treaty.  The traditional explanation is that the 
opposition was motivated by political sour grapes.  For example, according to Thomas Farnham, 
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Federalists represented a minority northern sectional faction by 1803 and their opposition was an 
attempt to block southern expansion because it would presumably expand the Jeffersonian voting 
bloc.  Linda Kerber argued that Federalists saw the acquisition of Louisiana as a national security 
issue as the new territory would undoubtedly contain a large percentage of slaves.  Many other 
historians have simply dismissed the opposition all together as insignificant when compared to 
the larger sweep of American expansion.123 
Those who opposed the treaty and their arguments ought to be taken seriously.  While 
they lost the debate, their arguments established a rhetoric of anti-imperialism that, in the words 
of Alexander DeConde, “would be echoed later in the century by a new breed of anti-
imperialists.”  The underlying focus of the opposition’s most lasting arguments were not based 
on political partisanship or on national security.  More often than not, the opposition presented 
genuine and principled ideological concerns about a free republic dealing with the likes of 
Napoleon.  The fact that the pro-treaty faction felt that they had to respond at all demonstrates 
that linking Bonaparte to American expansion retained much of its rhetorical and ideological 
power.124 
 Accepting the Louisiana Treaty, however, was only the first step on the American road to 
empire.  On October 26, the Senate passed the legislation which allowed for the formal 
occupation and administration of Louisiana.  Two days later the House of Representatives 
followed suit and forwarded a bill to the Senate allocating the funds needed to purchase the 
territory.  With that, the question of whether or not the United States would be an empire was 
settled for good, but this only opened up new questions about the administration of that empire.  
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The language of the bill allowing for the formal occupation of Louisiana resulted in a vigorous 
debate amongst Americans about what their new empire should look like.  How Louisiana was 
administered would be key to the future of American expansion.  As one Senator put it 
succinctly, “the U.S. in time will have many colonies—therefore precedents are important.”  In 
the debate that followed, the opposition used Napoleon’s empire to engage the Jeffersonian plans 
for occupation.125 
 Both Federalists and Jeffersonians had some doubts about how the Purchase Treaty 
would shape the occupation of Louisiana.  The clause in question was in the third article of the 
treaty—allegedly written by Bonaparte himself—which proclaimed that, “The inhabitants of the 
ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as 
possible…to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of the 
United States.”  Some Americans smelled a rat.  The always cantankerous Senator William 
Plumer wondered, “What could induce Bonaparte to insist on this people’s [sic] being 
incorporated into the Union?  He has never discovered a strong attachment to the rights of any 
nation, or to that of any individual.”  Historians of the Purchase are only recently starting to 
realize how fundamental qualms over the people of Louisiana were to native born Americans.  It 
was not until 2004, that Peter Kastor observed laconically that, “it was the demographic 
expansion, rather than the geographic expansion [of the United States] that was the subject of so 
much concern.”  Even these demographic worries, however, had their roots in perceptions of 
Bonaparte.126 
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 Read literally, the treaty appeared to require that all inhabitants of Louisiana become 
citizens of the United States.  This caused many Americans, both Jeffersonian and Federalists, 
grave concern.  Part of the problem was that less than half of the inhabitants were of European 
decent.  The rest were, as one newspaper put it, an amalgamation of, “red-white, black, [and] 
black and white.”  Would they also become citizens?  The terms of the treaty seemed to suggest 
that they would.  Though simple racism was a partial factor here, the critique was more 
sophisticated (and conspiratorial) than that.  “Can it be conceived then,” asked one writer, “that 
these people, bred in [French] despotism, will suddenly be fitted for self government and 
republicanism?”  This author was just as worried about the ability of “white” Louisianans to 
become American citizens as he was concerned about the other members of Louisiana society.127 
 Many wondered if Napoleon had once again fooled the naïve Jefferson administration.  
One writer complained that, allowing “people of different nations, distinguished by dissimilar 
manners, various habits, strong prejudices, and fixed sentiments of attachments to several 
countries,” to enjoy the benefits of citizenship, “must soon produce a dissolution of the union.”  
This, as some writers pointed out, would only help Bonaparte in the long run by providing a 
ready ally for him in the western hemisphere.  Others wondered if Napoleon had deliberately 
inserted the third article knowing that the United States could not fulfill this part of the document 
and thus giving France a reason to “justly abrogate the whole treaty,” and reclaim Louisiana 
without paying back the $15 million.  Nothing seemed impossible to the wily Napoleon in 
1804.128 
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 Other writers were not quite so conspiratorial.  After all, as one historian has pointed out, 
“nationhood as a concept was in its infancy,” in 1803.  Over thirty years ago, James Kettner 
showed that Americans came from an English tradition of citizenship which did not allow for a 
subject to truly change their allegiance.  In other words, once one was a citizen of the “Great 
Republic” of France, one was always French.  Louisiana, then, which changed hands on a regular 
basis, presented a particularly troubling case for Americans.  The inhabitants had been French 
subjects; therefore they would always be—at their core—French.  This line of reasoning was a 
stretch in a post-revolutionary world where so many British colonists had voluntarily thrown off 
their own allegiance to the British monarch, but, as Peter Kastor has recently demonstrated, the 
argument still had real power when it came to the bewildering variety of seemingly strange 
peoples in Louisiana.  After all, some of the older ones had been French, British, and Spanish 
subjects at various times in their lives—and this was only counting those who would have 
identified themselves as of European decent.  Few spoke English as a first language—and many 
balked when their first governor, William Claiborne spoke no French.  Members of the 
opposition had legitimate reason to question where the allegiance of Louisianans truly lay.129 
 Even Bonaparte himself—or at least his minions—made this charge more believable.  In 
the widely published farewell to the people of Louisiana, the French commissioner in New 
Orleans, Pierre Laussat, proudly announced that the First Consul congratulated the people of the 
territory on their “peaceful emancipation.”  Bonaparte, he said, would always think on the 
inhabitants of Louisiana as his brothers.  “Your children will become our children,” he 
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explained, “and our children will become yours.”  Bonaparte, Laussat continued, wished to 
“perpetuate the ties which unite the French of Louisiana with the Frenchmen of Europe,” and he 
hoped that that sight of the French flag would, “never cease to gladden [their] hearts.”  More 
than that, however, Laussat repeatedly reminded the inhabitants of Louisiana of Bonaparte’s 
insistence that they be incorporated into the union as soon as possible in order that their liberty, 
property and religion be protected.130 
 Words like these greatly worried an author in The Repertory.  “In the face of the World,” 
he wrote, Bonaparte had officially encouraged the Louisianans to remember their “common 
origin” as Frenchmen. According to the First Consul, the author continued, “The people of 
Louisiana…will always be attached to the interests of France.”  Thus, “A band of Frenchmen is 
to be incorporated into our Union, and to remain, after incorporation, still Frenchmen, still 
attached to the interest of France.”  Yet, the author marveled, “this threatened danger stirs no 
fear, the insult stirs no anger.”  Another disgusted author wrote that Napoleon was obviously 
counting on the “cameleon [sic] inhabitants of Louisiana” to gain a “preponderance” of influence 
at “the national councils.”  The fear was that Bonaparte knew that they would always maintain 
their “eternal love and gratitude” for France.  Thus, as new states were carved out of Louisiana 
and gained congressional representation, eventually the emperor would have a nation of allies 
ready to do his bidding.  Interestingly enough, Julien Vernet’s recent work on the transfer of 
Louisiana to the United States shows that, prior to the official handover, Laussat did indeed 
deliberately set up a pro-French municipal council in New Orleans in an attempt to maintain 
French influence in the region.  Sometimes, rhetoric is reality.131 
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 What then was to be done with the “cameleon” inhabitants of Louisiana?  More than a 
few Americans proposed solutions that sounded more like what Napoleon would impose on one 
of his “sister republics” than an “empire of liberty.”  “I have always thought,” mused Federalist 
Gouverneur Morris (who had been of the loudest advocates for a preemptive military strike on 
New Orleans) “that when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern 
them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils.”  Senator George Campbell of 
Tennessee explained to his congressional colleagues that he considered the Louisianans as 
standing in, “nearly the relation to us as if they were a conquered country.”  In the legal terms of 
the nineteenth-century, this meant that the United States would have had virtually unlimited 
power over their fate.  Then, of course, there was the novelist and militant expansionist, Charles 
Brockden Brown, who fully expected that the United States would have to treat Louisiana’s 
“present inhabitants as vassals.”  Presumably this would be the case until settlers from the United 
States moved into the area and supplanted the degenerate French and mixed-race population.  Of 
course, these men carefully did not use any kind of reference to that ambitious despot, Napoleon.  
Clearly, there was clearly some cognitive dissonance at work here which the opposition was 
quick to point out.132 
 Ultimately, the overwhelmingly pro-administration Congress agreed—at least to a certain 
extent—with those who agitated for a less than republican solution for Louisiana.  Both the act 
authorizing the occupation of Louisiana and the act creating the territorial government gave the 
executive branch sweeping authority to administer the new region and severely limited any 
popular participation in government.  According to the occupation document, the President was 
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authorized to “employ any part of the army and navy of the United States,” as well as the militia 
to enforce the transfer.  Presidential supporters saw this threat of force as particularly important 
given that Spain had threatened to contest the occupation and they still occupied the territory 
even though it had been (in theory at least) ceded to France.  Then, of course, there was no 
guarantee that “cameleon” inhabitants of Louisiana had any interest in becoming part of the 
United States.  The act also gave the President the unilateral authority to exercise all “military, 
civil and judicial powers,” in Louisiana until such time as Congress could make other 
arrangements.133 
 Five months later the Congress passed the statute creating the territorial government of 
Louisiana.  They created a governor, who would be appointed by the President and serve at his 
pleasure.  The governor would be assisted by a council of the thirteen “most fit and discreet 
persons of the territory.”  These too would be appointed by the President, as would the judges 
who would see to the judicial needs of the territory, and the officers of the territorial militia.  In 
fact, every virtually civil, military, and judicial officer of the new territory would be appointed 
by the President of the United States.  Significantly, there would be no legislature.  Why the 
Congress set up a government with so much power invested in the president is a matter of 
conjecture.  It does however, seem quite surprising given the Americans’ familiarity with British 
colonial rule.  Not everyone was happy with the outcome, of course.  One Federalist Senator 
glowered, “this is a Colonial system of government.”  He was not being complementary.134 
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 The opposition launched a counterattack that tied the American occupation of Louisiana 
directly to Bonaparte.  In March of 1804, the editor of Boston’s Repertory vented at what he saw 
as the potential for tyranny contained in act creating the territorial government.  “IT IS A 
DESPOTISM” he wrote using all capitals and italics to emphasize his point.  “Never, before, 
have we seen a system of government, constructed by any association of men, among whom 
there was not of the people to be governed!”  The editor then tied the imperial occupation 
directly to the best imperialist he knew.  “Without the least levity of allusion, we may truly say, 
this is a transaction worth the school of Bonaparte.”  For emphasis he explained exactly what he 
meant by this.   
A country is partly bought, and partly conquered; for thousands of troops were in 
readiness to overpower any symptom of resistance which might appear, and which the 
order for the organization of those troops proves was expected.  The American flag was 
hoisted under the protection of American arms.  The purchasers of the country without 
the slightest reference to the opinions of its inhabitants, form a constitution for them, to 
which they must submit. 
 
To the nineteenth-century reader, this all sounded suspiciously like how Bonaparte had treated 
his conquests during the Italian campaigns.135 
 In 1796, for example, The Minerva had brought up several issues that Americans found 
themselves facing less than a decade later in the occupation of Louisiana.  Confronted by 
Bonaparte’s successful campaigns in Italy, The Minerva lamented that this conquest was done in 
the name of republicanism.  Calling attention to an order of Bonaparte’s which threatened to 
burn the homes of any Italians who did not submit to his “republican” rule, the editor groaned, 
“this is the gentle language of republicanism.”  In another article the editor bewailed Bonaparte’s 
monetary exploitation of the Italian republics.  He could understand the abuse of the native 
population as an unfortunate side effect of war, but, “to give these operations an air of honor and 
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generosity,” Bonaparte had played the hypocrite and pretended “to conquer the people into 
freedom.”  This maligning of republicanism was the worst tragedy of the conflict, according to 
the Minerva.  Eight years later, Americans faced the some of these same issues as they debated 
how to treat the potentially hostile population of Louisiana.136 
 Returning to The Repertory, the editor had saved his most biting remarks for Thomas 
Jefferson himself.  The act creating the new government in Louisiana gave the President virtually 
unlimited power, the editor fumed.  “Have we got an angel in the shape of Thomas Jefferson,” he 
asked sarcastically, “that a territory of this boasted extent, bordering on a country not the most 
friendly to us, and peopled by inhabitants who will be very difficult to govern, should be solely 
entrusted to him?”  Or, he added ominously, is Jefferson, “as Bonaparte announced himself, the 
delegate of heaven, commissioned to regulate the destines of men?”  The editor of The Repertory 
was not alone in his assessment, though he perhaps was the most vocal.137 
 Writing in the Washington Federalist, “A.B.” made similar accusations.  “When 
Bonaparte took possession by violence of the government of France,” he wrote in February 1804, 
“the democrats, who till that event had been in the habit of extolling him as the purest and best of 
republicans, immediately denounced him, as a usurper, and a traitor because, forsooth, he had 
undertaken to rule a people without previously obtaining their consent.”  Was this any different 
then what Jefferson had just done in the Louisiana territory he asked rhetorically.  “He is surely 
as much of a usurper, as Bonaparte—for he has become their master, and is in the exercise of the 
most despotic and absolute authority without having consulted them on the subject.”  A.B. 
thought the presidential supporters hypocritical for, “instead of applying to Jefferson, the angry 
and harsh epithets with which, but a short time since, they loaded Buonaparte [sic], they hail him 
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as the best of men and patriots.”  They would probably continue to do so, A.B. sneered, even if, 
Jefferson, like Bonaparte, “were to enslave, and by fraud or violence, reduce one half of Europe 
under his dominion.”  While Jefferson was certainly the first American president whose 
accumulation of political power would to be likened to Bonaparte, he would not be the last.138 
 The inhabitants of Louisiana were also concerned about the rather un-republican system 
with which their new imperial rulers had saddled them.  In a remarkable document presented to 
Congress in the winter of 1804-05, Louisianans questioned the legitimacy of the American 
occupation.  The document, titled, “A Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana against the 
Political System Adopted by Congress for Them,” appealed to the history of the United States to 
support their inclusion into the American system of liberal government.  They briefly referenced 
Article III of the Purchase treaty, but, realizing its controversial nature, carefully framed most of 
their argument on the inalienable rights of mankind implied in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution.  The Louisianans concluded by hoping that the nation which had been 
formed on the principle that “governors were intended for the governed and not the governed for 
the governors,” would not be “deaf to their just complaints.”139 
 Many native-born Americans scoffed at the Remonstrance.  The Republican Watchtower 
printed a particularly vicious response to the document which linked the Louisianan identity to 
Bonaparte rather than to the United States.  In the article, the author posed as a Louisiana Creole 
and composed a satirical mockery of the Remonstrance.  In the original document the authors 
had conspicuously avoided unnecessary references to Article III and made no reference at all to 
Bonaparte, but in the mock one, the Consul entered the argument in the first paragraph.  “You 
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promise de citizen Bonaparte dat you shall take us into one state” the “Creole” wrote.  This was a 
subtle jab at the Jefferson administration which had, after all, promised to incorporate these 
people into the United States as soon as possible in the Purchase Treaty.  It also demonstrated a 
childish misunderstanding of the American political system.  Of course, the “Creole” continued, 
it was not the Louisianans who had actually wanted to leave the French Empire; it was the 
Americans who “give fifteen million dollar for his [Bonaparte’s] permission for dat.”  These 
comments demonstrated the “Creole’s” filial attachment to his French master.  By starting the 
piece in this way, the author cleverly tapped into already established doubts that many 
Americans had about the administration of their new empire.140 
The debate over the occupation of Louisiana shows how elastic the rhetoric of Bonaparte 
could be in the hands of Americans by 1805.  Where one group expressed concern that the 
Purchase Treaty required the inhabitants of Louisiana to become members of the American body 
politic, the other voiced concern about the lack of popular participation in the Louisiana 
government. Both groups ultimately tied their arguments to Napoleon Bonaparte.  The popular 
debates over the occupation of Louisiana also lend credence to the arguments of recent historians 
like Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrell who argue in Empire’s Twin that anti-imperialism was an 
“important shaper of imperialism.”  This became even more evident in the pro-imperial 
arguments that developed over the next several months as Jeffersonians found themselves forced 
to appropriate the very language of their opponents to justify national expansion to the American 
public.141 
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As they celebrated the addition of Louisiana to the United States, pro-expansionists found 
that they could not help but compare the new empire of the United States to that of Bonaparte’s 
France.  As they did, they turned the potent anti-expansionist Bonaparte rhetoric of their 
opponents into a positive, pro-imperial argument.  Even before the ink was dry on the treaty, the 
Jeffersonian senator from Kentucky, John Breckinridge, cheered the acquisition of, “an empire 
of perhaps have the extent of the one we possessed.”  Just as important to this old revolutionary 
was that this American empire had been won “from the most powerful and warlike nation on 
earth, without bloodshed, without the oppression of a single individual…through the peaceful 
forms of negotiation.”  To Breckinridge, the Louisiana Purchase showed just how different the 
peaceful conquests of United States were in comparison to the bloody wars of Bonaparte.  
Indeed, it even showed that peaceful conquest could overpower even the mighty Napoleon.  
Ironically, within weeks of making this speech Breckinridge would be introducing the legislation 
for the military occupation of the Louisiana territory.142 
 When David Ramsay spoke, people listened, which, perhaps says something about the 
nature of the United States at the turn of the nineteenth-century.  Though he had served as a 
doctor during the War for Independence and completed multiple terms as a member of the South 
Carolina legislature and in the Continental Congress, he was probably best known to Americans 
as a historian.  His two-volume History of the Revolution in South Carolina was the first book to 
receive an American copyright.  Amongst a host of other historical writings, he published several 
volumes on George Washington, as well as the first comprehensive history of the American 
Revolution.  So, on May 12, 1804, when David Ramsay gave a stirring speech to “a very large 
audience” at St. Michael’s Church in Charleston, South Carolina celebrating the Louisiana 
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“cession,” it was reprinted all over the nation.  Within the month, anxious readers all over the 
nation could buy a printed copy for twenty-five cents at their local shop.143 
 Ramsay’s message was similar to that of Breckinridge.  He began with a geographer’s 
introduction to the new territory which painted a territory of “prairies or natural meadows of 
inexhaustible fertility” and forests that abounded “with excellent timber.”  It did not take long, 
however, for the historian in Ramsay to think about the Louisiana “cession” within a geopolitical 
context.  “In other countries, and under the direction of other governments,” he pointed out, “the 
energies of nations have been called forth—thousands of lives have been sacrificed—seas have 
been crimsoned with human blood in the attack or defense of a few acres or of barren rocks.”  In 
1804, no one would have had any doubt which “other government Ramsay had in mind.  In case 
his audience was not already thinking about any number of Bonaparte’s bloody victories, 
Ramsay provided Malta as an example.  For his audience, this would have immediately called to 
mind Napoleon’s attack on the island in 1798.144 
 Not so for American expansion, Ramsay claimed.  “We have gained this invaluable 
territory,” he continued, “without the imposition of any new taxes; and at the same time with the 
consent of the inhabitants, and without giving offense to any of the powers in Europe.”  With 
these words Ramsay simply brushed aside Federalist concerns about the lack of popular 
participation in the new territorial government or the lingering doubts about Spanish title to the 
territory.  He also countered Federalist apprehension about paying $15 million to support 
Bonaparte’s wars in Europe by insisting on calling the Purchase a “cession.”  This choice of 
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words linguistically turned the tables on Federalists who had railed against Jefferson’s naivety in 
dealing with Bonaparte by suggesting that it was actually Jefferson’s hardnosed negotiations 
which had gotten the best of the First Consul.145 
 With the minds of his audience already on Napoleon, Ramsay doggedly stayed on the 
theme.  He asked the audience to consider what would have happened if Louisiana had stayed 
“in the hands of that wonderful man, who presides over France.”  He imagined that Bonaparte 
would have used New Orleans as the “fulcrum of an immense lever by which he would have 
elevated or depressed our western country in subserviency to his gigantic projects.”  He would 
have turned Kentucky and Tennessee into virtual colonies and eventually this would have 
inevitably led to between east and west.  Thus, for Ramsay, Bonaparte’s expansion generated 
war and bloodshed, but the exact same action taken by Americans produced peace. 146 
 In many ways, this reflected a question over whether the United States was something 
new—a nation freed from the history of Europe.  For the Federalists, the answer had been “no.”  
They saw the United States as a nation that would have to play by Europe’s rules, which is why 
they so strongly argued for seizing Louisiana by force before the transfer to Napoleon took place 
during the Mississippi Crisis.  On the other hand, for Ramsay and his fellow Jeffersonians, the 
bloodless acquisition of Louisiana through negotiation seemed to prove that the United States 
was truly different than Bonaparte, Europe, and the rest of the world.  In a newspaper 
retrospective of 1804, one proud expansionist explained the difference between the United States 
and France.  “Looking on America,” he began, “we see an extensive empire, enlarging her 
territory…at peace with the world and rising with happy celerity to that rank in the scale of 
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nations, to which her character, her institutions, her privileges, her pursuits give a title.”  On the 
other hand, across the Atlantic, one saw Bonaparte, “actively employed in equipping numerous 
armaments to make a decent on England, and at the same time squabbling with all the rest of 
Europe.”  Like Ramsay, this author highlighted American exceptionalism by seeing expansion 
by the United States as establishing peace in North America while simultaneously viewing 
French expansion as conquest.147 
 The overwhelming passage of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty showed that Americans had 
largely accepted that their nation would expand—at least into Louisiana.  The raucous debate 
surrounding the treaty and the terms of occupation demonstrates that Americans still virulently 
disagreed over how the nation ought to expand, how the empire ought to be administered, and 
what American expansion meant for the rest of the rest of the world.  As they contested these 
important questions, Napoleon increasingly became the standard by which Americans measured 
their decisions over expansion and the administration of their new empire.  Yet, as many had 
foreseen, Louisiana would not be the last place Americans coveted for their own.  In fact, even 
where the boundaries of Louisiana were was a perplexing question that the Purchase Treaty had 
not settled.  Over the next four decades Americans sought to work out exactly what their “empire 
of liberty” actually was and how they ought to approach it.  As they did, the ideas and rhetoric of 
Napoleon continued to occupy an important place in their debates. 
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CHAPTER 4 ALLIES AND ANNEXATIONISTS:  FLORIDA AND THE WAR OF 1812 
Readers of the Federal Republican were in for a treat as they opened their papers on the 
morning of April 7, 1813.  Inside, they found an article titled, “Short Answers to Short 
Questions.”  The article was a response to another article that had appeared in the Richmond 
Enquirer—a Jeffersonian paper—earlier that year and took the form of a series of questions and 
answers on the War of 1812 that read very much like a catechism.  In one question, for example, 
the Federalist faithful read, “Q.  Was it ambition which declared [the war]?”  To which the 
answer was, “Yes.  Low, sordid, despicable ambition.  The ambition to be dignified by the title 
of Ally to Imperial France.”  Shortly thereafter, the readers came to this question regarding the 
motives for war.  “Q.  Is it the thirst for dominion?  A.  Not content with Louisiana and West 
Florida, the declared object of the war was the conquest of Canada…and the occupation of her 
territories.”  Near the end of the article, the reader came across a similar question with a similar 
answer.  “Q.  Is [the war] for the unjust plunder of a poorer neighbor?  A.  Let the Indians, 
Canadians, and Floridians answer.”  As this article demonstrates, by the War of 1812, the links 
between aggressive American expansion and the imperialism Napoleon’s France were solidified 
to the point where they were literally part of the Federalist catechism.148 
Historians have known that the borderlands were central to the War of 1812 since Julius 
Pratt published Expansionists of 1812 in 1925.  However, the “borderlands” idea remains rather 
nebulous.  Many recent historians of the war have taken “the borderlands” to mean that our 
geographic and demographic understanding of the war is too limited.  These historians have 
incorporated a much broader view of the war along these lines.  In 1981, Frank Owsley Jr. 
argued that the Creek War of 1813-14 should be seen as part of a bigger campaign for the South.  
                                                      
148 “Short Answers to Short Questions,” Federal Republican (Baltimore, MD), April 7, 1813. 
 
 
 98 
More recently, James Cusick suggested that the Patriot War in Spanish East Florida, which lasted 
in fits and starts from 1811 to 1814 should also be seen as part of a broader war narrative that 
emphasizes the regional nature of the conflict.  Jeremy Black also expanded our view of the war 
in the other direction by tying its military and strategic aspects back into the Atlantic context of 
the Napoleonic Wars.  Implicitly, all these historians suggested that we rethink the War of 1812 
as a war of American conquest, rather than as a tiny republic fighting desperately for survival 
against the British empire.149 
This chapter builds on all of this new research into the military history of the War of 
1812 by suggesting that to understand how Americans—in particular Federalists—came to terms 
with the war’s expansionist aims we must first understand the rhetoric behind their debate over 
aggression in Florida.  There is, of necessity, a military component to any work that deals with 
armed expansion and aggressive diplomacy, but, this is not a military history in the strictest 
sense.  Instead, this chapter explores how Americans—especially the American public—
vigorously debated how to come to terms with their own expansion through the midpoint of the 
War of 1812.  Americans struggled with the language to explain their republican expansion, 
though elites drew extensively on the theory of Emmerich Vattel.  To make their case to the 
American public, however, both Jeffersonians and Federalists returned to the person and 
concepts with whom their constituents best identified as imperialism personified:  Napoleon 
Bonaparte.  Americans found that they could best explain and understand their own expansion 
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into Florida by looking across the Atlantic to France, and applying what they saw to their own 
unique context. 
The decade between the Louisiana Purchase and the beginning of the War of 1812 were 
characterized by increasingly acrimonious and hyper-partisan debates over the future of 
American foreign policy.  Though clearly the minority, Federalists and disgruntled Jeffersonians 
managed to hold the upper hand for the remainder of Jefferson’s time in office.  They derailed 
administration plans to force a sale of Spanish Florida in 1806, and then managed to turn the 
Burr Conspiracy into a referendum on Jeffersonian expansion policy in 1807.  Elected in 1808, 
the new Jeffersonian president, James Madison, turned the tables on the opposition.  In 1811, he 
took advantage of a popular revolt in West Florida to seize that province from under the nose of 
the Spanish despite fierce opposition from Federalists.  Finally, in 1812, Madison was able to 
secure the necessary votes for America’s first declared war despite vigorous opposition from his 
Federalist opponents. 
After losing the debates over the Louisiana Purchase, anti-expansionists—now becoming 
more and more identifiable as the Federalist party—spent most of 1805 regrouping and waiting 
for an opening through which to launch a rhetorical counterattack.  In 1806, they got their chance 
when expansionists made a colossal tactical blunder in their pursuit of Florida.  Americans had 
long seen Florida as a natural part of their economic and physical security.  As discussed in the 
first chapter, not a few militant expansionists had suggested seizing Florida along with New 
Orleans to protect American interests during the Mississippi crisis.  In particular, West Florida, 
which referred to that part of Florida which lay west of the Perdido River, captivated the 
imagination of many Americans.  In the hand of the United States, the numerous rivers of area 
would provide a rich commercial outlet for the burgeoning American settlements in what would 
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become Mississippi and Alabama.  The Spanish, however, saw this same strip of land as their 
last piece of leverage against the monstrous territorial ambitions of the United States.150 
 Unfortunately, in their haste to snap up Louisiana from Bonaparte in 1803, American 
negotiators had failed to pin the French down on the exact limits of the territory.  This was 
almost certainly a deliberate ploy of the First Consul.  With the borders between the United 
States and Spain left open to interpretation, only he could act as ultimate arbiter of the Purchase 
treaty—an extremely useful bargaining chip with war looming.  As Bonaparte intended, the 
nebulous boundaries immediately led to friction between the United States and Spain with both 
nations appealing to Napoleon for support.  In the dreams of American expansionists (including 
the Jefferson administration) Louisiana included both east and west Florida, most of Texas and 
even Oregon.  Meanwhile, the Spanish insisted, correctly as a matter of fact, that neither Florida 
nor Texas had been part of the original retrocession to France and thus could not have been part 
of the French sale to the United States.  In typical Bonaparte fashion, the emperor played both 
sides of the issue for as long as he could.  Eventually, however, war forced him to publicly 
support the Spanish claims.  Spain, after all, had proven itself as one of Bonaparte’s more 
reliable, if reluctant, wartime allies.  Even more importantly, it possessed a large fleet with which 
Napoleon could challenge British naval supremacy.151 
 Along the contested border of West Florida, matters quickly spiraled out of Bonaparte’s 
control.  In June 1804, two American brothers named Kemper and a gang of toughs marched on 
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the West Florida capital of Baton Rouge in an attempt to convince the local population to declare 
their independence from Spain.  Theirs were mostly local grievances, however, and the majority 
of Floridians were generally happy with Spanish rule.  When support for their rebellion failed to 
materialize, the filibusters fled into Mississippi.  Understandably, the Spanish believed that the 
American government had something to do with the plot, but the territorial governor of 
Louisiana, William Claiborne, refused to extradite the two conspirators, and the wary Spanish 
began shifting troops into the disputed area.  In response, the President dispatched a sizeable 
portion of the tiny American army to the region.  Another series of coups by disaffected 
Americans in West Florida fizzled in mid-1805 and caused both sides to edge even closer to a 
war-footing.  In December, Jefferson sent a State of the Union message to the new congress that 
sounded a remarkably bellicose tone.  “Our citizens have been seized, and their property 
plundered…by the regular officers and soldiers” of the government of Spain he warned 
ominously.  These depredations, he added, had taken place on territory claimed by the United 
States as Louisiana.  A few days later, Congress went into a secret closed-door session.  War 
seemed but a matter of time.152 
 When Congress emerged in early February, most Americans were stunned at the result.  
Instead of the expected vote for war, Congress had instead passed “An Act Making Provision for 
Defraying any Extraordinary Expenses Attending the Intercourse between the United States and 
Foreign Nations.”  This vaguely worded act, popularly referred to as the “Two Million Dollar 
Act,” authorized the President to spend up to $2 million to negotiate for Florida.  To Americans 
who viewed West Florida as having been part of the original Louisiana Purchase, this seemed 
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like paying for the same real estate twice.  Others were uncomfortable with what looked 
suspiciously like bribe money.153  Horrified at what one prominent Jeffersonian—the Virginian 
John Randolph—saw as a “base prostration of national character,” the congressional opposition 
began launching devastating rhetorical salvos at the Jeffersonian plan almost as soon as the 
prohibition on releasing details of the secret proceedings was lifted at the end of March.  As 
before with the Louisiana Purchase, the vast majority of the opposition was in favor of 
expansion, but argued that the manner of expansion was just as important as the physical 
expansion itself.  As they went on the offensive, the French Emperor and his empire figured 
prominently in the argument against expansion at all moral and economic costs.154 
 Without knowing the full details of Jefferson’s gambit for West Florida, virtually all of 
the opposition saw the President prostrating American interests at the feet of Bonaparte instead 
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of Machiavellian intrigue on the part of the President.  One typically bellicose Federalist, for 
example, was extremely disappointed to hear that Congress’s secret session had not been called 
for the raising of, “ships, troops and taxes” for a war with Spain, but instead for voting 
“TRIBUTE to Bonaparte!”  He found it unconscionable that the United States should pay for 
Louisiana a second time.  This was, he fumed, nothing more than “servile condescension to the 
French tyrant” who demanded “Tribute, Tribute, Tribute.”  Federalists had long seen Jefferson 
and his party as kowtowing to the French empire, but the emphasis on the United States 
becoming a full-fledged tributary to the French Republic was a new device which owed its sting 
to what Americans saw as the ill-treatment of Napoleon’s “sister republics” in Europe.155 
 The idea of tribute was a powerful one in early America because it implied dependence.  
Dependence on anyone or anything was dangerous because it robbed an actor of their freedom to 
act in the best interest of the community.  Americans understood this freedom to act 
independently as the characteristic that made classical republicanism possible.  Without it, an 
actor was little better than a slave.  The actor might be an individual, but it could also be a 
community or even a nation.  Napoleonic Europe furnished perfect models of this dependence in 
the semi-autonomous “sister republics” of France.  As the Napoleonic wars dragged on, 
Americans saw these dependent satellites being milked for money and men to supply the 
ravenous needs of the French war machine.156 
 Americans were not shy about using these examples in their everyday discourse.  For 
example, when one New England author complained that while New England states provided the 
Federal government with the overwhelming majority of its tax revenue, it was the southern slave 
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states that received the majority of federal post-office funds, he used a classic Napoleonic 
illustration.  “Does not the enlightened government of the French Republic,” he asked, “in a like 
manner receive tribute from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Hanover, and 
the numerous dependent principalities of Germany?”  He concluded sarcastically, “Are not our 
proceedings equal and correct according to the model of our sister republic, and will they not 
very speedily have the same desirable and happy issue, with respect to our equality, liberty and 
independence?”157 
 Because it was so effective, other opposition writers quickly took up the refrain of 
“tribute” to Bonaparte in the wake of the Two Million Dollar Act.  Many publicly questioned 
whether the United States was truly the master of its own foreign policy—the hallmark of 
national independence.  One author, for example, cringed at “giving Two Millions of dollars to 
France, to have Bonaparte’s permission to treat with Spain.”  The author had no faith in the 
Jeffersonian members of Congress to protect American interests or independence.  “If Jefferson 
& Co. should pass a law to transfer the independence and liberties of this country to the Emperor 
Napoleon,” he snarled, “a majority of these exclusive patriots would be found to justify the 
measure.”158 
 Others used the same message, but presented a more dejected rather than angry tone.  For 
example, “Col. Cent” who wrote under a headline that cleverly reversed the famous rallying cry 
of the XYZ Affair from “Millions for Defense, not a Cent for Tribute” to “Millions for Tribute, 
not a Cent for Defense.”  Col. Cent sadly suggested that, “the word Independence be stricken 
from our records and the declaration thereof sent off with the tribute money.”  Another 
                                                      
157 Even the term “enlightened government” was a Napoleonic blow at Jefferson, who, in his announcement of the 
Louisiana Purchase treaty, had made the mistake of praising the “enlightened” policy of the government of France; 
The Post Boy (Windsor, VT), April 2, 1805. 
158 The Portland Gazette and Maine Advertiser (Portland, ME), April 21, 1806. 
 
 
 105 
(misinformed) opposition author sadly concluded that that since sixty tons of silver had set sail 
for France as a “peace offering to Bonaparte” even before the Congress had lifted the veil of 
secrecy from its disgraceful proceedings, “these states, once free, sovereign and independent, 
[have] become a humble tributary to France.” 159 
 Not every member of the opposition was quite so maudlin, however.  The West Florida 
fiasco provided a marvelous opportunity for Federalists to sharpen their satiric wit.  Several 
newspapers offered a reworked version of Yankee Doodle that they saw as more appropriate for 
the times.  It featured the rousing chorus,  
Yankee Doodle keep it up! 
Yankee Doodle dandy! 
A word or two from Bonaparte 
goes down like sugar candy. 
The ditty closed with the biting verse,  
Our State Machine is mov’d about, 
Some say on slippery rollers; 
We’ve sent a Hornet’s Nest to France 
To sting the French with dollars 
To make them feel our desp’rate power, 
So secret was the doing, 
That few e’er thought, at Bona’s nod, 
A tribute was a brewing. 
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The core message of the song was essentially the same as in the other pieces.  However, by 
appropriating a popular song of the revolution, the opposition portrayed the Jefferson’s actions 
not only as fundamentally weak and laughable, but also as betraying the nation itself.  The song 
also shows that the opposition made efforts to reach an audience beyond than the Federalist elite 
of New England.160 
 Another, similarly irreverent format that the opposition began to use was the satirical 
cartoon.  In response to Jefferson’s West Florida woes, cartoonist James Akin produced a 
popular cartoon titled “The Prairie Dog Sickened at the Sting of the Hornet” (figure 1).  The 
cartoon was only produced as a stand-alone print, but it was reproduced widely enough to justify 
satirical commentary in two of the most important Federalist newspapers of the period.  In the 
cartoon, Jefferson is portrayed with the body of a prairie dog—undoubtedly a reference to the 
“wilderness” of Louisiana.  He is in the act of vomiting up $2 million while a French diplomat 
teases him with maps of East and West Florida.  Napoleon appears as a hornet that has just stung 
the prairie dog, thus, in the words of the New York Gazette, “acting as a violent emetic on the 
terror-struck spaniel.”  Though Bonaparte is the smallest figure in the drawing, the cartoon is 
clearly a commentary on his inordinate power over Jefferson.  The title of the cartoon itself 
indicates the diplomatic connection between the prairie dog and the hornet and offers a clear 
indication of which man Akin thought was in control of the relationship.161 
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Figure 1.  James Akin, “The Prairie Dog Sickened at the Sting of the Hornet,” 1806 
 In case anyone missed the point of the cartoon, the Federalist newspapers quickly 
published a satirical explanation that highlighted the new role of Bonaparte in directing 
American foreign policy.  The cartoon was, the article insisted, was a “historical” piece of art 
and not a caricature—as suggested by some “ill-natured folks.”  Indeed, said the article, it was 
such a masterpiece that it now hung in the halls of the Bonaparte’s Palace, where it was greatly 
enjoyed by the emperor himself.  With great attention to historical detail, the article continued, 
the painting depicted Bonaparte administering a new purgative to a unique species of North 
American dog which caused him to “disgorge Two Millions of Dollars at the feet of a certain 
little Marquis.”  The “dreadful operation” of this medicine was already well known in “Holland, 
Spain, Italy, and most parts of the Continent of Europe, by the name of the Napoleon physic.”  
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Like the parody of Yankee Doodle, Akins’s cartoon and the satirical commentary that went with 
it demonstrate a turn toward the satirical in the use of Napoleon in rhetoric over expansion, and 
show that Bonaparte had become a cultural symbol with whom Americans regardless of class 
could identify.162 
 For one of the rare times in American history, the opposition rhetoric was so effective 
that it completely derailed plans for expansion.  Stunned at the furor he had created and at the 
defection of many in his own party, Jefferson dropped all ideas of using the French Emperor as a 
mediator for West Florida. After a fresh round of negotiations with Madrid failed miserably in 
1806, he quietly let the matter drop.  The damage had been done, however, and despite their 
fervent insistence otherwise, Jefferson’s allies could never quite shake the accusation that they 
were the toadies of Bonaparte. 
 After the decisive French victory at Austerlitz in 1806, the third coalition broke apart 
leaving Britain to carry on the struggle against Bonaparte alone.  A fourth coalition went to war 
again later in the year, but was crushed by the end of 1807.  Buoyed by his unbroken string of 
success, Bonaparte looked to reshape the map of Europe once again.  In 1806, he reorganized the 
ancient Holy Roman Empire and formed the Confederation of Rhine in its place.  Next, he 
established the Kingdom of Holland in the place of the Batavian Republic.  In 1807, he 
organized the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) as a counterbalance to Russia, and, through the 
Decrees of Berlin and Milan, established the Continental System to put economic pressure on 
Great Britain.  The Continental System proclaimed a blockade and closed all European ports to 
British ships—or neutral ships that had traded with Great Britain.  By the start of 1808, Napoleon 
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was quickly reaching the height of his power and even his opponents marveled at his ability to 
use Machiavellian tactics to remake political systems at will. 
Americans too watched Bonaparte with a mixture of wonder and concern.  To understand 
why Bonaparte’s moves in Europe played perfectly into the fears of Americans who were 
already concerned about events on their southern border, we must leave Florida for the moment 
and take a digression into the murky world of the Burr conspiracy.  Even after 200 years, 
historians have a difficult time explaining exactly what took place during the Burr conspiracy 
and separating the fact from the newspaper frenzy that resulted.  Many modern historians have 
accepted the traditional account of Burr the national traitor.  Put very briefly, this version 
account runs as follows.  After killing the Federalist darling, Alexander Hamilton, in the famous 
duel at Weehawken, NJ, the Vice President emerged a marked man.  Ostracized by his political 
friends and shunned by the President, he concocted a plot to recruit an army of secessionist 
westerners and, with help from Britain and Spain, establish a new empire in the states and 
territories west of the Alleghenies.  Once this task was complete, he expected to lead his 
victorious army into Mexico, Spanish Florida and, possibly, march to Washington itself to unseat 
Jefferson.163 
 More recent research, however, suggests that Burr probably only planned to take 
advantage of the war scare on the Texas/Louisiana border and lead a filibustering expedition into 
Spanish Mexico with the assistance of the British navy.  Filibustering was a privately backed 
military invasion intended to topple a government by encouraging residents to “liberate” 
themselves from alleged tyranny.  It had also been an integral part of the Jeffersonian strategy of 
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peaceful expansion for many years.  Interestingly enough, Burr was so ambiguous as to his plans 
that even those he attempted to recruit were somewhat mystified as to his ultimate intentions.  
One he attempted to sway was Andrew Jackson, who was at that time a Major General in the 
Tennessee militia.  When Jackson reported on his odd meeting with Burr to his superior, he 
cautiously wondered if Burr’s actions were occasioned by a desire to prevent Louisiana from 
being snatched up by “the rapacious hands of Bonapart,” who, according to Jackson, “might be a 
troublesome neighbour to the united States.”164 
  Burr’s filibustering plans fell into disarray during the fall of 1806.  His chief co-
conspirator, the slippery General James Wilkinson (who had been on the Spanish pay-roll for 
decades as a double agent) turned on his erstwhile confederate.  Alleging that 20,000 Burrite 
freebooters were traveling south to attack New Orleans, Wilkinson fired off letters to 
Washington warning of the grave danger.  Meanwhile, he set about preparing a defense of the 
Crescent City and purging the town of Burr’s associates.  In actuality, no such invasion force 
existed and Wilkinson was merely covering for his own long list of misdeeds.  Once Burr 
realized Wilkinson’s betrayal, he briefly attempted to flee.  After only two weeks on the run, 
however, the former Vice President, along with about 100 cold and hungry supporters 
surrendered to authorities in Mississippi on January 12, 1807.165 
 Such were the facts.  What the nation’s newspapers reported, however, was quite 
different.  Burr had accumulated many political enemies in his life and now all of them sensed 
blood in the water.  Accusations of treachery were made even more sensational when the subject 
was portrayed as the American Napoleon.  Burr’s ambitious character had been associated with 
                                                      
164 Isenberg, Fallen Founder, 282-310; “Andrew Jackson to Daniel Smith, November 12, 1806,” The Papers of 
Andrew Jackson Digital Edition, Daniel Feller, editor, Charlottesville, VA:  University of Virginia Press, 2015. 
165 Ibid., 311-316. 
 
 
 111 
that of Bonaparte since at least his presidential run in 1800, but his treason trial breathed new life 
to this old accusation.  Early reports of Burr’s activities noted the similarity between the 
ambitions of Burr and those of the French emperor.  For example, the Richmond Enquirer 
suggested that the object of Burr’s mission appeared to be establishing a western empire and that 
such a territory could only be run by an emperor “bearing a resemblance to Bonaparte.”  Many 
papers linked the two men through use of the word “emperor.”  Almost immediately, Burr was 
styled the “Emperor of the Quids” by the highly influential Jeffersonian paper, The Aurora in an 
attempt to distance Burr (himself a Jeffersonian) from the presidential wing of the party.  Other 
papers called him “the little emperor.”  Thanks to the such actions, Americans of the Early 
Republic easily made a link between the characters of former vice president and the Napoleon.166 
For the Federalists, the Burr affair symbolized everything that was wrong with 
uncontrolled Jeffersonian expansion beyond the Mississippi.  For as long as they could 
remember, the dark, foreboding western regions of country had seemed to breed discontent and 
threats of disunion.  To them, Burr’s alleged conspiracy demonstrated the weakness of the 
Federal government in the West and they focused on the threat to union highlighted by the 
imagined plot.  The timing of the conspiracy also seemed suspicious to Federalists.  For several 
years, Bonaparte’s armies had been occupied in Europe, but with Napoleon’s dramatic 
destruction of the Third and Fourth Coalitions, many thought they saw the ambitious and 
treacherous hand of Bonaparte behind the insidious machinations of Burr. 
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 On January 1, 1807, the Federalist New York Gazette reported with certainty that muskets 
of “new and of French manufacture” had been seized from the conspirators.  Also, it was 
reported, among Burr’s associates, there were two “foreign gentlemen…who spoke the French 
language.” This could only indicate one thing according to the editors of the Gazette: Burr’s 
actions had been “conducted under the auspices of Napoleon.”  A week later The Western World 
warned its readers that if the rumored destruction of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt were 
true, it would clear the way for Bonaparte’s restless ambition to turn its gaze westward once 
again.  The author warily concluded that, “since the late operations of col. Burr,” he suspected 
anyone who suggested that Bonaparte was not still interested in the conquest of North America 
of trying to “lull us into security, the more easily to conquer us.”  Even after his acquittal, the 
perceived treachery of Burr remained linked to Bonaparte for many years to come.  In mid-1810, 
with West Florida descending into chaos, Baltimore’s Federal Republican warned that Louisiana 
“contained a mass of excitable matter, every way fitted for the conjoint projects of Burr and 
Bonaparte.”  This of course, was a throwback to Federalist demographic concerns of 1803 in 
which they had warned that that the citizens of Louisiana maintained their original allegiance to 
Bonaparte.167 
Even well after Burr’s acquittal, most of his countrymen continued to see him as the 
American Napoleon—and thus a powerful symbol of treacherous ambition.  In 1808, the 
Universal Gazette printed a letter originally from the National Intelligencer.  "We have enemies 
within our walls, inexorable, vigilant and powerful,” warned the anonymous author.  “The same 
inordinate love of power which has raised Napoleon to his lofty eminence, impels them; and if 
they do not pursue the same means to attain their ends, it is because we are vigilant and 
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powerful.”  It was worth remembering, concluded the author, that such treacherous enemies 
would have made Aaron Burr president, “and who doubts but that either he would have been 
another Napoleon or that our fields would have been crimsoned with blood."  Ultimately it was 
this linking of Burr to Bonaparte in the American mind which turned a filibustering expedition 
into treason.168 
 The threats of internal dissention and international intrigue to the young republic that 
undergirded both the Federalist response to the Burr conspiracy were not new but they took on a 
new fervor due to popular renderings of Bonaparte in the American press.  The first best-selling 
Bonaparte book in the United States was A Secret History of the Court and Cabinet of St. Cloud, 
which was already on its fourth printing in the United States by 1807.  This lengthy work 
purported to be a series of letters written in 1805 from a “gentleman” in Paris to his confident in 
London.  Many of the anecdotes contained in the book found their way into the daily papers and 
later Napoleon biographies.  The book portrayed the “wily Corsican” and his cronies as petty, 
cruel, conniving, self-serving, amateur aristocrats who did not play by the accepted rules of 
international diplomacy.  Instead the Bonapartist regime relied on subterfuge and illegitimate 
force to achieve their foreign policy ends.  Interestingly, the American-printed 1807 version of 
the book included a series of miscellaneous sketches at the end, one of which—the sketch of 
Swiss folk heroine Martha Glar—undoubtedly interested American readers a great deal as it 
included a direct warning to the people of the United States.169 
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 In the first sentence, the sketch emphasized to Americans that the conquest of the, 
“virtuous, peaceful, and happy little Republic of Switzerland,” had been accomplished by the, 
“intrigues…more than by the arms of France.”  What followed was a dismal tale of “horrid 
outrages” perpetrated by the French and their treacherous collaborators on the poor people of 
Switzerland and the tragic death of Martha Glar.  In 1797, the patriotic speech of this sixty-four-
year-old grandmother, had roused the peasants of her village to resist the French invasion of 
republican Switzerland.  Stirred by her call to arms, men, women, and children marched out to 
defend their homes, but after fighting valiantly most were butchered by the French army at the 
battle of Frauenbrun.  Among the dead numbered Glar herself, her husband, her father, two of 
her sons, both of her daughters, her brother and three of her grand-daughters.  Such stories of 
desperate female martial valor in defense of freedom easily recalled to the American mind the 
Revolutionary War images of Molly Corbin and Jane McCrea and Glar’s story tapped into an 
already established trope of American popular culture.170 
The author saved his most important point for last.  The sketch ended with words of 
warning to his American audience.  “May the sad fate of the simple, virtuous, and unoffending 
Swiss republics,” the author wrote, “be a solemn warning to all other states and kingdoms.”  
They must be ever on guard against the “perfidious machinations of the French.”  In case the 
point was not clear enough, however, the author continued.  It was inevitable that “the free, 
happy, and prosperous republic of the United States of America, shall…in the course of a very 
short time, be exposed to the threats of Gallic tyranny.”  The author feared it might already be 
too late for Americans to open their eyes to the dangers of French duplicity.  “God grant,” he 
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prayed, “this sad prediction not be verified; God grant that we be guarded in time against French 
intrigues and arms, and that at least the present generation may not be witness to the ruin of their 
country.”171 
 Americans heard similar words of warning against treacherous Bonapartian foreign 
policy from other sources.  In 1807, Thomas Branagan published Political and Theological 
Disquisitions on the Signs of the Times Relative to the Present Conquests of France.  Branagan’s 
was a remarkable career.  Irish by birth, he worked on slave ships and as a foreman on a 
plantation in the British slave colony of Antigua before having a Methodist conversation 
experience and embracing abolitionism.  With his newfound faith he moved to first to London 
and eventually to New York and began writing against slavery.  In Disquisitions he found a way 
to yoke his favorite subject to the looming threat of Bonaparte.172 
Branagan started by warning Americans that the dangers to the republic came in two 
interconnected forms:  first, internal threats which he defined as, “domestic factions, foreign 
spies, and at least 900,000 mortal enemies who are continually gnawing the vitals of the body 
politic.”  By the last, he meant the enslaved portion of the United States who might very well rise 
in revolt if given the opportunity by a treacherous foreign power like Bonaparte.  After the chaos 
and violence of the successful slave revolt against the French in St. Domingue, American slave 
owners were already on edge about what might happen if their own slaves rose up against them.  
The idea that Napoleon might actually encourage such racial violence was carefully calculated to 
clearly illustrate how treacherous and opportunistic the emperor could be.  The second threat was 
the large number of French emigrants who, according to Branagan, secretly maintained their 
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allegiance to Bonaparte.  He expected that unless Americans realized these dangers quickly, it 
would only be a matter of time before Bonaparte’s agents raised a fifth column element in the 
United States made up of French immigrants, domestic “partizans” of Napoleon, and slaves.  
Once that was done, Bonaparte’s crack troops could easily complete what “secret artifice and 
intrigue” of his agents had started.173 
Lest Americans think this an unrealistic scenario Branagan reminded his countrymen of 
the fates of Europe.  “What was it that ruined Switzerland?” he asked, “I answer French 
diplomatic artifice.”  “What annihilated the Batavian Republic?” he continued, “I answer French 
fraternizing violence.”  Furthermore, he warned, there was no reason to think that Napoleon 
would be content with his European empire.  “The quibbling policy of the court and cabinet of 
St. Cloud respecting the boundary of Louisiana,” he pointed out, “should be sufficient evidence 
of the hostile intentions of France.”  “Be assured,” said Branagan, it was ultimately Bonaparte 
who was “at the bottom” the Spanish “insolence” on the West Florida issue as well as the Burr 
conspiracy.  For Branagan, these events showed clearly that Bonaparte was preparing the North 
American continent for subjection into his universal empire.174 
 Branagan’s basic theme of Napoleonic intrigue in foreign policy was echoed in the 
newspapers, Federalist as well as Jeffersonian, especially after Bonaparte ousted the Bourbon 
monarchy of his ally Spain in mid-1808.  Napoleon had been justifiably suspicious of his 
Spanish ally after they considered joining Prussia against the French in the Fourth Coalition of 
1806.  The catastrophic Prussian defeat at Jena-Auerstaedt, however, convinced the Spanish to 
reconsider their moves, but they continued to greatly resent their domination by France, 
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especially after they were forced to acquiesce to the French Continental System.  The 
Continental System was Bonaparte’s answer to the British blockade of Europe and closed all 
European ports to British goods in 1807.175 
With the Spanish unable to prevent British influence in British-allied Portugal, Napoleon 
sent almost 100,000 French troops into Spain to assist.  This move proved extremely unpopular 
with the Spanish people and led to a military coup that forced the abdication of the ailing Charles 
IV in favor of his son.  The older Bourbon monarch appealed to Bonaparte to act as an arbiter in 
the dynastic dispute.  Always the opportunist, Napoleon forced both father and son to cede their 
throne to Bonaparte’s brother Joseph in March 1808.  Within months, however, a nationalistic 
Spanish resistance movement developed in the rural areas and set up an opposition government 
known as the Cádiz Regency.  The country rapidly devolved into a brutal guerilla war in which 
both sides seemed willing to outdo each other in terms of ghastly cruelty.176 
 Americans watched events in Spain very closely, and it seemed to play directly into their 
notions of Bonaparte that the popular press had been fomenting since at least 1805.  Many, 
especially Federalists, applied the events of Spain to their own nation.  When they connected the 
usurpation of the Spanish throne to the popular perceptions of Bonaparte in the media, the result 
was something like what appeared in the North American and Mercantile Advertiser in 
September 1808.  In this letter to the editor, “A Ploughman” wrote that he had fallen asleep 
while reading reports of the brutal French occupation of Spain and had a dream.  In this dream, 
“a little Frenchman” stood before him and handed him a copy of the Jeffersonian newspaper, The 
Aurora which contained a series of eleven edicts that mirrored French policies in Spain.  Among 
other draconian policies, the edicts named his imperial majesty Joseph Bonaparte “King of the 
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Continent of North America,” forbade prints of Washington and Hamilton, and threatened to 
shoot any who kept weapons in their homes or gathered in groups of more than eight (children 
could gather in groups of up to twelve).177 
The aspect of this dream that would have stood out the most to the nineteenth century 
reader century was the complicity of other Americans in these usurpations of their own liberties.  
After all, it was not by accident that these edicts were being issued through the Jeffersonian 
papers and that one of the edicts authorized William Duane, the firebrand editor of The Aurora, 
to “arrest all printers who have published aught disrespectful to the Emperor and see that their 
bodies are pierced and stung on a pole.”  Conspiratorial stories of Napoleon’s imperial treachery 
in Switzerland, Holland, and Spain created a volatile environment of suspicion in American 
politics perhaps only rivaled by the Red Scares of the twentieth century and forced Americans to 
reconsider their own place and role in the world.178 
 The portrayal of Bonaparte’s perfidious and violent means of expansion in Europe, 
especially in Spain, and the seemingly very real threat of his subterfuge undermining the 
American republic during the Burr conspiracy led at least some Americans to conclude that the 
means of their nation’s own expansion in North America really did matter.  For other Americans 
it reinvigorated a belief that foreign empires—especially that of Bonaparte—on the North 
American continent were dangerous to American national security.  How to react to these threats 
though, provoked debate, even amongst political allies.  These themes played an increasingly 
important role as Americans considered the ramifications of the overthrow of the Bourbon 
monarchy in Spain and their contemplation of war with Great Britain in 1812 to the persistent 
problem of Florida. 
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Even before it was clear that Bonaparte would overthrow the Bourbons in Spain rumors 
were already flying about how the decaying situation in the Iberian Peninsula would alter 
American territorial ambitions.  In late 1807 and early 1808, an extract of a letter from a well-
placed source in Washington D.C. appeared in many papers.  The author reported that rumors in 
the “most respectable circles” claimed Bonaparte would soon issue a proclamation in which he 
would no longer acknowledge American shipping neutrality—a reasonably accurate explanation 
of Bonaparte’s Milan Decree.  Furthermore, and less accurately, it hinted that Napoleon would 
guarantee the United States Canada and Nova Scotia for American entry into a war against Great 
Britain.179 
This article touched off a brief firestorm.  Federalists assumed that the Jefferson 
administration would take the bait and draw the United States into a military conflict with Great 
Britain for the misguided purposes of territorial aggrandizement.  On January 5, 1808, the Boston 
Repertory published a “Dream.”  In the dream, the author traveled to New York in May, but 
instead of finding a prosperous port, he found ships laid up, soldiers patrolling the streets, and 
fortifications being built along the East River.  “The Genius of Bonaparte prevailed,” wailed the 
dreamer.  “His imperial fiat: his imperious command, have been heard…and his voice was 
obeyed in terror on our shores.”  The author cursed his “deluded leaders” for their ambition and 
warned his fellow countrymen.  “Think not…that the wily Corsican will better keep his word 
with you than with the exhausted Republic of Holland,” he began.  “Think not that you will be 
left peaceably to occupy the provinces of Canada or Nova Scotia when conquered by your allied 
forces…think not the mighty Bonaparte will generously yield up the boon of the Floridas.”  Such 
were the miseries, he concluded, that flowed from “an ambition of territorial aggrandizement.”  
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The Federalist suggestion of a military alliance between France and the United States was a 
relatively new rhetorical tool that gained power as time went on.  At this early date, however, it 
was not particularly effective since the Jefferson administration confined itself to economic 
warfare and harsh language against the British.180 
Other Federalists also decried any military action in support of France.  An author 
identifying himself only as AB wrote an article that ran in several newspapers, including page 
one of the New York Spectator.  He asked the administration if they really believed that 
Bonaparte would allow any nation to rival his own empire.  Did they truly think that Bonaparte 
would actually allow the United States to “remain as it is now, ONE VAST OR RATHER 
BOUNDLESS STATE?”  This was an interesting line of attack.  In effect, AB imagined a 
bipolar world dominated in the west by the United States, and in the east by Napoleon.  Such a 
world might seem reasonable to the starry-eyed Jeffersonians, but not to Bonaparte.  Would the 
emperor, asked AB rhetorically, allow the United States “to cross in any direction, his gigantic 
march toward universal dominion?”  The answer, was, of course, a negative one.181 
Another gloomy take was offered by an author writing under the pseudonym “Peace.”  In 
a widely reprinted article titled, “War Unnecessary and Ruinous,” he decried any war against 
Great Britain because it would do nothing but eventually draw the United States into a 
unwinnable war with Napoleon.  Like AB, “Peace” could not imagine a world in which 
Bonaparte could allow the United States to remain the dominate power in the Americas.  There 
were no limits to French ambition he wrote, and it was useless to trust in patriotic American 
unity in case of war against the French.  Almost quoting verbatim from A Secret History of the 
Court and Cabinet of St. Cloud, he wrote, “France has done more by her intrigues than her 
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arms,” and, he reminded his readers, “are there not Burrs and Wilkinsons in our country?”  “My 
fears for the independence of my country,” he stated flatly, “are founded on the character of 
Bonaparte.”  It was the height of foolishness, he wrote, to trust any territorial promises made by 
the Emperor.  In what was becoming standard Federalist rhetoric by 1808, he asked, “where are 
the nations who have negotiated with Bonaparte…and what has become of his guarantees?”182 
“Peace” then questioned the entire idea of expansion from a national security standpoint.  
“As to possessing Canada and the Floridas—of what use would they be to us—of what use is 
Louisiana to us, unless to hatch treasons.”  Canada was a country of Frenchmen, he continued, 
echoing arguments made about the population of Louisiana five years earlier, “and Frenchmen 
are always Frenchmen.”  With the British defeated using American help, what then?  With both 
Canada and Louisiana full of French sympathizers, the United States would be hemmed in 
territorially and fall easy prey to Bonaparte’s treachery.  “I tremble for the independence of my 
country,” he concluded, “when it must rest on the faith or humanity of a conqueror.”  It is 
important to note that the real power in all of these arguments came not in questioning the means 
of American expansion per se, but rather in the dangers of expansion to national security, 
especially when expansion required trusting in the good will of the treacherous Napoleon.183 
 Federalists who breathed a sigh of relief when the Jefferson administration did not 
actually plunge the United States into an ill-conceived war for Napoleon in 1808, still could not 
escape two uncomfortable and interrelated facts.  The first was that the decaying Spanish 
empire—nominally under the control of Joseph Bonaparte—still laid claim to large swaths of the 
Americans including both of the Floridas as well as Mexico and Cuba.  Under the Bourbons, 
Spain had continued to dispute the validity of the entire Louisiana Purchase.  No one in the 
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United States was quite sure whether a Bonaparte on the throne would change that policy.  
Second, despite spending $15 million and nearly going to war to prevent Napoleon from 
becoming their western neighbor in 1803, there was once again a Bonaparte on their borders.  As 
one Federalist newspaper editor groaned forlornly, “thus ends the miserable policy of attempting 
to attain security by purchasing the ground that a suspecting and meddlesome tenant might 
occupy.”  Another lamented, “Has not Bonaparte one foot in Spain, and another in South 
America?  Are not East and West Florida his own?  Let him but raise a standard there and we 
shall soon see, furnished from our own bowels, thirty thousand men glittering in arms.”184 
Not all Americans were such pessimists, however.  Some saw a golden opportunity to 
start history anew in North America.  Stories of burgeoning independence movements in some 
parts of the Spanish American empire encouraged some in the United States to consider the 
nature of their own expansion.  Often they did this in terms they derived from Bonaparte’s 
expansion in Europe.  The most eloquent and thoughtful example of this type of thinking 
occurred in a series of five articles first published in the Virginia Patriot, but later printed 
throughout the east coast under the pseudonym Rusticus during the fall of 1810.185 
Rusticus began his articles by stating that the world was changing before his eyes.  “We 
see mighty empires reduced to dependence,” he wrote, “and states long deemed unimportant 
become formidable to their neighbors.”  He acknowledged that, at least in this age, much of this 
was due to Napoleon, but he reminded his readers that the rise and fall of empires had been 
going on since the dawn of time.  With the rise of independence movements in Spanish colonies 
he continued, it appeared that the tide of empire was shifting inexorably west to the Americas 
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where new nations would rise from the ruins of the Spanish colonial empire.  This was, of 
course, of paramount interest to the United States as it would give the nation “formidable 
neighbors who will be able to manage their own affairs.”  “The Atlantic,” he wrote, “will no 
longer roll between the U. States and the mighty potentates of the earth.  They will border upon 
us to a great extent and touch us at points particularly vulnerable.”186 
Rusticus then tried to explain how he believed the United States ought to react to this new 
geopolitical reality.  Put simply, Americans would need to tread with great caution.  According 
to Rusticus, there were two outstanding issues that needed to be resolved to preserve the 
economic and political security of the United States in this new world order.  First was the 
acquisition of the Floridas, which would provide settlers in Alabama and Mississippi the water 
routes they needed for the transportation of goods to Mobile and the Gulf of Mexico.  Possessing 
Florida would also prevent these same settlers from being influenced by powers—obviously he 
had only one in mind—hostile to the United States.  The second issue was the frustratingly vague 
boundary between the United States and Mexico, which would, he wrote, cause no end to enmity 
between the two powers when Mexico became a “distinct power.”  Resolving these disputes 
without “employing the sword” would undoubtedly be a difficult proposition that would “take a 
great deal of moderation and of mutual good will,” according to Rusticus.  Making things even 
more difficult was the dubious circumstances by which the United States had acquired Louisiana.  
As Rusticus pointed out, these had been deliberately calculated by Bonaparte to “make 
impressions unfavorable to that friendship which it is in the interest of neighbors to cultivate 
with each other.”187 
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With the groundwork laid, Rusticus moved into the heart of his argument.  In doing so, 
he tied American conduct directly to Bonaparte.   French claims in the Spanish colonial 
possessions, he wrote, were those of an “ambitious despot.”  According to Rusticus, Bonaparte’s 
expansion came through “sinning against heaven and earth…violating the most sacred laws 
divine and human, betraying friends who trusted implicitly in him.”  Thus Bonaparte had 
“robbed an ancient and high minded people of their sovereignty, and on atrocious deeds founds 
his whole claim to dominions over their American brethren.”  Yet, Rusticus continued, “the right 
given by force and fraud can only be coextensive with the means which gave it.”  In other words, 
expansion done through deceit and unlawful force could only be maintained though the same 
means.  Rusticus thus maintained that it would be near impossible for Bonaparte to maintain his 
grasp on the distant American colonies because his rule could only be enforced directly through 
coercion and deceit.188 
So much for the cruel and treacherous expansion along the Napoleonic model.  But, 
insisted Rusticus, there was another way when it came to extending an empire.  If the United 
States considered the “abstract right” and the “great, unalterable principles of justice” it would 
set the conditions for a permanent friendship with the newly formed governments of the 
Americas.  “The Floridas may be seized,” Rusticus wrote, “under various pretexts.”  But 
obtaining this critical piece of territory through “force or intrigue would make a deep and lasting 
impact on Spanish America.”  “A generous mind,” he went on, “cannot view without extreme 
disgust a nation boasting its justice and moderation and liberty lying in wait for the distress of its 
neighbors and seizing the moment when they are struggling for existence…to wrest or seduce 
from them an extremely valuable portion of their territory.”  Put simply, if the United States were 
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to expand through Napoleonic means, it would set the stage for perpetual animosity and war in 
the Americas, but if she expanded through just and magnanimous principles, it would create an 
environment of peace and prosperity for generations.189 
In his final article, Rusticus explained explicitly how to apply these principles of just 
expansion to the situation facing the United States.  First, the nation had to support these nascent 
American independence movements to prevent French control of Florida and Mexico.  This was 
critical to American national security and economic prosperity.  Second, to ensure perpetual 
friendship among the new empires emerging in the Americas, the United States should give up 
the half of Louisiana west of the Mississippi to an independent Mexico in return for the Floridas.  
Mexico resented the loss of its northern territories, he explained, and these territories were full of 
strange peoples who could never be assimilated into the United States and the vague boundaries 
would invariably cause problems between the two nations.  Florida, on the other hand was a 
knife poised at the heart of the United States, but was disconnected from and therefore useless to 
Mexico.  Ultimately, claimed Rusticus, this trade would have the happy benefit of divesting each 
nation of, “a territory of no value to the owner, but of immediate importance to the opposite 
party.”  Just as important, it would set a tone of cooperation and peace in the Americas.190 
Rusticus represents the way that at least some idealistic Americans sought to understand 
the new world that Bonaparte’s own cruelty and deceit had made possible within ideas that they 
appropriated from the expansion of the Napoleonic empire.  He imagined a peaceful and rational 
expansion to America’s natural limits in contrast to the cruel and treacherous expansion of 
Bonaparte.  He also represents an almost purely Vattelan worldview.  For Rusticus and others 
familiar with the Swiss political theorist, Napoleon’s European empire had overturned the 
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delicate balance of power that was the best safeguard against a “universal monarchy.”  States had 
an obligation to protect each other to maintain the balance of power and the nations of Europe 
had failed in their basic Vattelian obligation to protect the sovereignty of their brother nations.  
In the New World, it fell to the United States to help establish a new, peaceful balance of power 
of mutually supportive, sovereign nations.  Rusticus never, of course, mentioned this directly.  
His popular audience hardly cared about the intricacies of dead Swiss theorists.  Still, the 
fingerprints of Vattel were clearly evident in the work of Rusticus.  Despite Rusticus’s eloquent 
appeals for a peaceful balance of the power in the Americas, however, most Americans were far 
less magnanimous.  They also used the rhetoric of Bonaparte to frame their arguments.191 
One group that Rusticus was writing against were Federalists who called for an 
immediate military solution to the Florida problem.  “If Napoleon obtains a footing on this 
continent we are undone,” stated one in an article in the American Citizen.  Like Rusticus, this 
author was preoccupied by the Spanish colonies in the Americas. “Spain, I fear is conquered,” 
the author continued, “the colonies of Spain, if they do not become Independent, will follow the 
fate of Spain.”  Unlike Rusticus, however, he saw little that cheered him in these independence 
movements.  South America was unprepared to be a republic, he complained, and would likely 
become an independent monarchy.  Cuba, with its valuable plantations and strategic position in 
the Caribbean, would probably be seized by the British.  The Floridas, however, did not have the 
population to become an independent republic and had no strategic value to the British.  Thus 
they would probably fall “under the dominion of the grand despot.”  Yet, the author wrote, 
almost petulantly, “they should belong to us.”  In fact, he continued, “all Europe should be 
excluded from them.”  “They must be purchased or conquered,” he declared, and it seemed 
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inconceivable that Bonaparte would part with a colony with which he could exert influence on 
the United States.  There was but one alternative he concluded: “we must take them.”  
Fortunately, the author reasoned, “very little fighting will be necessary.”  Without a navy, he 
argued, Napoleon was, for the present at least, unable to oppose the designs United States in the 
Americas.  Thus, when the moment for action came, Americans had an excellent chance to defy 
Bonaparte if Americans remained, “faithful to ourselves, faithful to our interest [and] faithful to 
our safety.”192 
This rhetoric for war to prevent Bonaparte’s gaining a foothold on the North American 
continent sounded very similar to the debates over the use of military force during the 
Mississippi Crisis of 1803.  Yet, there was at least one major difference.  During the Mississippi 
Crisis, those in favor of an attack on New Orleans had justified their calls for war through 
Spanish abrogation of Pickney’s Treaty.  It was a flimsy excuse, to be sure, but one that held up 
legally in a Vattelian world.  In this case, however, there was no such legal justification.  
Bonaparte’s influence was so dangerous to the sovereignty of the United States, that an openly 
offensive, preemptive war was preferable to it.  The article did not even present the façade of 
rendering assistance to a struggling neighbor.  More than a few Federalists perceived Napoleon 
to be so dangerous to the very existence of the United States that they were prepared to turn 
Vattel on his head. 
Still other Americans looked with cynical satisfaction on the Napoleonic usurpation of 
the Bourbon monarchy as finally marking an end to the political fiction that Spain was actually 
in control of her own foreign policy.  For example, in July 1808, an editorial in The Monitor 
wrote that the United States had little to fear from a Bonaparte on the throne of the Spain.  
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Indeed, the editorial argued that it had the potential to be an excellent real estate opportunity for 
the nation.  Like Louisiana in 1803, reasoned the author, Florida was little more than a target for 
the Royal Navy and thus Napoleon would likely be interested in divesting himself of the 
vulnerable property as soon as possible.  The article ended with cynical optimism.  At last there 
would now be no more “baffling responses from Madrid to Paris and Paris to Madrid, but the 
avowed and responsible authority will be found in the person of Bonaparte.”  This fact, the 
author concluded, “will certainly be an advantage to all nations.”  Enough Americans agreed (or 
at least seemed to) with this sentiment for a Federalist author in the Newburyport Herald to 
explode in rage over Jeffersonians who would rather see “every man woman and child in Spain, 
spitted on the bayonets of Bonaparte’s war dogs, than lose their fifteen millions.”193 
In the flurry of ideas flying through the press about national security and expansion, few 
Americans apparently considered that the West Floridians might have something to say about 
their own future.  In the aftermath of the failed rebellions of 1804 and 1805, three factions 
gradually developed in West Florida.  The most numerous composed of those settlers who were 
content with laissez faire Spanish rule—or at least those who owed their land grants and 
positions of authority to the Imperial government.  Another, smaller group supported an 
American annexation of the territory, and a third faction sought to set up an independent republic 
of West Florida.  The overthrow of the monarchy in Spain and crumbling authority of the 
Spanish governor, however, led to the fatal weakening of the loyalist faction.194 
Taking advantage of the situation, pro-independence residents of the four parishes west 
of the Perdido River called for a convention in late July, 1810.  The convention delegates 
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carefully avoided any overt talk of rebellion but drafted a document pledging nominal support 
for the Cádiz Regency and to offering to “assist” the governor by taking over most of his 
executive duties.  This was a thinly veiled attempt at direct rule, but with only twenty-eight 
Spanish soldiers at his disposal the governor had little choice but to cooperate with the 
convention.  Quietly, though, the governor attempted to send secret messages to Spanish officials 
in Pensacola requesting aid to reestablish his authority.  Learning that messages had been sent to 
Pensacola and fearing harsh reprisals, the convention deposed the governor as “unworthy of their 
confidence,” and quickly mustered a force of pro-independence militia.  This force easily 
overran the tiny Spanish garrison at Baton Rouge on September 23, 1810, and the convention 
declared the Republic of West Florida an independent nation shortly thereafter.  On October 10, 
the newly independent Republic of West Florida warned that their independence was threatened 
by the “partizans” of Bonaparte and formally requested admittance to the United States.195 
 The request of West Florida to join the union created something of a foreign policy crisis 
in the Madison administration.  Based on the Vattel’s law of nations, Madison could not 
recognize the independent West Florida government, even to accept it into the Union, without 
effectively renouncing the American claim that West Florida had been bought and paid for with 
the original Louisiana Purchase.  This would allow both the Cádiz Regency and Napoleonic 
Spain to legitimately claim West Florida as a rebellious province and view any American 
interference there as an act of war—and also a violation of Vattel’s principle of non-interference 
with other nation’s sovereignty.  The British might also view any American meddling with West 
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Florida as an attack on their new ally, Bourbon Spain.  Time was working against Madison as 
well.  He knew that the British had already quashed an independence movement in Venezuela in 
support of Spain earlier in the year and there were reports that runaway slaves and Indians were 
being stirred up by Spanish agents along the border with East Florida.  It would be all too easy 
for the British navy to step in on behalf of their ally in the name of restoring order to the chaotic 
situation.196 
With this bewildering variety of factors in mind, Madison moved quickly and attempted 
to thread the needle of foreign diplomacy.  Without waiting for Congress to reconvene in 
December, Madison decided to ignore the West Florida government altogether so as not to 
jeopardize American claims to the area.  Instead, in a carefully worded proclamation on October 
27, he announced that the United States would occupy the region pursuant to the title conferred 
by the Louisiana Purchase in order to preserve the “tranquility and security of our adjoining 
territories.”  In separate instructions, Madison ordered the governor of the Orleans Territory, 
William Claiborne, to immediately incorporate West Florida into his own jurisdiction and 
authorized him to use the Army, navy gunboats, as well as militia from Louisiana and 
Mississippi to quell any resistance from the government of West Florida.  Even though most 
inhabitants of the area did hope to become part of the United States, they wanted to do it on their 
own terms and many resented the heavy-handed methods of the American government.  Despite 
some initial protests and threats to resist an American invasion, however, it was abundantly clear 
that Claiborne had overwhelming military force at his disposal.  After seventy-four days as an 
independent republic, the nation of West Florida quietly fell under the jurisdiction of the United 
States at the point of a bayonet.  Even this occupation did not entirely solve the Florida issue, 
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however.  The key cities of Mobile and Pensacola remained under Spanish control as did the rest 
of the Florida Peninsula.197 
 Despite Madison’s legalistic, if harsh, approach, Federalist newspapers were apoplectic at 
his handling of the West Florida affair.  They vented their rage through the Napoleonic rhetoric 
that was already second nature to them.  After a decade as an opposition, cracks were beginning 
to show in the Federalist camp and the party had a difficult time coordinating their responses to 
the Florida affair without seeming hypocritical. By the end of the crisis, the most effective 
attacks were those that argued the United States had become a willing tool of Napoleonic France.  
No matter which approach they used, however, the Federalist appeals to the American people 
used the rhetoric of Bonaparte. 
Even before the crisis reached forced Madison to act the Federalist newspapers began 
their attacks.  In August, the editor of the Boston Gazette wrote a scathing editorial in which he 
warned his readers that the Madison administration would likely not take advantage of the 
golden opportunities that the chaos in Florida provided to the nation.  Like many others before 
him, the editor pointed out the important advantages of American possession of the Floridas.  
West Florida, he noted, contained Mobile, “an outlet essential to the convenience of a large 
district of the western country.”  East Florida, in the hands of Americans, would prove “an 
invaluable security and a powerful means to annoy our enemies.”  In the hands of others, 
however, it would be a “scourge to chastise and vex us.”  The United States, he insisted, would 
justified in “gaining them at considerable expense.”  Yet, as the region was populated mostly by 
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Americans, the editor continued, that it was likely that they would soon make an “offer of 
associating with our union.”  Yet, in this offer, “they will likely be disappointed.”198 
Madison would not dare to receive this western “Gibraltar” into the union even at little 
cost to the United States because such a step would “involve him with Bonaparte.”  Even if the 
British and the Spanish renounced their claims on the territory the editor argued, Madison would 
never move against the French Emperor’s wishes.  “Mr. Jefferson used to say,” the editor 
concluded, “that the Floridas would fall into our hands without effort, as a ripe cherry would fall 
into the hands of him, who waited with patience for the proper season.”  The current 
administration, however, would rather allow the cherry to fall to the ground and rot.  “To them it 
is forbidden fruit—forbidden by Napoleon.”  For this editor and those who thought like him, the 
whole basis of Jeffersonian expansion was dictated by fear of Bonaparte.  This was not unlike 
how Federalists had portrayed Jefferson as a starry-eyed idealist during the Louisiana Purchase 
debates.  By 1810, however, the global circumstances had changed.  Bonaparte was the 
undisputed master of Europe and Federalists adjusted their rhetoric accordingly.  Many 
suggested that the Madison administration cowered in fear before Napoleon rather than simply 
being naively hoodwinked by his empty promises.199 
Most Federalists were probably surprised when they read about Madison’s military 
annexation plan for West Florida, but they quickly revised their lines of attack to correspond to 
the new reality.  Of course, Bonaparte was still central to their rhetoric.  On December 18, the 
Boston Repertory published a long discussion of the President’s proclamation.  The Repertory 
acknowledged that the United States had a “clear and unquestionable” title to West Florida.  The 
means of asserting this claim, however, were very important.  “Is it consistent with sound policy 
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and the pacific professions of the United States,” asked the Repertory, “to oust the Spaniards at 
the point of the bayonet?”  They found the timing of the territory’s “forcible seizure” extremely 
questionable.  “While Spain was the ally of France, we did not dare assert our rights in arms,” 
the author noted.200 
Yet, in 1810, the situation was reversed.  Bourbon Spain was the ally of Britain, 
struggling for its independence against the Bonaparte regime, and it was at this point that 
Madison chose to forcefully assert American claims in West Florida at the risk of starting a war 
with Great Britain.  Small wonder the Repertory believed there was more to the policy than met 
the eye.  Why, asked the author, had Madison suddenly become a “military man” so interested in 
“offending Great Britain and patriotic Spain?”  For the editor of the Repertory, the bottom line 
was simple: “he serves Bonaparte.”  “We think it a just speculation,” concluded the Repertory 
article, “that West Florida has been seized, not only with the consent of France, but with her 
special insistence, and is probably to be held in secret trust for Napoleon until the fate of Spain is 
decided.”  In contrast to the earlier Boston Gazette article, the Repertory’s analysis of Madison’s 
expansionist policies shows a shift to a much darker rhetoric.  In the eyes of the Repertory, by 
committing military forces to Florida, Madison was not simply reacting in fear to Bonaparte, but 
was actively working as an agent of his foreign policy in the Americas.201 
Accusations of the administration’s complicity with Bonaparte in foreign affairs quickly 
became commonplace.  There had been occasional suggestions of this in earlier times, but, 
before the West Florida revolt the debate had been in the abstract.  The actual use of ground 
forces to enforce the American claims in West Florida by military fiat was so distasteful to many 
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Federalists that it led to an unmistakable ratcheting up of this rhetoric.  For example, a typical 
article making the rounds of the Federalist presses in early 1811 wondered that the United States 
was, “actually and openly” taking part in Bonaparte’s “unnatural war against commerce and 
civilization.”  The author warned his readers that nation’s military was now arrayed against the 
interests of the American people and ready “to carry the projects of the Emperor into execution.”  
Another characteristic article in the Federal Republican accused the United States of being “an 
instrument of Bonaparte’s aggrandizement.”202 
In the wake of the furor over the annexation of West Florida, Jeffersonians fought back 
harder than they had done in years against Federalist attacks on their expansionists policies.  
Recognizing the power of Napoleonic language in mobilizing public support, they too framed 
their arguments using Bonaparte.  On December 14, 1810, while the rest of Boston was reading 
biting commentaries on the administration’s military occupation of Florida, the Jeffersonian 
readers of the Old Colony Gazette were treated to a front page, seven-year retrospective on the 
benefits of the Louisiana Purchase.  “The cession of Louisiana to the United States was an 
event,” the article began, “the importance of which does not appear to have been duly 
appreciated.”  The article singled out one group in particular who did not seem to understand the 
value of Louisiana:  “Those whose distempered imaginations discover in every passing cloud a 
squadron of French balloons, with an invading army of exterminating jacobins.”  This, of course, 
was a jab at the Federalists, who always seemed too ready to believe the incredible stories they 
read about the duplicity of the Emperor. 203 
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It ought not be forgotten, the article continued, that there was at one time a very real 
threat to the United States from Bonaparte.  At the very moment the Purchase was worked out, 
“the terrible Napoleon was on the point of sending out a formidable expedition of French troops, 
for the very purpose of colonizing the country under consideration.”  According to the article, it 
was only through the shrewd diplomacy of Jefferson that the horrors of a Napoleonic colony as a 
neighbor had not come to pass.  In case the audience had forgotten, the article was happy to 
remind them what the terrible consequences might have come to pass.  For this, they reached 
back to America’s favorite historian, David Ramsey and quoted at length from his Charleston 
speech celebrating the Purchase.  In particular, they highlighted the point where he argued that a 
French military colony would have checked the expansion of the United States or led to its 
dismemberment through to French economic pressure.  To Ramsey’s analysis, they added one 
more comment of their own.  “No people,” the article wrote of the French, “are so well qualified 
for acquiring an ascendency over the savage mind.”  There was no telling what mischief the 
“wily Napoleon” could have made on the western frontier with the help of thousands of native 
Indian allies.204 
“I think,” the article concluded, “we cannot too highly applaud the wisdom of that 
policy…which so happily exempted the nation from the inconvenience and danger of a 
formidable and restless neighbor.”  Though it was cleverly disguised, the underlying message of 
this article was not hard to discern when given the context.  The Jefferson administration had 
done whatever it took—including overlooking some his most cherished constitutional 
principles—to prevent Bonaparte from gaining an American colony.  In doing so, he had saved 
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the nation from great danger.  At the end of 1810, with the prospect of Bonaparte gaining control 
of the Floridas, it was vital for the Madison administration to do the same.205 
Another way Jeffersonians defended Madison’s actions in Florida was by attacking 
Federalist hypocrisy on the subject of Napoleon.  On the first day of 1811, an article in the New 
Hampshire Patriot went on the offensive against what it called the “uncandid and inconsistent 
conduct of the Federalist faction in regard to taking possession of this territory.”  The editor 
asked his readers to recall that only five years ago, the same Federalists who now claimed 
Madison’s actions as an act of war against a foreign power, had recoiled at the prospect of 
paying $2 million for territory that we had already bought in the original Louisiana Purchase.  
Quoting from prominent Federalist papers, the article went on.  In 1805, the Federalists had 
called Jefferson “cowardly” and “under fear of Napoleon,” for not daring to “take possession of 
what was indisputably our own.”  These same men now claimed that Madison was acting out of 
“fear or love of Napoleon” for doing exactly what they had counseled before.  No, the article 
continued, Madison’s policy actually demonstrated that the course of the United States would be 
charted in spite of Napoleon’s bluster and not because of it.  In the end though, the author 
doubted his logic would change any minds.  “Each and every thing is condemned,” he 
complained.  “The President and Congress is stigmatized and abused—one is called a ‘French 
President,’ and the other declared to be guided by the ‘secret hand of Napoleon.’”206 
Without a doubt, the most damaging attack on the Madison’s expansionist policies in 
West Florida had been the accusation that the United States had finally become an active 
participant in Napoleonic expansion.  This rhetorical weapon gained its potency because of the 
assumptions Americans made about the purpose of military alliances.  As Daniel Lang shows in 
                                                      
205 Ibid. 
206 The New Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), January 1, 1811. 
 
 
 137 
Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, military alliances held an important role in the world of 
Emmerich Vattel.  In a perfect world, said Vattel, each nation state would have approximately 
the same power and thus balance each other out.  States became dangerous when they were not 
balanced out by their neighbors.  Alliances were an unfortunate necessity in an imperfect world.  
They allowed smaller, less powerful states to preserve their sovereignty by collectively 
counterbalancing their more powerful neighbors and allowed neighbors to band together to check 
a state which attempted to upset the balance of power and create a “universal monarchy” by 
subverting the sovereignty of other states.207 
Bonaparte threatened to upend the whole Vattelian understanding of the proper role of 
alliances because his alliances only reinforced his dreams of “universal monarchy.”  This is why 
the Richmond Enquirer was so struck by the remaking of Europe after the French victories of 
1806.  The Enquirer marveled at the ability of Bonaparte to create new kingdoms with a snap of 
his fingers and then weave them into the fabric of his empire through a complex system of 
alliances to suit his ambitious needs.  “If his success should warrant an exorbitant extension of 
his power,” the article explained, he could then “reduce Holland, Italy, and even Wittenburg and 
Bavaria, into humble provinces of his empire.”  On the other hand, “if the situation of Europe did 
not favor his ambition,” he could simply “consider them like the Swiss Cantons, as simply 
connected by alliance to his kingdom, but not subjected to his control.”  In this way, he did not 
have to actually govern another state directly; he could obtain just as satisfactory result by 
entangling his neighbors in webs of deceitful alliances.208 
Thus, when Federalists accused their political opponents of making a military alliance 
with Bonaparte, they were no longer simply suggesting that the Jeffersonians were naively 
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making a bad deal for a worthless piece of real estate in the west.  Instead, the Federalists 
suggested that the Madison administration and its followers were actively scheming to pervert 
the entire world order as envisioned by Vattel.  Not only were they allying with a power that 
sought to establish a universal monarchy through a system of complex alliances, but also they 
were putting the nation’s very sovereignty at risk since an alliance with the emperor would only 
be good as long as it suited the needs of Bonaparte.  When it was within his power, the United 
States would be reduced to a “humble province,” of the French empire, just like Holland and 
Italy. 
In January 1811, the Jeffersonian dominated Congress attempted to clarify the situation 
in Florida by passing a resolution that provided for the “temporary occupation” of West Florida, 
warned Spain that it would not tolerate the transfer of Florida to any “other foreign power.”  It 
also gave the President power to “take possession of, and occupy” any parts of Spanish Florida 
east of the Perdido River that the “local authorities” in the area might be willing to “deliver up” 
to the United States or that might be threatened by a third power.  When Spain still refused to 
give up Mobile and Pensacola, Madison attempted a more aggressive solution to the issue of 
Florida. Seeking to duplicate the success of the West Florida revolution, American officials 
quietly armed and organized a coup of American-born Floridians along the Georgia border with 
the understanding that these “local authorities” would be more amenable to American annexation 
than the Spanish officials.  Backed by U.S. gunboats anchored menacingly offshore and promises 
of U.S. military support, the rebels quickly took Amelia Island and forced the Spanish south to 
St. Augustine.209 
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At St. Augustine, however, the rebels ran into stiff resistance and the fighting devolved 
first into a stalemate, and then into a nasty guerilla war.  A bill that would have explicitly 
allowed the handful of American military forces already in Spanish Florida to occupy the 
territory failed to pass an increasingly disgruntled congress in June of 1812 and forced Madison 
to reconsider his policies on the southern border.  Realizing that such aggressive expansion in 
Florida would further exacerbate a divided nation already at war with Great Britain, Madison 
withdrew U.S. military support for the East Florida Republic.  A second bill that authorizing the 
use of force to prevent the British from using Florida as a base of operations failed in February 
1814.  However, a modified version did authorize the administration to seize the Mobile region 
and this was done in short order.  Devoid of American support, the rebellion collapsed and by 
mid 1814, the last of the rebels had surrendered or fled the territory.210 
Preoccupied with an increasingly likely war with Great Britain on their northern borders, 
Federalists—concentrated in the urban strongholds of the northeast—did not comment much on 
the East Florida fiasco.  Perhaps they missed an opportunity in doing so.  In 1980, the historians 
Ronald Hatzenbuehler and Robert Ivie argued through a complicated word analysis model that it 
was the persuasive Jeffersonian rhetoric of “recolonization” by Great Britain which finally led 
the congress to declare war on Great Britain.  Still, the Federalists regrouped quite quickly and 
solidified their anti-expansionist rhetoric around the connected themes of Bonaparte and 
Florida.211 
The best example was an article initially published in the Alexandria Gazette, but later 
reprinted in numerous Federalist papers.  It pointed out the uncomfortable connections between 
                                                      
210 Cusick, The Other War of 1812; J.C.A Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands, 124-133; Owsley and Smith, 
Filibusters and Expansionists, 80-81. 
211 Ronald Hatzenbuehler and Robert Ivie, “Justifying the War of 1812: Toward a Model of Congressional Behavior 
in Early War Crisises,” Social Science History 4, no. 4 (Autumn, 1980), 453-477. 
 
 
 140 
Madison’s actions in Florida and Bonaparte’s actions in Europe.  “Madison did not pretend to 
have any claim of right to this territory, but urged its conquest upon the plea of mere expediency, 
to prevent it from falling into the hands of the British” the author pointed out.  “This was,” he 
continued, “precisely the reason given by Bonaparte for the conquest of Switzerland, of Holland, 
of Italy and the neighboring republics and his present efforts to subdue Spain and Portugal; to 
prevent the influence of the British in the affairs on the continent.”  The author also found timing 
of American involvement suspicious.  “During the time that Bonaparte was a friend and ally of 
Spain, and England her enemy, expedience never suggested to our administration that East 
Florida might be conquered by Great Britain.”  The author had one final complaint as he 
concluded.  “The farce of receiving a province from a handful of insurgents…is disgraceful in 
the extreme.  If Florida must be ours, let the arms of the United States take it, and not receive it 
at second hand.”212 
In the Alexandria Gazette article, the author artfully combined multiple pieces of anti-
expansionist rhetoric around Bonaparte to create an effective public argument.  First, he equated 
the questionable moral justifications of American involvement with Florida to Bonaparte’s 
previous expansion in Europe.  Second, he directly tied American imperial expansion to 
Bonaparte’s concurrent conflict with Great Britain, thus indirectly accusing the United States of 
either forming a military alliance with France or demonstrating cowardly subservice to the 
Emperor.  Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the author indirectly accused the United States 
of expansion through treachery with the comment in which he suggested that if Florida was truly 
critical to the United States, the United States ought to seize it outright rather than foment 
rebellion.  Though he did not say it directly, any reader of the Gazette would have immediately 
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equated such expansion through duplicity to the “wily Corsican.”  Here again, expansion itself 
was not the issue, it was the means of expansion that the Federalists found troubling.  The doors 
of the debate over the bill to allow American occupation of Florida were closed, so we do not 
know how the representatives made their arguments.  However, it does seem likely that many of 
their arguments were made along lines similar to this article.  If so, arguments against expansion 
by tying American actions to Bonaparte proved highly successful once again. 
As the United States drifted toward the War of 1812, Federalists throughout the United 
States proved adept at retooling their Bonapartist rhetoric for the coming conflict with Great 
Britain.  Historians continue to paint Federalist reaction to the conflict as hysterically, even 
treasonously, anti-war.  This is a misconception.  In “Party Unity and the War of 1812,” David 
Hickey demonstrated that while Federalists were quite prepared to back defensive military 
measures, like harbor defenses and the navy, they refused to endorse measures they deemed of 
an “offensive” nature.  Despite his excellent analysis, however, Hickey failed to provide a good 
explanation for why the Federalists from South Carolina to Vermont were able to rally behind a 
defensive war, but not an offensive one.  Examining public Federalist reaction to the War of 
1812 through the lens of the Bonapartist rhetoric they developed over the last seven years 
fighting against aggressive expansion in Florida provides this missing link.213 
 As in Florida, much early opposition to the impending war was based on the perceived 
danger of entangling the United States with a treacherous military despot.   A large number of 
Federalists based their arguments on a widely reprinted article from the Bonapartist propaganda 
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organ, Le Montieur.  According to this article, the Emperor had allegedly proclaimed to a 
delegation from Ionia that, “In India, in America, in the Mediterranean, everything that is and 
has been French shall always be so.  Conquered by the enemy, by the vicissitudes of war, they 
shall return into the empire by the other events of the war, or by the stipulations of the peace.”214 
 One representative article that based their argument off this piece began its life in the 
Connecticut Current, but was printed as far south as Alexandria Daily Gazette.  In the first part 
of the article, the author made some of the same points about Florida that many had made before 
him, but tied them to the new proclamation from the Emperor.  He warned his countrymen that 
Bonaparte’s claim to everything that had been French was no idle boast, and that this had 
immense ramifications for the foreign policy of the United States.  “West Florida as far as the 
Perdido River, was owned and occupied by the French,” he noted, and the American government 
had “employed some very extraordinary measures” to conquer it.  Yet, he continued, “whether 
they got it by purchase, or by the sword, Bonaparte declares that it will be his at last.”  Therefore, 
tying American foreign policy to the character of Napoleon was a highly dangerous prospect.215 
From there, the author artfully tied his concerns over American intervention in Florida 
into his current opposition to a war with Great Britain.  “Nova Scotia and Canada were owned by 
the French,” he pointed out, and “now…there is a plan afoot for conquering Canada.”  This was 
too much for the author.  “Is not, ‘the hand of Bonaparte’ in this thing?”  Knowing the difficultly 
of a cross-ocean invasion, the author surmised, Napoleon intended to make the United States an 
unwitting tool of his own imperial aggrandizement.  Yet, it went even deeper than that. “Over 
and above all this,” he reminded his readers, “a very large part of the United States has been 
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heretofore claimed by France.”  Ultimately, the author concluded, Bonaparte’s imperial dream 
included the entire western half of the North American continent as well as Florida and Canada, 
and an ill-advised war with Great Britain would only help the treacherous Bonaparte realize his 
immoral dream of “universal monarchy.”216 
 The arguments above did not directly accuse the United States of creating a military 
alliance with France, instead the author was content to simply point out the danger of trusting a 
treacherous military despot.  Many others commentators, however, did raise the damning 
accusation of a military alliance with Bonaparte.  Historian Lawrence Kaplan centered most of 
an essay on this accusation, and concluded, unsurprisingly, that Madison did not, in fact, intend 
to make any kind of military alliance with France.  That is almost certainly true, however, 
Kaplan misses the point.  Perception is almost always more important than reality, and after at 
least five years of seemingly pro-French foreign policy in Florida, the charges seemed 
uncomfortably accurate to many Federalists. 
 A widely reprinted author writing under the pseudonym Nestor made this charge quite 
forcefully.  In one of several articles, he claimed that he had been accused of using imprecise 
language by suggesting the relationship between the United States and France was one of 
alliance.  He shrugged off such concerns.  “I presume that I was correct in using the term 
alliance, for though we may, in pure finesse, abstain from signing a formal treaty offensive and 
defense, our conduct will include all the necessary parts of the treaty.”  “I presume,” he 
continued sarcastically, “that no instance will be produced of two nations aiding one another by 
making war on a third nation without being called allies.”  Later in the war, another author linked 
this point directly to American policy in Florida.  As the magnitude of Bonaparte’s disaster in 
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Russian became known, his fate became increasingly clear.  The Boston’s Repertory printed its 
own take on what they presumed would be a new world order led by Great Britain.  They had 
little good to say.  “In the general restoration which will take place,” the Repertory asked 
gloomily, “how will the voluntary allies of the humbled despot, the projectors of expeditions into 
Canada and East Florida, as diversions in his favor, appear?”217  
 Nestor was a prolific writer.  In another article, he cleverly combined several of the older 
Federalist arguments against expansion and turned them into a case against a war with Great 
Britain.  He began by playing on Federalist fears about Bonaparte’s deposition of the Spanish 
monarchy by warning that the Iberian Peninsula was only the means to a sprawling overseas 
empire.  Nestor accused the United States of playing an “auxiliary” to Bonaparte’s imperial 
dream since war with Great Britain would force her to divert troops from Spain to Canada and 
Nova Scotia.  Britain would soon be brought to the bargaining table.  Yet, the Spanish empire 
was only the start of Bonaparte’s overseas ambitions.  He would claim “Maurilius, Bourbon, the 
Cape of Good Hope, Martinique, Guadalupe, Demerara, and Suriname” as having once been part 
of the French Empire—a reference back to Napoleon’s supposed response to the Ionian 
delegation.218 
Nestor elaborated: “[Bonaparte] will then tend to his American provinces that were given 
him by Spain.”  East and West Florida would soon have “French settlers and French garrisons.”  
With the French in Pensacola, Nestor went on, he did not need to remind his readers “what a 
submissive and tractable set of people our new French citizens in New Orleans are likely to 
prove.”  “Their revolt,” he growled, “is absolutely certain for they know that we should not 
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venture to reduce them by force.”  Nestor left his audience with a final jarring question.  Having 
helped Napoleon to “conquer peace,” how long did they think it would be before he “picked a 
quarrel with the United States?”219 
In this remarkable article, Nestor built on multiple anti-expansionist arguments that had 
been in place for nearly a decade.  In the first place, he depicted American expansion as an 
auxiliary to Bonaparte.  This was a deliberate choice of words, since Nestor had used the world 
“ally” in his last article.  Nestor chose “auxiliary” as a classical term that denoted a military force 
working with another nation’s military but that was clearly subordinate to the other nation in 
terms of strategy and foreign policy.  This was an obvious downgrade from an “ally” who at least 
retained their free will in foreign policy.  It is important to note that Nestor was not anti-
expansionist.  After all, he indirectly claimed that the United States did not have the courage to 
impose martial law in New Orleans.  His concern was that American expansion appeared to be 
only for the dreams of Bonaparte. 
Nestor then tied American subservience to Bonaparte to his own imperial designs in the 
Americans.  He did this by using American fears over his disposition of the Spanish monarchy 
and turning them into a clear concern for American national security.  He did this by blending 
concerns over the duplicity of the Emperor with the demographic concerns that Federalists had 
raised a decade earlier when discussing how to assimilate the peoples of Louisiana into the 
American union.  With Bonaparte kept out of North America, the peoples of Louisiana would—
hopefully—eventually assimilate to American political and social norms, but with the 
treacherous Napoleon reintroduced to North America through his Spanish colonies or restored 
French colonies, it would only be a matter of time before the west devolved into chaos and 
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bloodshed.  With his well crafted arguments that built on years of Napoleon fears, it is little 
wonder that this was one of the most re-published articles in the United States during the first 
half of 1812. 
By June of 1812, the calls for action from the western-aligned “war hawk” wing of the 
Jeffersonian party had become too loud to ignore any longer and Madison reluctantly asked 
Congress for a declaration of war.  After eighteen days of debate, Congress acceded to the 
President’s request by the slimmest margin in American history.  Though he had been able to 
scrape up enough votes for war, Madison was not able to unite the nation behind his foreign 
policy.  Federalists vigorously opposed the War of 1812 using the anti-expansionist rhetoric 
inherited from the Florida fiasco.  The inconclusive nature of the conflict during its first two 
years only emboldened the Federalists in their efforts to oppose what they saw as an immoral 
war waged on behalf of Napoleon.220 
The war went badly from the start.  Despite confident Jeffersonian assurances that with 
the British occupied by Napoleon, conquering Canada would be a “mere matter of marching,” 
American invasions in 1812-13 were stymied by a surprisingly tenacious Canadian defense, 
American military incompetence, and the refusal of many American militiamen to cross an 
international border and engage in an “offensive war.”  Farther west at Fort Detroit, an ill-
prepared American force surrendered to a smaller British army partly because the American 
forces had not yet received news that war had been declared.  At sea, the Royal Navy easily 
outmatched their undersized American foe and established a crippling blockade.  About the only 
good news was that the British were unable to capitalize on their advantages since Napoleon still 
occupied their attention in Europe.221 
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In 1814, the already dim American fortunes took a further turn for the worse.  An Anglo-
Russian coalition defeated Napoleon, forced the emperor to abdicate and sent him into exile.  
This allowed the British to concentrate their forces and take the offensive in the American 
theater.  The British raided the Chesapeake, easily brushed aside American resistance, and 
burned the national capital.  Only a stubborn defense of Baltimore forced the British to withdraw 
from the region.  Farther south, the British assembled a large invasion force in the Caribbean for 
the purpose of conquering New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.  Opposing them was a handful of 
troops under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson.  A few months earlier, Jackson’s 
troops had inflicted a crushing defeat on the pro-British faction of the Creek nation at the Battle 
of Horseshoe Bend.  While this victory forced the tribe to surrender virtually all of its remaining 
territory to the United States, few Americans thought it likely that such a small force could repel 
the impending British invasion.  With the American war effort at a nadir, Federalist anti-war 
rhetoric reached its height in the fall of 1814.222 
 Almost as soon as the war began, a familiar trope took form when Federalists questioned 
the very morality of American military conquest through comparisons with Napoleon.  In 1803, 
some Federalists had argued that the occupation of Louisiana was an unjust an immoral military 
rule in the method of Bonaparte.  Then in 1810, Federalists had strongly opposed American 
military expansion into West Florida as immoral.  Just before the commencement of hostilities, 
an article in the Poulson Daily Advertiser reminded Jeffersonians that in 1802, their own papers 
had warned that Bonaparte’s elevation to First Consul had demonstrated the importance of 
avoiding wars that were not “purely defensive.”  Yet in 1812, the article pointed out, all the 
Jeffersonians talked of was “foreign conquests—invading Canada, [and] taking possession of 
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Florida.”  In reporting the declaration of war, the New York Commercial Advertiser wrote that 
the bill for war included a provision that allowed the President to issue a proclamation, “in the 
Bonapartian style, inviting the Canadians to revolt,” while also providing the executive the 
power to “march troops into Canada and to conquer it.”223 
 Heated debates over the expansion of the regular army dripped in Bonapartist rhetoric.  
One of the most powerful arguments was made by Elijah Bringham, a long-time congressman 
from Massachusetts.  Ultimately it made its way into numerous newspapers.  He dismissed the 
new army as one raised only for offensive purposes.  What right, he asked pointedly, did the 
United States have to Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Canadas or East Florida?  What right did the 
United States have to “invade and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter 
house for the sons of America…destroy cities, demolish houses and plunder the inhabitants?”  
He answered his own question, “There is no right but a Napoleon right, and that is power.”  A 
year later, Massachusetts governor Caleb Strong announced in a widely reprinted speech that the 
American invasion of East Florida “annulled the distinction between power and right and 
authorizes a government and its subjects, whenever they are able, to subdue and destroy the 
neighboring state.”  “It seems,” he continued, “impossible not to see the hand and realize the 
morals of Bonaparte marking our destinies.”224 
Federalists outside New England echoed the rhetoric of their brethren.  In March, 1813, 
the Alexandria Daily Gazette carried a letter by an “Old Virginia Farmer.”  The “Farmer” 
commented extensively on Madison’s second inaugural address, but focused on the unjustness 
nature of the war.  In his inaugural address, Madison had announced that the war had been 
carried on in a “just and honorable” manner.  The “Farmer” ripped apart this claim by reminding 
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his audience of the proclamation that General William Hull had issued upon his invasion of 
Canada in July of 1812.  Hull had warned the inhabitants of Canada not to resist his soldiers, lest 
he turn their land into an “indiscriminate scene of desolation.”  This proclamation, the “Farmer” 
argued, showed the hollowness of Madison’s claim of just war.  The “Farmer” illustrated his 
point by examining what he thought was an analogous situation with which all his readers would 
be familiar.  As Napoleon’s army retreated out of Russia harassed by the Cossacks, villagers in 
the Dutchy of Warsaw begged Napoleon to allow them to commence a guerrilla war against the 
pursuing Russians. Yet, the “Farmer” wrote, “Bonaparte, great as were his extremities in Russia, 
and intreated as he was by the villagers…turned pale with horror at their proposal.”  In other 
words, not even Napoleon could countenance such a proclamation “so repugnant to ‘justice and 
honor.’”225 
 The Bonapartist rhetoric had an undeniable impact on at least the Federalist population of 
the United States.  In public, group denunciations of the war, Federalist men and women reverted 
back to the same rhetoric they had heard from their leaders for over a decade.  In the Providence 
Resolves, published in the Newport Mercury in April 1811, Federalists of Rhode Island asked 
their fellow countrymen if they were willing to see their sons drafted “like French conscripts” 
engage in a war on behalf of “Bonaparte, who has destroyed the liberties and subjected every 
Republic on the Continent of Europe; witness Holland, Switzerland, Venice, Lucca, Genoa, 
whose citizens like Slaves, are exercised under the iron rod of Bonaparte.”  The resolves warned 
that by support for the war would end with the citizens of the United States “reduced to the same 
state.”  The public of Essex County in Massachusetts also publicly tied the war to Bonaparte.  
They ascribed all the boundary disputes of the United States to the “intrigues of France,” and 
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accusing the administration of conducting an ill-conceived war at the behest of a French regime 
that would immediately demand the cession of Canada, Louisiana, and Florida at the conclusion 
of hostiles.226 
The primacy of Federalist Bonapartist rhetoric during the War of 1812 complicates our 
view of the war in two aspects.  First, it confirms the usefulness of the recent trend among 
historians to expand our lens of the conflict geographically.  The common language of the 
rhetoric of Bonaparte shows that Federalists, at least, saw American policy into Florida and War 
with Great Britain within the same Napoleonic lens.  They easily shifted their rhetoric from one 
conflict to the other because Napoleon allowed them to see both as immoral imperial 
aggrandizement.  Second, it demonstrates that while the Jeffersonians might have actually waged 
the war in a regional way, as historians like J.C.A. Stagg and James Cusick have suggested, this 
is not the whole picture.  As Donald Hickey demonstrated in “Party Unity and the War of 1812,” 
the Federalists displayed remarkable geographic unity throughout the war as they supported 
“defensive” war measures while opposing “offensive” ones.227 
They were able to do this because of the common language of Bonaparte they developed 
over past decade as they fought against aggressive Jeffersonian expansion in Florida.  Federalists 
did not oppose expansion per se, but they deeply cared about the means by which it was 
accomplished.  They viewed the conflict as a war of conquest that placed the United States into a 
de facto, if not an actual military alliance with a violent and treacherous military despot bent on 
creating a “universal monarchy.”  As the War of 1812 grew increasingly likely, they transferred 
the successful rhetoric of Bonaparte that they had honed in Florida to the war with Great Britain.  
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So successful was this rhetoric with the public, that they were able to successfully partially derail 
Jeffersonian dreams of expansion into both Florida and Canada. 
Even before the ink was dry on the Louisiana Purchase treaty, Americans of all political 
stripes looked covetously south toward Spanish Florida.  Yet, for those seven years, the success 
of American imperial success in the Floridas was greatly in doubt.  Opponents of aggressive 
expansion were remarkably successful in developing a language centered on Napoleon that 
helped derail the Jefferson administration’s plans for duplicitous diplomacy in the $2 Million Act 
of 1805.  In the wake of Bonaparte’s redrawing of Europe, and especially his disposition of the 
Bourbon monarchy in Spain, Federalists refined and honed their rhetorical attacks against 
aggressive expansion.  The successful American intervention in West Florida led to a further 
refinement of rhetorical attacks against militant expansion that helped to stymie Madison’s 
questionable policies in East Florida.  They then easily transferred this rhetoric to opposing the 
offensive nature of the War of 1812. 
This rhetoric was not necessarily anti-expansionist in nature.  By 1805, virtually all 
Americans agreed that the United States would and should expand into Florida.  Yet, for 
Federalists, the means of expansion were incredibly important.  Many of them argued that 
American expansion should be done in a moral and logical manner—a manner that clearly 
differentiated the United States from Bonaparte’s France.  Another group argued that the 
American expansion had to be based on a rational national security concerns.  These Federalists 
viewed Bonaparte as the most dangerous threat to the United States, both as an external threat—
such as when he threatened to take control of the Spanish possessions in the Americas, but also 
as a treacherous ally who would likely turn on an unwitting United States that was foolish 
enough to ally themselves with him.  In both cases, the effectiveness of the rhetoric focused on 
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the person and character of Napoleon Bonaparte.  What the Federalists did not, and could not 
know was that Bonaparte’s days on the throne of France were drawing to a close, and that the 
effectiveness of their rhetoric would be challenged severely when Americans no longer saw him 
as a threat. 
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CHAPTER 5 SEIZING BONAPARTE’S DREAM:  THE MEXICAN AMERICAN WAR 
 
Americans in the early republic simply could not get enough of Napoleon.  Their 
voracious appetite for reading anything they could find about the Bonaparte resulted in countless 
biographies, military histories, pamphlets, broadsides, religious tracts, and even song books 
published about the French emperor.  Yet, as familiar as they were with Bonaparte, Americans 
could not agree on who he was or what his image represented.  Between 1815 and 1850, several 
very different images of Napoleon developed in the United States.  A hand-colored lithograph 
produced in Connecticut by the E.B. and E.C. Kellog firm near the end of this period neatly 
illustrates the final result of what I call the American bifurcation of Bonaparte (figure 2).  In the 
image, three Bonapartes are presented to the viewer.  The topmost depicts a young Bonaparte in 
the uniform of a French lieutenant of artillery in 1794.  To the subaltern’s lower right is a 
handsome First Consul Bonaparte in a republican general’s uniform.  To the left of both of these 
the artist portrayed a garlanded Emperor Napoleon adorned in a splendid ermine-trimmed 
imperial robe.  To the American viewer was left the decision as to which Bonaparte was the most 
representative one.228  
Even before he left power, and especially after he was overthrown in 1815, Americans 
began to view Napoleon through the bifurcated lenses indicated by the Kellog lithograph.  Many 
Americans, especially those who identified themselves as Whigs continued to see Napoleon as 
an aggressive and ambitious military despot.  Yet, as new democratic currents swept through the 
nation, Americans increasingly admired Bonaparte as both the ultimate democratic success story 
and as a courageous republican military genius.  Indeed, some Americans found it entirely 
possible to hold both views concurrently.   
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Figure 2, E.B. and E.C. Kellog, “Napoleon,” 1842-1848. 
These twin images were reinforced by the flood of printed material on Napoleon that appeared in 
the United States between his death in 1821 and the start of the American Civil War in 1861 and 
greatly shaped how Americans faced their own expansion into the Spanish, and later Mexican, 
borderlands.  Using Bonaparte to contest American expansion was, of course, not new.  
Napoleon had been integrated into the arguments of both pro and anti-expansionists since the 
Louisiana Purchase, and had proved particularly useful to the Federalists in opposing the 
aggressive elements of the War of 1812.  Yet, by the start of the Mexican American War in 
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1846, the more sympathetic, military image of Napoleon had become ingrained in the mind of 
much of the American public and robbed the old anti-expansionist rhetoric of its power.  The 
loss of this rhetorical device helped lay the groundwork for the most aggressive expansion yet in 
the young republic’s history. 
For almost a century and a half after its conclusion, historians of the Mexican War spent 
their time and ink assigning blame for the war—largely fighting the same battles that Americans 
fought in the 1840s.  It was not until the 1980s that any historians began looking seriously 
beyond this debate.  Social and cultural historians were some of the first to open new avenues of 
investigation.  These historians largely focused their attention on whether war did more to unify 
or divide the young republic.  Robert Johannsen’s To the Halls of the Montezumas fired the first 
shot.  By looking at mostly printed materials to gauge public reaction to the war, he argued that 
whatever the causes of the conflict, the American public perceived the war a unifying national 
event.  Ten years later Johannsen’s ideas were bolstered by James McCaffrey’s Army of Manifest 
Destiny.  McCaffrey extended Johannsen’s thesis to the American army by suggesting that the 
war was not long or bloody enough to force American soldiers to alter the starry-eyed 
democratic ideals they brought with them to the battlefield.  More recent scholarship, however, 
has challenged these assertions.  In A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, Paul Foos looked at the 
same soldiers McCaffrey did and found evidence of widespread disillusionment as well as class 
and racial conflict.  Most recently, Amy Greenberg’s A Wicked War found widespread and deep 
division in American society as a whole over the conflict which she credited with spawning the 
first national anti-war movement.229 
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It seems almost incredible that such polar opposite views could be found in looking at the 
same source material.  In this chapter, using a similar methodological approach as Johannsen, I 
offer at least a partial solution to this problem.  By looking at a single symbol—Napoleon—in 
which virtually every American could and did find meaning we find that it is far too simple to 
only say that the Mexican American War was “unifying” or “divisive.”  It was both.  Before and 
during the war, Americans of all types used common, presumably unifying, symbols like 
Napoleon to debate their expansion, yet, they increasingly found to their frustration that this 
symbol meant radically different things even to people who claimed a common history and 
language.  Ironically, it was by using what they thought was a unifying reference to make their 
arguments for and against aggressive expansion into Mexico, Americans discovered exactly how 
divided their nation was. 
Federalist anti-expansionist rhetoric reached a highpoint during the War of 1812.  Their 
message, which centered on the national security threat posed by Napoleon, allowed the anti-
expansionists to present a remarkably unified front in opposition to the aggressive aspects of the 
war.  Using such rhetoric, they managed to hold off the Jefferson and Madison administrations’ 
attempts to aggressively annex Florida.  Their rhetoric was also probably at least partially 
responsible for the collapse of American invasions of Canada when militia refused orders to 
march across the American border, and for the New England unity displayed in the Hartford 
Convention. 
The success of this rhetoric was largely due to a generally common American 
understanding of who Napoleon Bonaparte was, and what he represented.  In The Old Dominion 
and Napoleon, Joseph Shulim demonstrated that while initial reaction to Bonaparte was mixed, 
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once Bonaparte had himself crowned Emperor in 1804, most of his overt support in the United 
States evaporated.  The image of the ambitious, treacherous, military despot replaced that of the 
courageous, republican, military genius.  Supporters of Bonaparte could still be found within the 
United States, of course.  In the August 14, 1806 edition of Boston’s Independent Chronicle, for 
example, one brave writer cautiously suggested that the influence of Bonaparte had been good 
for nationalistic groups in Hungry and Poland, and that he had always retained a “pacific 
disposition” toward the United States.  Such opinions, however, were quickly demolished by 
vicious counter articles.  One article directed at the Chronicle author quoted above decried those 
American “jacobins” who excused Napoleon for the innocent “blood which he has poured in 
torrents over the continent of Europe.”  In such a climate, wise Americans kept any pro-
Bonaparte thoughts to themselves.  By the War of 1812, pro-expansionists were reduced to 
explaining how their policies would prevent Napoleon’s dangerous influence in North 
America.230 
This common American understanding of Bonaparte, however, collapsed with 
astonishing speed.  One reason for this was that Bonaparte could no longer be portrayed as a 
legitimate national security threat to the United States.  Capitalizing on the disastrous loss of the 
French Grand Armée in Russia, a sixth anti-Bonaparte coalition formed in the spring of 1813, 
and, after a year of hard fighting, eventually drove Bonaparte from the throne of France and into 
exile on the island of Elba.  The strongest arguments from both the pro and anti-expansionist 
camps had always centered on the unacceptable national security risk posed by the French 
emperor.  Many Americans had been willing to go to war to prevent his controlling New Orleans 
in 1803.  The Madison administration had claimed that they occupied West Florida by fiat and 
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engineered a coup in East Florida for the same reason.  In large part, Federalists had opposed co-
belligerency with France against Britain during the War of 1812 to prevent France from claiming 
its old empire in North America at the end of the conflict.231 
To a certain extent, the British stepped into the role of America’s national security 
bogeyman.  For example, an editorial in the Republican Farmer worried that with the defeat of 
Bonaparte, “America will now be nearly surrounded by the English or their red allies.”  Yet, 
most Americans never seemed to fear the British influence in North America as much as they 
had Bonaparte’s.  Indeed, one article from Georgia that found itself reprinted in multiple places 
went so far as to claim, “If Bonaparte is hurled from the throne of France, and the war continues 
with England, the occupancy of the Floridas by the United States would, at least secure our 
Southern and Western territory against any exterior force that could be brought against it.”  In 
other words, the national security of the United States had actually been contingent on Napoleon 
keeping British ambitions in North America at bay.  With Bonaparte gone, the United States 
would need to seize the strategic peninsula to prevent the British from laying claim to it.232 
Another reason for the rapid change was that Americans had begun to compartmentalize 
their views of Bonaparte even before he was forced from power.  In 1808, Hume Robinson—
who billed himself as a former American military officer living in Paris—published a self-styled 
“American” account of Bonaparte’s rise to power.  Within the first pages of the book, Hume’s 
audience read that, “it must be remembered that Bonaparte assumes different characters as policy 
dictates.”  “When a General many of his actions were distinguished as being mild and humane,” 
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he continued, but “when a Consul, he began to exercise that overbearing tyranny that power so 
often engenders.”  Finally, however, “when we behold him on the imperial throne and arrived at 
the summit of his conquering ambition we see him degenerated into a bloody tyrant."  Hume 
meant that Bonaparte’s very character changed as time went on and could be understood on 
different levels at different times in his career.  In essence, this gave Hume’s readers permission 
to indulge their fascination with the brave general, but still hate the treacherous despot.233 
Within weeks of learning of Napoleon’s exile to Elba, articles began to appear in 
American newspapers that marveled at Napoleon’s military prowess while quietly skirting 
around political aspects of his reign.  Examples of good American generalship were rare enough 
during the first few years of the War of 1812, and, of course, British military skill was a non-
starter, so the newspaper editors looked to France.  Reporting on Andrew Jackson’s little army 
gathering at New Orleans, the Baltimore Patriot opined that they expected to hear good news 
from that locale soon, since, “General Jackson appears to possess that wonderful talent which 
rendered Bonaparte so successful, that of making good soldiers of the most incongruous 
material.”  They did not have long to wait.  Jackson, in fact, had already won a major victory 
over the British at New Orleans earlier that month.234 
As might be expected for a war weary public, Americans made a great deal out of this 
last-minute victory.  Historians have often dismissed the importance of the battle, but Frank 
Owsley makes a convincing case that the Battle of New Orleans finally cemented American 
claims to Louisiana.  The Spanish, he points out—a key British ally—still viewed Louisiana as 
having been cheated from them by Bonaparte and considered West Florida as a province in 
revolt.  Without Jackson’s victory, Owsley contends, it was likely that the British would have 
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backed Spanish claims to Louisiana and West Florida at the bargaining table in Ghent.  
Ultimately, it had to be decisive military victory that established indisputable United States 
claims in the Spanish borderlands.  Americans knew this, but they added an additional 
component to their celebrations of the battle:  more often than not, they used it as an opportunity 
to claim a military victory over Napoleon by proxy.235 
As much as the Federalists might have wished it, the United States did not embroil itself 
in a war with Napoleon.  The victory at New Orleans, however, gave Americans the next best 
thing.  As the commemorated their victory over the British, many transformed into a virtual 
victory over Napoleon at the same time.  One widely reprinted article informed its readers, “It 
ought also to be remembered that Jackson's troops were 'backwoods militia,' who had never 
before smelt gunpowder, and Packenham's were the 'choicest veterans of the Peninsula,' the 
conquerors of the legions of Bonaparte.”  A popular ditty held a similar theme,  
Ten thousand men they landed 
as Packenham demanded! 
The hero who commanded New Orleans to destroy 
all men of valiant heart who had beaten Bonaparte 
 But what was that to Jackson? 
 
In both the article and the song the British were clearly identified as the soldiers who had beaten 
Napoleon.  The logic, then, ran as follows:  if the British forces at New Orleans had bested 
Napoleon, and Americans had bested the British forces, then the Americans must have been 
more than a match for Napoleon himself. 236 
Even in exile, Bonaparte remained ingrained in the minds of Americans when they 
looked to their southern borders.  Americans had almost gone to war with him in 1803 to prevent 
him from controlling New Orleans and then had seized West Florida from Spain in 1811 to 
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prevent his influence there.  It was his questionable title to Louisiana and deliberately murky 
boundaries which had caused over a decade of frustrating political conflict with the Spanish 
empire.  While it is impossible to prove with certainty, this proxy military victory over 
Bonaparte probably helped some Americans finally make peace with their questionable claims to 
both Louisiana and West Florida. 
The year 1815 was a remarkable one.  So remarkable, in fact, that the events occurring 
during that fateful year allowed many Americans to make peace with at least some of the 
political aspects of Napoleon’s rule.  Following hard on the heels of the victory at New Orleans 
and the Treaty of Ghent, which finally ended the War of 1812, Americans learned that Napoleon 
had slipped off of Elba and returned to France.  Americans waited breathlessly for news from 
Europe—no doubt cursing the slowness of the mail ships.  Soon they learned that the royal 
French military units sent to prevent Napoleon’s approach had defected and returned him to the 
throne in Paris.  Yet another anti-Bonaparte coalition formed and finally faced down the French 
at the Belgian village of Waterloo in June. 
Napoleon lost the battle at Waterloo, but it was not clear what would happen next.  
Rumors abounded.  Some said that Bonaparte had been arrested by his own troops and beheaded.  
Others reported that he had been taken prisoner by the British.  Still others said that Bonaparte 
was attempting to flee to the United States and seek asylum.  In actuality, both of the last rumors 
were true.  Bonaparte had indeed seriously considered going into exile in the United States, as 
had many of his officers and family members.  Instead, Bonaparte surrendered himself to the 
British.  The British, unsure of what to do with their arch antagonist, sent him into exile again.  
This time under guard and to the remote South Atlantic island rock of St. Helena.  With 
Napoleon gone, the Congress of Vienna, convened by the victors, reestablished the balance of 
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power in Europe and restored the Bourbons to the throne of France in the uninspiring person of 
Louis XVIII.237 
Americans read about all these events with absolute fascination, and it triggered a 
softening towards Napoleon’s politics because when compared to Louis XVIII, Napoleon 
appeared to have democratic legitimacy.  Most Americans learned of Bonaparte’s return by 
reading the official French versions of the event that their local papers simply translated and 
printed.  These accounts, of course, painted Napoleon’s return in strikingly sympathetic and even 
democratic tones.  For example, in the account that most Americans read, when Napoleon first 
encounters the French troops come to arrest him, Bonaparte dismounts, announces himself, and 
tells them, “The first soldier who chooses to kill your emperor may do so.”  According to the 
article, the unanimous reaction from the humbled soldiers was to tear the white Bourbon cockade 
from their caps and replace it with the Napoleonic tri-color as they cry, “Long Live the 
Emperor!”  A few paragraphs later, the Emperor returns to Paris to the wild shouts of, “down 
with the Bourbons!  Down with the enemies of the people!  Long live the Emperor and a 
government of our choice!”238 
Americans keyed into the contrasts in democratic legitimacy between Napoleon and 
Louis XVIII illustrated in the Paris articles.  In a letter to a friend, Andrew Jackson wrote that, 
“The wonderfull revolution in France fills every body and nation with astonishment.”  As a 
popular military leader himself, Andrew Jackson noted one part of the article in particular.  “the 
tricoloured cockade being found in the bottom of each soldiers knapsack tells to all europe that 
Naepoleon reigns in the affections of the soldiers that were to oppose him, and their dislike to the 
Bourbons.”  At first glance, it might seem odd that Jackson would see the army as a democratic 
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element in French society.  Two elements were probably at work here.  First, Jackson himself 
was well aware of Napoleon’s conscription system which had created a truly “peoples” army in 
France.  Second, Jackson, like many other Americans was likely adapting his own experience to 
what he read about Napoleon.  Most of the soldiers he had led in the past were militiamen, who 
had to be led, rather than coerced—though Jackson did attempt to coerce obedience at times, 
usually with disastrous results.  In popular recitations of Napoleon’s return, Jackson noticed that 
Bonaparte had given his soldiers the democratic choice to shoot him or to join him.  This Jackson 
must have understood and admired.239 
The second exile of Napoleon also allowed Americans to juxtapose the bloody restoration 
of the Bourbons and Bonaparte’s peaceful, and somewhat democratic return from Elba.  One 
example of this was an article originally published in the Boston Gazette, titled “The ‘Usurper’ 
and the ‘Legitimate.’”  In the article, the author reminded his readers that, “When the sanguinary 
Napoleon returned to Paris from Elba, not a single drop of blood sullied the glory of his career.”  
Yet, the article went on, dripping with sarcasm, when the “Legitimate Louis” returned, 
supporters of the Napoleonic regime were “barbarously arraigned and most inhumanly 
executed.”  After describing one of the executions in heartrending detail the author left his 
readers with little doubt which of the two—Napoleon and Louis—was the usurper, and which 
was the legitimate sovereign.240 
Even Americans less inclined to read received the same message.  A print distributed by 
the Philadelphia firm of William Charles in 1815 provided a humorous commentary on the 
chaotic nature of French politics after the Bourbon restoration (figure 3).  In it, a portly Louis 
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XVIII struggles up a greased pole towards a crown symbolizing imperial legitimacy.  “Support 
me or I shall fall” he cries.  To help his endeavors, Louis stands on the backs of squabbling 
figures representing the army, the Catholic church and various foreign powers.  Noticeably 
absent from his support are the people of France.  In the background, but still prominent, is 
Napoleon on the rock of St. Helena carefully guarded by British cannon.  Watching with a hint 
of amusement, the Napoleon figure comments, “I climbed up twice without any help.”  Whether 
they read the original reports of Napoleon’s return from Elba or saw the commentary that 
followed, many Americans drew the similar conclusions: even though Napoleon was an emperor, 
he was at least a popular and democratic one.241 
While the events of 1814-1815 did soften the image of Bonaparte considerably in the 
eyes of many Americans, this image was not unopposed.  Federalists continued to use the anti-
Napoleon imagery that they had used for so long with such success.  A great many Americans 
were genuinely glad when Bonaparte was forced out of power in 1814, and public gatherings 
were full of orations praising his downfall.  At least some of commentators used the occasion to 
remind Americans of the unfortunate consequences of territorial ambition through association 
with Bonaparte.   
On July 4, 1814, the respected physician Charles Caldwell addressed the Washington 
Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania.  Caldwell began with a brief account of the rise and fall of 
Napoleon using the trope of the bloody, treacherous tyrant.  Then he discussed what he saw as 
the unfortunate American dealings with Napoleon.  During our own revolutionary struggles, he 
pointed out, Spain and Holland were “sincerely attached to our interests.”   
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Figure 3, William Charles, “Louis XVIII climbing the Mât de Cocagne” (Detail), 1815. 
Yet, in the last few years, the United States had shamefully yoked itself to “him who carried 
carnage and mourning into both Holland and Spain.”  This was, of course, disgraceful said 
Caldwell, but the actions that had followed were even worse.  In reference to West Florida, he 
thundered Americans had acted “in an equal violation of magnanimity and right” to Bonaparte 
when they “invaded a defenseless province.”242 
As Caldwell’s speech shows, with Napoleon no longer a national security threat, most 
Federalists reverted to their other effective argument against unscrupulous expansion: critique by 
example.  A scathingly sarcastic commentary on the British-American peace talks in Ghent, for 
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example, contained this passage that compared American territorial ambitions to Napoleon’s 
own,  
The commissioners in the name of the United States, indeed, disavow all projects of 
aggrandizement whatsoever; and acts of theirs having a contrary appearance, are all 
accounted for by particular circumstances; and so were all aggrandizements of 
Bonaparte; it was his enemies that forced him to extend the power of France from the 
Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Vistula.  It was mere friendship for the royal 
family of Spain, that made him place his brother on the throne of that kingdom; so it was 
Spain that made it necessary for the United States to acquire Louisiana; it was Spain that 
compelled them to seize the Floridas, and Great Britain that prompted them, at an 
unlucky hour, to seize the Canadas. 
 
Messages that condemned opportunistic, territorial aggrandizement by comparing it to that of 
Napoleon still held power in a sizable, but shrinking section of the American people.243 
Even after Bonaparte lost at Waterloo, Federalists continued to remind Americans of 
their unfortunate co-belligerency with Bonaparte during the War of 1812.  For example, when 
one Federalist editor was told that Napoleon intended to seek asylum in the United States 
following the loss at Waterloo he hoped it was true.  If it was, he snidely opined, the emperor 
ought to be held by the government and exhibited for money until all the debts incurred by the 
War of 1812 had been paid off.  After all, the editor reasoned, reverting to the rhetoric that had 
served his party so well, the Madison administration had waged the war on Napoleon’s behalf.  
The sheer number of these arguments show that they still held some power, but reactions to the 
American invasion of East Florida in 1818 demonstrated that numbers of people who could be 
reached by such arguments were shrinking.244 
The harsh Treaty of Fort Jackson, which ended the Creek War in 1814, left the Creek 
people divided and dispossessed of their Georgian and Alabamian homelands.  Despite clauses in 
the Treaty of Ghent which promised to restore their territory, the defeat at New Orleans forced 
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the British to renege on their promises to support their erstwhile Indian allies.  Desperate and 
abandoned, many Creeks moved south into Florida where they joined bands of Seminole Indians 
and runaway slaves.  Over the next few years, land pressures there led to increasingly violent tit-
for-tat raids between American settlers and Seminole war bands, who used the ill-defined 
international border between East and West Florida as a sanctuary.  In March of 1818 tensions 
boiled over.  With vague orders to protect American interests and citizens in Florida, the senior 
army commander in the region, Major General Andrew Jackson, launched a full-scale invasion 
of Spanish East Florida with nearly 4,000 soldiers, militia, and friendly Creek allies claiming that 
he was pursuing enemy Seminole war parties.245 
Through a combination of bluster, ruthlessness, good fortune, skill, and Spanish 
unpreparedness, Jackson’s army quickly overran not only most of the Seminole villages in the 
territory, but also all of the major Spanish garrisons.  During the campaign, his army captured 
two British nationals: Alexander George Arbuthnot, a Scottish trader, and Robert Ambrister, a 
former Royal Marine.  Jackson accused the men of providing firearms to the Seminoles (which 
they probably did) and of inciting them to make war on American settlers (which they probably 
did not).  Never one to bother much with the international implications of his actions, Jackson 
convened a courts martial, which, unsurprisingly, found both men guilty, and then had them 
executed.246 
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Foreign reaction to the Seminole War was quite negative.  Britain protested the summary 
execution of its citizens.  The men were unfortunate noncombatants in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, they said.  Spain, of course, vehemently objected to the invasion and occupation of 
her territory.  Neither country, however, was in a place to make good on its complaints.  Britain 
did not wish to endanger relations with her best trading partner and eventually let the matter drop 
after a suitable period of righteous indignation.  Spain was more difficult.  Jackson’s invasion 
endangered ongoing negotiations between Spain and the United States for the cession Florida.  In 
the end, however, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams took advantage of the situation and 
issued a letter blaming the whole war on the British, the Seminoles, and the Spanish.  In fact, the 
whole episode actually strengthened Adams’s diplomatic hand in the long run.  Once 
negotiations resumed, he demanded that Spain either control her Indian subjects in Florida, or 
cede the territory to someone who could.247 
However, just because he had avoided the international consequences of his actions did 
not mean that he had completely escaped punishment.  He still had some powerful enemies in 
Congress, and they refused to let an opportunity like this go to waste.  In early 1819, the House 
Military Affairs Committee issued a report condemning Jackson’s actions in Florida.  Based on 
their recommendations, the House of Representatives readied itself to debate a series of bills that 
would have disavowed the aggressive expansionism of Jackson.  There was no guarantee that 
such bills would fail.  After all, on at least three separate occasions before, Congress had derailed 
aggressive expansion in Florida.  The ensuing debate took almost a month, which, at that time, 
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was the longest ever spent debating one issue, and was carefully followed in the papers by the 
American public.248 
Despite the obvious similarities, surprisingly few of those in the anti-expansion camp 
took the opportunity to draw parallels between Jackson’s actions and those of Bonaparte.  Even 
the most eloquent orator in the House of Representatives, Kentucky’s Henry Clay, shied away 
from bringing too many references to Bonaparte into his anti-Jackson speech.  Born in 1777 and 
a lawyer and hemp plantation owner by trade, Clay spent virtually his entire adult life 
representing Kentucky in Congress.  He rose to prominence in Congress as a leader of the so-
called “War-Hawks” during the War of 1812 who pushed for American entry into the conflict.  
He had built a reputation, however, for moderation in expansion and fostering good relations 
with the Latin American republics.  When, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, stood to 
address the House and a packed gallery, on January 12, 1819, he knew that he was speaking to 
the American people and not just his congressional colleagues.  If they expected a long harangue 
tying Jackson’s treatment of the Creeks and Seminoles to Bonaparte’s treatment of Italy, or 
Holland, or Prussia, or half a dozen other places in Europe, however, they would have been 
greatly disappointed.249  
While Clay did denounce the Treaty of Fort Jackson as unreasonable and found nothing 
in international law which could sanction Jackson’s invasion of a foreign country, he tied neither 
of these episodes to Bonaparte.  Instead of linking Jackson to illegal national expansion through 
Napoleon, Clay saved his Bonaparte references for what he saw as Jackson’s overly aggressive 
and ambitious character.  Clay’s strongest attack came in his condemnation of Jackson’s 
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execution of Arbuthnot.  Jackson’s best biographer, Robert Remini, characterized Clay’s allusion 
to Bonaparte here as “subtle.”  It was not.  Considering the execution, Clay claimed could think 
of only one analogous incident, that of the arrest and execution of the Duc D’Enghein.  Here, 
Clay referred to, and described in detail, an infamous incident in which Bonaparte had a French 
royalist seized by his military from the neutral state of Baden, arrayed on trumped up charges 
and quickly executed.  It was this incident, and, thus by implication, not Bonaparte’s 
expansionism, which according to Clay, “had brought more odium than almost any other 
incident on the unhappy Emperor of France.”  This was truly a momentous shift in rhetorical 
strategy, and though Clay’s speech was widely reprinted, no one seemed to have noticed.250 
Napoleon appeared one other time in the Clay’s remarks, and he was used once again not 
to contest expansion, but as a warning against the character of military heroes.  Near his 
conclusion, the Speaker warned that aggressive, expansionist warfare had the tendency to erode 
the liberties of free societies.  Wars resulted in glory-covered heroes, and such men had a habit 
of swaying the democratic crowds to do their will, no matter how injurious to liberty.  Of course, 
Bonaparte was the obvious example of this.  Clay was quick to point out that he did not think 
Jackson to be another Napoleon, but lest anyone doubt that such things could happen in the 
United States, Clay warned that Bonaparte had proven the dangers of “military chieftains” to 
unwitting societies.  Quoting from a well-known biography of Napoleon by Madam De Staël, 
Clay pointed out that well regarded Frenchmen had insisted that they would never again see 
monarchy in the very month that “Bonaparte with his grenadiers had entered the palace at St. 
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Cloud…and laid the foundations for that vast fabric of despotism which overshadowed all 
Europe.”251 
Most of the anti-expansionist camp followed the lead of the Speaker, appealing to 
Bonaparte only as a reflection of his treacherous political character, not to his expansionist 
tendencies.  They were not foolishly missing a golden rhetorical opportunity.  Instead, they were 
recognizing how Bonaparte’s reputation had changed in the years since his deposition, and 
changing their rhetoric to reflect what they imagined was the new reality which was an American 
public that that increasingly found aggressive expansion in the manner of Bonaparte acceptable.  
As the bifurcated image of Napoleon became more prominent, Americans became more 
comfortable with military expansion.  Clay understood this, and hoped that they still might be 
swayed by appeals to the political despot image of Napoleon.  However, as he would do so many 
times in his political career, Clay miscalculated.  Parts of the American public were probably 
moved by his oration, but many more had accepted the softer image of the democratic emperor 
produced by the momentous events of 1815.  Despite this, Clay did lay a rhetorical groundwork 
on which anti-expansionists would build over the next two decades. 
Surprisingly, at least in a few cases, Napoleon was also used by the pro-expansionists.  
Representative Ballard Smith of Virginia spoke after Clay, and used much of his speech to refute 
the Speaker.  In the middle of his lengthy speech, he spent what must have been several minutes 
discussing the ultimate justification of American expansion.  “The gentleman,” he began, “asks 
what would be said to our unreasonable demands were the Treaty of Fort Jackson to be seen by 
the powers of Europe.  And I ask who would presume to find fault with them.”  It certainly could 
not be France, he sneered, “who so recently demanded Spain, Portugal, Italy, Holland and 
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Germany.”  In essence, Ballard was suggesting that Napoleon’s imperialism had overturned the 
old Vattelian world and replaced it with a realpolitik system in which nations could expand as far 
as their means and ambition could take them.  This was an extraordinarily bold move by Ballard 
in a country where so much of the rhetoric of expansion had been built on not being like 
Napoleon, but it seems at least not to have hurt the final result.  Indeed, the final result probably 
had more to do with the pro-expansionists carefully not using Napoleon rather than through their 
use of him.  Not only was Jackson completely exonerated, but by a vote of 42 to 112, the House 
refused to pass a more general bill to prohibit the invasion of a foreign country without the 
express authorization of Congress.252 
With the Jackson’s army firmly ensconced in Florida with the approval of both the 
executive and legislative branches of government, the Spanish came to the bargaining table.  In 
the resulting Adams-Onis Treaty, the Spanish ceded East Florida to the United States in return 
for the United States renouncing its claims on Texas—another offshoot of the murky borders of 
Louisiana that would have profound consequences a few decades later.  The immediate effects of 
the use of Napoleon by the pro-expansionists is difficult to assess. The use of Bonaparte as a 
positive was certainly hesitant and not at all commonplace.  Indeed, they may have score more 
political points by not mentioning him at all.  Either way, they seem to have been more more 
successful than their opponents in reading the effect of the events of 1815 on the American 
public.  Whether it was from a careful use of Napoleon, or from not using Napoleon, the results 
were undeniable.  Jackson’s aggressive expansionism was completely condoned and after sixteen 
years of political and military posturing the United States finally acquired Florida through 
aggressive military diplomacy. 
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Jackson’s pro-expansionists should also be credited with laying the groundwork for a 
new use of Napoleon that began in earnest shortly after the Florida treaty was signed.  This line 
of argument posited Napoleon as an example—not of moral goodness, but of greatness.  As 
William Weeks demonstrated in his analysis of John Quincy Adams’s rhetorical defense of 
Jackson’s invasion, this type of argument tapped into a deep desire of the post-revolutionary 
generation for their actions to be rooted in the myths of virtue, mission, and destiny.  In these 
“neo-greatness” arguments, the system and practice of empire building of the United States was 
compared favorably to that of the Napoleonic Empire.  This was not entirely new of course.  
David Ramsey had used this line of argument in his valedictory on the Louisiana Purchase, but 
awkward questions about aggressive expansion posed by the Federalists during the long War of 
1812 drove these arguments out of fashion.  Once the war was successfully terminated, however, 
and the image of Bonaparte softened sufficiently thanks to the events of 1815, these arguments 
once again gained favor.253 
One of the first of this “neo-greatness” argument came almost as soon as news of the 
Florida Treaty became known.  Perusing the reaction to the cession from Europe, a triumphant 
editor of the Providence Patriot was hard pressed to contain his glee.  “The gigantic schemes and 
comet-like progress of Bonaparte dazzled and confounded the vision [of Europe],” he wrote, 
“but the steady inevitable march of Columbia to unparalleled greatness arrests the attention and 
commands the admiration of every intelligent observer.”  Europe, he continued, had contrived to 
halt the progress of Bonaparte, but, “it is in vain that the governments of the old world would 
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strive to check the rising glory of the new.”  In other words, Napoleon’s empire might have been 
great, but the rising American empire would be even greater.254 
Bonaparte’s premature death on St. Helena in 1821 occurred conveniently as the last of 
the revolutionary generation in the United States was passing away.  In many ways, this added 
fuel to the neo-greatness arguments, since death humanized and rendered Bonaparte even more 
harmless in the minds of most Americans.  In one telling example, the editor of the Easton 
Gazette discussed the elaborate funeral observances for Bonaparte taking place in New Orleans.  
For over two decades, many Americans had suspected that the Louisianans maintained their 
Napoleonic allegiance and had justified their aggressive actions in the area based on this 
assumption that Bonaparte’s influence in the territory would lead to insurrection.  Yet, after the 
death of Napoleon, such overt support for Bonaparte by Louisianans seemed harmless.  
According to the Easton Gazette, it ought not surprise Americans that the “old French feelings 
still exist” in the hearts of Louisianans.  Yet, he continued with a rhetorical shrug, “there is now 
as little danger to us now in paying honors to Napoleon as there is to Nero or Caligula.”255 
The best example of the neo-greatness argument occurred in 1826.  In a charming article 
titled “Napoleon and Franklin” one author imagined a dialogue between the dead French 
Emperor and that quintessential dead American, Benjamin Franklin.  Bonaparte starts the 
conversation by pointing out the weakness of the American grasp on North America.  “Why do 
you not take Mexico and Cuba?”  Bonaparte asks, “And why do you let the Russians keep a foot 
on your continent?”  Franklin patiently explains that Americans have no need to conquer such 
places and points out that “the peaceful possession of all the really valuable part of [Europe],” 
would have been more effective in fulfilling Napoleon’s European ambitions.  To this, Napoleon 
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scoffs and explains that Franklin underestimates how global his ambitions truly were.  Analyzing 
this new information, the ever-wise Franklin doubts that such a far-flung empire built on one 
man’s talents could possibly have survived the death of great Napoleon.  The system of 
expansion practiced in the United States, Franklin continues, is of a more lasting kind.  The 
Americans, “have founded an empire destined to be wider than the Roman,” according to 
Franklin, and that through “peaceful colonization and expansion” the language of liberty has 
already been spread, “through vast regions.”  Americans thus have no need to impose their 
empire on conquered people as Bonaparte did with his “iron legions on Europe.”  Even the 
brilliant Napoleon struggles for words to contradict the wisdom of the American sage, and 
finally grumbles, “Enough, Doctor, this philosophizing is worse than Moscow.”256 
The bifurcated images of Bonaparte that appeared in wake of his abdication were both 
intensified and solidified by the tidal wave of printed material about the emperor that appeared in 
the United States following his death.  The vast majority of this material painted Napoleon as the 
great, democratic, military genius and left those who focused on Napoleon the bloody tyrant 
increasingly on the defensive.  It is important to remember that this printed material did not 
occur in an American vacuum.  The single most important change of the decades between 1815 
and 1850 was the expansion of American democracy.  The societal changes wrought by market 
revolution emphasized the ability (true or not) of the individual to work his way up in a system 
of individualistic capitalism.  This led to demands by the middling and working classes for the 
rapid expansion of the voting franchise, which, by 1850, had been extended to virtually all white 
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men.  It was within this expansion of the democratic system that Americans read and internalized 
their printed materials about Bonaparte.257 
According the leading historian of American biography, biographies written in the 
nineteenth-century United States were written for two basic reasons:  to promote nationalism and 
encourage character formation. In many ways, these twin goals were intertwined, for the national 
character was only as great as the collective character of men and women who formed it.  
Biographies and histories of great men were particularly useful to these purposes because they 
held the mantels of truth and attainability, whereas characters in a novel were invented and thus 
seen as unattainable ideals.  Problems, arose, of course, when Americans could not agree on 
exactly what character meant.  Yet, American readers of biography and history also read them 
for a different reason:  for entertainment.  In a world without reality television or streaming 
movies, Americans found escape in exciting biographies.  Publicly, at least, most biographers 
and historians would have sniffed at such a suggestion.  The low-brow genre of the novel was for 
entertainment.  But, especially when it came to military subjects, it is difficult to believe that 
young men did not find biographies as a means of escaping the stresses of daily life.  Napoleon’s 
life neatly fit the bill for all of these purposes.258 
American consumers of Napoleonic printed material could not have helped but notice the 
democratic character of the French Emperor.  The overwhelming majority of Bonaparte 
biographies portrayed his rise as an incredible “rags-to-riches” elevation and highlighted his 
industrious character.  Almost every biography had some comment like the following one from 
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the introduction to a popular biography: “In his rise and in his career of prosperity and glory, 
[Bonaparte] greatly surpassed…the heroes of antiquity.”  The author explained that while 
Alexander and Caesar came from noble families and had powerful friends to assist them, “the 
early advancement of Bonaparte was without any such powerful aids, and at the same time more 
rapid.”  Even young American children imbibed this characterization of Bonaparte.  One 
grammar school reader noted that, “Napoleon Bonaparte was one of the greatest warriors who 
ever lived.  He won many battles and rose, by his skill and courage from a poor Corsican boy to 
be an emperor, and the most powerful sovereign in Europe.”  The message was clear enough for 
readers of all ages—if you would rise in the world, model your character and habits after that of 
Bonaparte.259 
If Napoleon’s rise was incredible, however, it was not simply a matter of chance.  
Biographies regularly described his calm, calculating demeanor, seemingly inexhaustible energy 
and attention to the tiniest of details.  A passage from the very popular, five-volume set titled, 
The Napoleon Anecdotes reported a popular story from Bonaparte’s early military career 
illustrates the general idea.  Not long before daybreak, one of Bonaparte’s friends cautiously 
opened his apartment door and was surprised to find the young officer fully dressed, and 
surrounded by reports and maps.  “What!” the friend exclaimed, “Not yet in bed?”  Napoleon 
scoffs and replies, “In bed?  I have already risen.  Two or three hours are enough for any man to 
sleep.”  Another anecdote described Bonaparte as the consummate planner.  “No human 
precaution, which it was possible to adopt, was ever…neglected or forgotten by Napoleon.”   
Napoleonic biographies were full of this type of character analysis.  In the uncertain world of the 
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market revolution, this was the type of character advice that would serve a young, ambitious 
American man just as well as the future emperor of France.260 
Perhaps even more important than his own democratic rise was the perception that 
Napoleon had presided over the creation of a true meritocracy in France and supported the 
democratic rise of others.  The two ideas were certainly linked in the eyes of many Americans.  
In the most popular of all the Napoleon biographies, Sir Walter Scott’s mammoth, nine-volume 
Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, the author of Ivanhoe wrote that, the emperor, “lay the foundation 
of his throne on the democratic principle which had opened his own career.”  Thus, because of 
his own democratic rise, Napoleon threw “open to merit…the road to success in every 
department of the state.”  Scott’s egalitarian Napoleon clearly affected the thinking of young 
Americans like feminist leader Margret Fuller.  In 1847, she mimicked Scott’s words almost 
verbatim when she wrote to The New York Daily Tribune. “Through Napoleon,” she declared, 
“career had really been open to talent.”261 
It is important to note just how men got ahead in the world of the democratic emperor.  
There were a few stories that highlighted elevation of intelligent youths, such as the tale of the 
thirteen-year-old Milanese boy who impressed Bonaparte so much with his discernment that the 
general ordered his father to see after his son’s education, for “he will be no common man some 
day or other.”  These, however, were the exception.  The vast majority of stories that featured 
advancement under Napoleon were tales of meritorious military promotion.  In one story, 
Napoleon is refused passage on a certain road by a watchful French sentinel who has orders to 
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not let anyone pass by.  The soldier is later called to headquarters and made an officer for his 
discipline.  In another case, a young Lieutenant bravely steps out of ranks at a review to calm the 
Emperor’s horse and is promoted on the spot to a Captain in the elite guards battalion.  In 
perhaps the most well-known tale, the young general Napoleon promotes a brave sergeant at the 
siege of Toulon for coolness under fire.  At the end of the anecdote, the reader discovers that this 
valiant soldier was none other than the future General Junot.  These tales of rapid military 
advancement based on merit convinced many American youths that gallant military service 
during wartime was an excellent avenue for their own rapid social advancement.262 
The military advancement of so many young men was contingent on nearly constant 
warfare in the Napoleonic empire.  Traditionally, war—especially aggressive, offensive 
warfare—was seen by Americans as a dangerous proposition and the bane of republics.  In fact, 
anti-expansionists had held up Bonaparte for almost two decades as the example, par excellence, 
of the dangers of military aggression to republics and humanity.  Yet, this view rapidly lost 
ground in the two decades after Napoleon’s death.  The challenge came most strongly from the 
memoirs of Barry O’Meara, the Irish physician who attended Bonaparte on St. Helena.  His 
sympathetic Napoleon in Exile captivated millions of Americans.  Even in the midst of his first 
presidential campaign, Andrew Jackson found time to converse with a friend about the book.  “I 
am happy you have read O’Meara’s works,” he wrote.  “The world generally has taken up false 
ideas of Napoleon—much prejudice had been raised against him [but] I never had a doubt but he 
was a great & good man.”  Since O’Meara purported to record the conversations he had 
Bonaparte during the last years of his life, the statements within the book were regarded as the 
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closest thing available to Napoleon’s memoirs and treated as a truthful account of the great 
man’s opinions.263 
In O’Meara’s hands, Bonaparte’s wars became honorable, brilliant campaigns that 
defended the natural boundaries of France against aggressive European monarchs and spread 
democratic values throughout Europe.  This became the dominant understanding of Bonaparte 
through the 1850s.  O’Meara even managed to work in the democratic trope into the idea of 
Napoleonic warfare.  According to him, even as emperor, Napoleon saw his empire as a “kind of 
republic,” whose maxim was “the career open to talents without distinction to birth or fortune.” 
American histories of Bonaparte continued to use this trope of positive expansion for decades.  
For example, John Abbott’s widely successful History of Napoleon Bonaparte actually compared 
Napoleon’s expansion favorably to that of the United States in an astonishing passage that 
deserves to be quoted in its entirety: 
It was the plea of Napoleon that he was not going to make an unjust war on the 
unoffending nations of the East, but that he was the ally of the oppressed people, drawing 
the sword against their common enemy, and that he was striving to emancipate them 
from their powerful usurpers and to confer upon them the most precious privileges of 
freedom.  He marched to Egypt not to desolate but to ennoble; not to enslave but to 
enfranchise; not to enrich himself with the treasures of the east, but to transfer to those 
shores the opulence and the high civilization of the West.  Never was an ambitious 
conqueror furnished with a more plausible plea.  England, as she looks at India and China 
must be silent.  America, as she listens to the listens to the dying wail of the Red Man, 
driven from the forests of his childhood and the the graves of his fathers, can throw no 
stone.  Napoleon was surely not exempt from the infirmities of humanity.  But it is not 
becoming an English or an American historian to breath the prayer, "We thank Thee, oh 
God, that we are not like this Bonaparte." 
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O’Meara’s book and the ones that followed gave Americans permission to begin seeing warfare 
as a positive method of spreading democracy and freedom.264 
Printed material on Napoleon not only helped reshape American thinking on the 
legitimate ends of warfare, but also shaped how many thought about the physical nature of 
combat and military service in general.  For this, Sir Walter Scott was the chief culprit.  His Life 
of Napoleon Bonaparte was a runaway American best seller.  A check of library holdings from 
the 1830s-1850s shows that every library for which the American Antiquarian Society has 
records had at least one edition of Scott’s work.  Scott’s take on Napoleon was actually mildly 
negative.  While he admired Napoleon’s military and administrative skill, he found fault with 
Napoleon’s habit of hubristically confusing his will with that of the French people.  Even this 
was too much for many Americans.  In fact, his work spawned a cottage industry of American 
biographies defending Napoleon from the British author.  One American newspaper reviewer 
commented accurately, “The people of this country have ever looked upon Sir Walter Scott with 
suspicion since the production of this biography.”  Despite being castigated by Americans as an 
unfair, negative, portrayal of the great man, Scott actually painted a Napoleon who was 
ambitious, yet egalitarian.  As discussed earlier, this fit nicely into the democratic American 
imagination.265 
In her 1990 essay, “Romancing the Empire,” historian Amy Kaplan showed that the 
romantic novels of the 1890s offered an explanation for American overseas empire building at 
the turn of the twentieth century.  This was not a new phenomenon.  Scott’s views on Napoleon’s 
political life were almost certainly not what most young, male Americans took from his work.  
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He, was, above all, a romantic novelist, and he wrote his history using the literary devices which 
had served him so well in Ivanhoe and Waverly.   Of the battle of Austerlitz, Scott reported, 
“Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of 
his own army strove to decide the destiny of Europe.”  The idea that a single titanic battle could 
decide the fate of three great empires was heady stuff by itself, but Scott went even further.  On 
that fateful morning, “The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy,” he wrote.  “As its first beams 
rose across the horizon, Bonaparte appeared in front of his army surrounded by his marshals, to 
whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.”  
Imagining such a magnificent sight could hardly have failed to stir the hearts of young 
Americans.266 
American commenters marveled at Scott’s ability to evoke martial emotion in his work 
on Napoleon.  The Barre Gazette, for example, printed the part of the biography in which Scott 
described Napoleon’s crossing the Alps during the Italian Wars, and gushed that it was “one of 
the most graphic accounts of the feat which has ever been written.”  The Salem Gazette 
concurred with this assessment.  In an editorial on Scott, the author admirably wrote of his work 
on Napoleon: “the depictions of the battles are clear and graphic.  All other men’s descriptions 
are confused compared to his.  They have fine words—he has fine images.  They have plenty of 
smoke—he is all fire.”  Ultimately, that was the rub. Whatever their concerns were with Scott’s 
analysis of Napoleon as a person, a large majority of Americans—especially young men—were 
enthralled by his brilliant martial prose that made military service seem like a grand, memorable 
adventure.  This worried many anti-expansionists.267 
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It is notoriously difficult to measure the influence of printed material.  One crude way to 
measure its influence is by seeing how well the materials sold, but a more effective way is to 
gauge the reaction of the opposition.  By the latter measure, the pro-Napoleon mania that swept 
the United States was astonishingly effective.  The shrinking circle of who continued to see as 
Bonaparte as a bloody, treacherous tyrant saw the tidal wave of pro-Bonaparte literature as a 
grave threat to the moral and political character of the nation and reacted to it as such.  Between 
1820 and 1850, these Americans—mostly concentrated in the old Federalist (now Whig) 
strongholds of the northeast—were increasingly put on the defensive, but they managed to mount 
a respectable rear guard action that culminated during the Mexican War. 
By far, the most popular anti-Bonaparte tract in the United States was William Ellery 
Channing’s Remarks on the Character of Napoleon Bonaparte Occasioned by the Publication of 
Scott’s Life of Napoleon.  Channing (1780-1842), was one of Unitarianism’s leading lights by the 
time he published his work in The Boston-based Christian Examiner in 1827.  The work was so 
popular, however, that it was printed as a separate pamphlet almost immediately after its initial 
publication.  It proved most influential among the New-England elite.  For example, the son of 
President John Quincy Adams, Charles Francis Adams, wrote highly of the essay in his diary and 
noted discussing it over dinner with friends and arguing its merits in debating society.  The 
young lawyer and future Supreme Court Chief Justice, Salmon P. Chase also wrote favorably of 
Channing’s essay in his diary, “Undazzled by the blaze of military and civil glory which has 
surrounded the Hero, he has deeply penetrated and faithfully exposed his real character.”268 
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After reading Scott’s work, Channing had grave concerns, but they were not those of 
Americans who thought the author had been too hard on the emperor.  Instead, Channing worried 
that Scott’s sympathetic view of his subject would affect the moral character of the Americans.  
Channing admitted that, like Scott, he could not deny Napoleon’s military greatness.  He was old 
enough to remember with what “rapturous admiration” he first read of Bonaparte’s Italian 
campaigns in the newspapers, and wrote that he could not read Scott’s brilliant rendition of his 
military exploits “without a quickened movement in the veins.”  Yet, with the wisdom of age, 
Channing had come to understand that while military genius was a form of greatness, it was its 
lowest form.  There was no question, Channing wrote, that Napoleon had been a military genius, 
but he lacked the intellectual and moral greatness which were far superior.269 
Indeed, according to Channing, it was the presence of Napoleon’s military genius without 
the restraint of moral and intellectual greatness which was responsible for the “unprincipled and 
open aggressions” that characterized Bonaparte’s wars.  Military success had bred the dangerous 
notion in Napoleon’s mind that an “empire of the world” was the “fulfillment of his destiny.”  
Channing’s choice of the word “destiny” was a deliberate swipe at Scott’s writing.  In Scott’s 
saga, Destiny (always capitalized) was a nearly physical character.  “She” was literally at 
Bonaparte’s side “leading him by the hand, and at the same time protecting him with her shield.”  
Napoleon was, according to Scott, “the man of Destiny.”   For Channing, this was dangerous, 
self-aggrandizing nonsense that would corrupt the minds of impressionable young Americans.  
Ultimately, Channing argued, it was Bonaparte’s misguided sense of “destiny” had led to the 
corruption of the entire French nation, who “in her madness and folly had placed her happiness 
in conquest [and] felt that the glory of her arms was only safe in the hands of the First Consul.”  
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For Channing, it was a sad commentary on the state of the French people that they had allowed 
their national character to be usurped and corrupted by one man.270 
All this led Channing to his final paragraphs in which he commented on the nature of war 
itself.  As a rule, Channing was far more interested in the conduct of individuals than of nations.  
His chief concern with Scott’s sympathetic portrayal of Napoleon’s character was in its ability to 
convince the minds of impressionable young men that military genius and a sense of destiny 
were the chief ends in life.  Yet, he felt obligated to lodge a brief commentary on warfare in 
general.  War was, in his opinion, a very great evil—especially when it was conducted for the 
fulfillment of some misguided sense of personal destiny.  “Wearied with violence and blood,” 
Americans should pray that God “subvert oppressive governments by the gentle, yet awful power 
of truth and virtue.”  Yet, if this was impossible, war could be necessary.  Its most harmful 
effects, he continued, could be muted if those who engaged in it “took to the sword with awe,” 
and remember that they served one whose “dearest attribute was mercy.”  In practice this meant 
that individual soldiers should “not stain their sacred cause by one cruel deed, by the infliction of 
one needless pang, [or] by shedding without cause one drop of human blood.”  For Channing, the 
lesson of Bonaparte was ultimately that war and national expansion was a reflection of individual 
human character.271 
A decade after the publication of Channing’s Remarks, another book was published that 
addressed similar concerns in a slightly different way while still keeping Napoleon central to the 
message.  Its author was one of the most remarkable, and yet unknown, men in the history of the 
early republic.  William Ladd was born into a wealthy New Hampshire merchant family only 
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two years after the United States declared their independence from Great Britain.  After 
graduating from Harvard and serving for a time as a sailor on one of his father’s merchant 
vessels, Ladd decided to change the world.  Luckily for him, he was able to ride a growing tide 
of Christian humanitarian reform that swept through in the United States during the first half of 
the nineteenth century.  After a brief attempt to undermine African slavery by setting up a cotton 
plantation in Florida using paid immigrant laborers failed miserably, Ladd listlessly moved from 
humanitarian cause to humanitarian cause before finally discovering on the international peace 
movement in the early 1820s.272 
Ladd began his crusade for peace in 1823 by starting local peace society in his home of 
Minot, ME.  Over the remaining seventeen years of his life, Ladd worked diligently for his new 
cause.  He successfully unified the disparate peace organizations across the United States into the 
American Peace Society, and had some success in enlisting support for his cause from other 
humanitarian organizations.  He had considerably less success, however, in realizing his dream 
of creating an international Congress of Nations to hear and arbitrate transnational disputes—a 
plan that presaged the modern United Nations.  Ladd also devoted a considerable amount of time 
and energy to combating the growing tide of militarism that he saw emerging in the youth of 
America.  He vocally opposed the creation of the Bunker Hill memorial, calling it a “monument 
to barbarism and anti-Christian spirit” and wrote numerous books aimed at American youths 
which advocated Christian pacifism.  One of the last books that Ladd wrote was published 
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pseudonymously in 1838 and explicitly tied Napoleonic literature to the militarism that he 
believed was corrupting the youth of America.273 
Written under the pseudonym Philanthropos, Howard and Napoleon Contrasted was 
aimed at older children and featured eight chapters, or dialogs, between two school boys named 
William and Henry.  The former was an idealized model of Christian virtue, while the latter was 
a representation of the young American everyman.  Henry is a truly remarkable character.  He 
has read all the latest Napoleon biographies and gripes about the British bias of Scott’s Life and 
the Secret History of St. Cloud.  He grew up surrounded by pictures of Napoleon and his 
marshals.  Additionally, a cadre of adults—including his father, his school master, and his 
minister—who taught him that the chief end of life is making a great name for oneself in this 
world.  Unsurprisingly, Henry virtually worships at the altar of military glory and the its chief 
saint—Napoleon.  He loves the martial spectacle of the local militia musters and longs to finish 
his education at a military academy, and become a military officer of great renown.274 
Surrounded as he is by the new American martial culture perpetuated by Napoleon-
mania, Henry is quite shocked—even outraged—when his best friend, William, questions his 
life’s goals.  William, however, is undeterred and attempts to reason with his friend along two 
parallel lines of attack.  The first line of attack was reminiscent of Channing, though certainly 
more accessible to children.  William asks Henry to compare the actions and objectives of his 
idol with those of a nondescript Christian merchant.  Though Henry finds the biographies of such 
lowbrow men “flat and uninteresting,” William patiently coaches him to a new understanding of 
humanity.  When pressed by William’s keen logic, Henry finds to his surprise that there is a vast 
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difference between greatness and goodness, and that Napoleon had the former without the latter 
which made him cruel and unjust.  Even the French nationalism which Scott held up as 
Bonaparte’s chief virtue William reduces to simple selfishness for it demands that he love only a 
small portion of humanity at the expense of all others. 
William’s other line of attack was one to which Channing briefly alluded but never fully 
engaged.  This was the dangerous “War Spirit” fostered by the celebration of Napoleon.  Henry 
loves the spectacle of the local militia musters.  “Oh how I love a sham fight!” he sighs while 
perusing Scott’s Life of Napoleon, “and to hear the cannons roar, and the muskets rattle, and the 
drums beat, and the horses neigh, and feel the ground tremble.”  In words directly reminiscent of 
Scott, Henry comments on how he loves to see the bright glint of the sunlight off the bayonets 
and swords of the militia.  “Oh! It is the most glorious sight in the world,” he says to William.  
“If a sham fight is so glorious, what must a real fight be like?”  With such magnificent 
spectacles, it is no wonder that Henry finds the biographies of Christian merchants so boring.  
Ladd here made a damning comment on how Napoleonic literature had finally developed into a 
new social culture that celebrated martial glory at the expense of Christian charity.  Luckily for 
Henry, his friend has no illusions about the real nature of war.275 
William makes his case in an innovative style.  Instead of relying on the Bible as he did 
in his initial arguments, he goes to one of the most famous of Bonaparte military histories, the 
General Philipe-Paul Comte de Ségur’s History of the Expedition to Russia.  First published in 
English in 1825, this French history of the disastrous 1812 campaign remains in print.  An 1841 
introduction to an American edition noted that, “nothing can more effectively dissipate every 
illusion of military glory than the perusal of this dreadful narrative.”  So hoped William.  Ségur’s 
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history in hand, he quotes lengthy, graphic descriptions of hungry and half-frozen French 
soldiers hacked to death by marauding Cossacks, blown to bits by Russian shells, or even 
committing suicide.  When Henry points out that this was a campaign lost, William describes the 
spread of disease that killed so many American soldiers following their victory at New Orleans.  
Ultimately, William concludes, “the life of the modern solider is ill-reported by heroic fiction,” 
and that if Henry persists in his dream of becoming an officer, it is likely that he will perish in 
“hopeless misery” languishing in a disease riddled camp or a prison ship far from loved ones. 276 
Williams stark description of the soldier life finally has the desired effect, and Henry 
resolves to give up his dreams of earthly glory and focus his life on Christ rather than on 
Napoleon.  Paradoxically, Ladd had to fight Bonaparte with Bonaparte, and though he probably 
did not intend it, it was actually the Comte de Ségur and not the Bible that managed to sway 
Henry away from the dangerous influence of Scott’s Napoleon.  This literary device was not far 
from the reality, and it informed the rhetoric of anti-expansionists for the next decade and a half.  
If they wanted to make an effective argument, they would need to work within the image of 
Bonaparte as the American military authority and standard of national greatness. 
In many ways, Americans saw their debate over national expansion between 1836 and 
1848 as a contest waged over the image of Bonaparte.  Many saw the outcome of these debates 
as providing the United States a legitimate national claim to the greatness of the Napoleonic 
Empire.  For other Americans, the problem was that the greatness of the Napoleonic empire 
could only come at the expense of American goodness.  It was almost as if the argument between 
Henry and William in the last section had become a national argument waged by millions of 
Americans.  Over the course of these years, Americans picked up many of the threads of the 
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Napoleonic rhetoric they had learned over the pervious thirty years and used them to weave new 
defenses and critiques of national expansionist policy. 
The outbreak of the Texas revolution in 1835 set the United States and Mexico on a long, 
slow, side towards war.  Shortly after gaining its independence, Mexico had attempted to 
populate its northern state of Coahuila y Tejas in an effort to create a buffer that would keep land 
hungry Americans and restless Comanche raiders from the core of Mexico.  Enticed by promises 
of cheap land and low taxes, thousands of American families spilled into the area and largely 
ignored government demands that they become Mexican citizens and abandon slavery.  Thus, it 
was hardly surprising that a rebellion broke out in the marginally loyal Mexican province with 
abrogation of the 1824 Constitution and the creation of a more centralized state.277 
After successfully dealing with similar revolts in the south of Mexico, general and 
President Antonio López de Santa Anna turned north and led an army into Texas where he 
quickly defeated Texans at Goliad and San Antonio.  A few months later, however, a Texan 
force under Sam Houston surprised and virtually annihilated the overstretched Mexican army at 
the Battle of San Jacinto.  Santa Anna himself was captured in the aftermath and forced to 
acknowledge the independent Republic of Texas as a condition of his release.  Following their 
victory over the Mexican army at San Jacinto in 1836, the infant, cash-strapped, Republic of 
Texas quickly applied for admission into the United States and Mexico warned that any 
American interference with what they saw as a rebellious province would be viewed as an act of 
war.278 
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Not only did American expansionists find war to be an acceptable risk, many were 
positively anxious for a military conflict in which they could take up the military mantel of 
Napoleon.  Texans assured their northern cousins that they could “plant the American Eagle” 
over the Halls of the Montezumas as easily as “Napoleon replaced his conquering banner on the 
turrets of Vendome.”  Meanwhile, the editor of the New York Herald did not fear any war with 
Mexico.  After all, he assured his readers, the United States had a population of twenty million 
souls who were “as fearless, as brave, and as passionately fond of glory…as the French under 
Napoleon.”  Such an argument could not have been made with any kind of legitimacy before the 
bifurcation of Bonaparte and the proliferation of Napoleonic literature.279 
The other expansionist argument that utilized Bonaparte was more understated but 
deserves careful examination.  It played on the old trope of expansion in the name national 
security.  Without a real Bonaparte, however, expansionists had to invent one.  This they did, 
partly without even trying to.  Santa Anna himself laid most of the groundwork for them when he 
began to accept the moniker, “Napoleon of the West.” 280  This was a helpful image, at least at 
first, for Santa Anna present to Mexican citizens looking for a strong, nationalist leader.  Many 
Americans were even willing to grant him some Napoleonic legitimacy.  “He is,” wrote one 
editor, “unquestionably a man of consummate abilities.  He has always heretofore been 
successful in his enterprises—he subdued a nation to his sway and became the Napoleon of 
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Mexico.”  Once Santa Anna became a threat to Texas in 1835, however, Americans turned this 
into a weapon.281 
Expansionist Americans used Santa Anna’s use of Napoleon to justify their expansion in 
several ways.  First, they drew on the political image of Bonaparte to paint Santa Anna as an 
ambitious, treacherous, blood thirsty despot, while at the same time chipping away at his military 
claims to the mantle of Bonaparte.  A letter written from Vera Cruz on June 22, and published in 
several American papers, for example, described in graphic detail Santa Anna’s attack on 
Zacatecas.  According to the letter, men, women, and children were butchered in the streets.  The 
sovereignty of the state was destroyed, he continued, and the “torch of rational liberty” 
extinguished.  All this was blamed on that “singular hero of the Americas, the Napoleon of this 
continent.”  The picture painted by this letter showed no glorious military conquest to defeat an 
enemy army, only the slaughter of civilians, which delegitimized Santa Anna’s claim to the 
military aspects of Bonaparte.  It also highlighted the wanton destruction of civil liberty which 
emphasized Santa Anna’s similarities to the Emperor Napoleon rather than the General 
Napoleon.282 
Santa Anna’s failures in the Texas revolt also badly compromised his claims to the 
military mantel of Napoleon.  Not only was his execution of prisoners at Goliad and the Alamo 
widely publicized and condemned, but the embarrassing rout of his army at San Jacinto was 
quite un-Napoleonic.  Virtually every paper in America printed some variation of Santa Anna’s 
surrender in which he tells Sam Houston, “The man who conquered the Napoleon of the South 
was born to no common destiny.”  Next to the story, the editor of the New Bedford Gazette 
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snidely put into words what many Americans were thinking: “a pretty fellow to call himself a 
Napoleon who was caught napping...and whose highest pretentions to military fame consisted in 
having slaughtered unarmed prisoners.”283 
After his embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Texans, the moniker “Napoleon” when 
applied to Santa Anna by American papers was always preceded by “the so-called” or “the self-
styled,” which delegitimized his claims to greatness and made him vulnerable in a military sense.  
When Santa Anna returned to power in Mexico in 1842, most Americans were probably 
unsurprised and sympathetic when they read in their papers that the Republic of Texas was 
strongly considering a preemptive attack to conquer Mexico to the Isthmus of Panama.  To 
justify this course, the Texans called for an “appeal to the God of Battles for a redress of the 
grievances” given them by the “self-styled Napoleon of the West.”  By appropriating Santa 
Anna’s appropriation of Napoleon, Americans and their Texas cousins not only turned him into a 
dangerous political threat, but also made him into a counterfeit who had all of Bonaparte’s 
ambition, but none of his greatness.284 
Anti-expansionists—almost all Whigs—drew on years of anti-Bonaparte rhetoric to make 
their case.  Some made arguments that differed little from those made by their fathers against the 
Louisiana Purchase.  For example, one letter to the editor of the Philadelphia Enquirer read, “If 
we embrace Texas for fear she will conquer Mexico and become a powerful rival we shall only 
act upon a policy which knows no limits and is always fatal to those who undertake it as proved 
by Alexander and Napoleon.”  This was virtually the same argument made by the editor of the 
American Citizen writing against Coriolanus in 1803.  Others Whigs adopted well-worn 
arguments about legitimacy and constitutionality.  In a paragraph that could have been lifted 
                                                      
283 New Bedford Gazette (New Bedford, MA), June 13, 1836. 
284 Weekly Herald (New York, NY), April 30, 1842. 
 
 
 194 
from a paper in 1803, the editor of the Richmond Whig argued against annexation by pointing out 
that there was no provision in the constitution for the incorporation of foreign territory into the 
union.  In fact, he continued, even Jefferson had admitted as much during the purchase of 
Louisiana, and only made the deal at the “order of Bonaparte, at whose name the whole world 
grew pale, but none grew so pale as Thomas Jefferson.”285 
Yet, at least a few Whigs did try to incorporate aspects the bifurcation of Bonaparte into 
their rhetoric though sometimes the result probably left even contemporary Americans scratching 
their heads in wonder.  For example, on May 23, 1844, the freshman Senator from New Jersey, 
Jacob Miller, warned that, “this Texan treaty belongs to the code of Napoleon.  Its object is 
dominion and its only sanction the sword.”  He did see one difference, however, between the 
expansion of the United States and Napoleon which he proceeded to explain.  “Napoleon first 
won the country by open, manly war; whilst we, pursuing a less hazardous course, steal into the 
country under the cover of a treaty and then having the nine points possession in our favor, make 
war upon Mexico for our title.”  Miller, in attempting to use the acceptable military image of 
Bonaparte, made “open, manly warfare” preferable to expansion through treaty.  This was not 
entirely new since Federalists had complained about negotiating for New Orleans rather than 
simply seizing it in 1802.  The key difference was that in 1803, Federalists demanded action to 
protect the United States from Bonaparte, whereas Miller was suggesting that the United States 
act in imitation of Bonaparte.286 
The most cringe-worthy of all the Whig attempts to use the bifurcation of Napoleon, 
however, occurred in the June 27, 1844 edition of the Boston Courier.  An author writing under 
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the name Franklin argued that while Napoleon conquered kingdoms and empires, he had always 
“employed the spoils of victory for nobler purposes than piling up dollars and counting them.”  
He had stimulated the spread of science, established commercial programs that encouraged 
economic growth for all Europe, and “laid the foundation for the greatest moral reform since that 
began at Bethlehem.”  High praise indeed.  “Conquest, in such hands and so used,” Franklin 
mused, “has something to palliate, if not ennoble it.”  On the other hand, he snorted, American 
conquest “by land jobbers and stock brokers can have no redeeming qualities.”  Remarkably, 
both “Franklin” and Miller argued against the annexation of Texas by arguing that the expansion 
of the United States was not enough like that of Napoleonic France.287 
Polk’s election led to the annexation of Texas in late 1845.  War did not come 
immediately, but the simmering border dispute between the two republics did not dissipate.  
Mexico considered the Nueces River the southern border of Texas, and the United States 
maintained that the boundary was 150 miles farther south along the Rio Grande.   After failing to 
secure purchase of the disputed territory—probably on purpose—Polk ordered an army under 
Zachary Taylor into the area.  In April 1846, a border skirmish occurred in which several 
American soldiers were killed.  Polk used this incident to ask for a declaration of war from 
Congress, which he got on May 13.  With war declared, new arguments had to be mustered.  
War, after all, did not necessarily mean conquest and expansion along a Napoleonic model.  Both 
pro and anti-war advocates attempted to control and describe the conduct of the war using the 
Napoleonic rhetoric that they had used for so long.288 
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As their armies prepared to invade Mexico, Americans debated the strategic conduct of 
the United States’ first major war of expansion.  As they did, they used a method best described 
as argument by anecdote.  Both sides appealed to the military authority of Napoleon through a 
short story or a saying.  These stories usually came from what they had read about Bonaparte in 
their volumes of anecdote books and from Napoleon’s Maxims of War, which had conveniently 
been published in the United States for the first time in 1845.  Yet, Americans could not even 
agree on the military lessons of Bonaparte.  For some, the most effective national strategy would 
limit American objectives and fight an aggressive defensive war within the bounds of Texas.  
This, said one commentator, was the “humane” method preferred by Napoleon for breaking up a 
mobs:  “fire balls first to let the enemy learn our seriousness and feel our power, then burn blank 
cartridges afterwards, if necessary, to stimulate his haste in retreat.”289 
Other, more aggressive, armchair generals argued that such a policy was foolish—and 
frankly un-Napoleonic.  Rather than fighting a limited conflict on the frontiers of Texas said an 
author writing as “St. Mark,” the United States ought to “fight with Mexico as Napoleon fought 
with Europe, by striking at her capitals.”   Most other commentators agreed with this assessment.  
One however, added a frightening additional component.  An article in the National Aegis 
opened with a quote from Napoleonic biography in which Bonaparte orders his artillery to fire 
on his Russian and Austrian forces as they flee across a frozen river from the Austerlitz 
battlefield.  The impact of the shots breaks the ice and drowns thousands of enemy soldiers.  This 
anecdote, he claimed, showed that the United States should adopt a harsh military policy in its 
war with Mexico to terminate the conflict quickly.  “War is war, the world over,” he concluded 
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darkly.  “Napoleon had his way and we have ours for carrying it forward, but ours, no less than 
his, aims at one simple object—conquest and destruction.”290 
 Recruiting of citizen soldiers to carry out these strategies was less difficult than agreeing 
on the methods themselves.  During the during the War of 1812, recruitment had been a 
challenge for the national government especially in New England where anti-Bonapartist 
sentiment was deepest.  The government faced no such problem when it came to recruiting 
young men to invade Mexico.  For example, the state of Tennessee had 30,000 men lined up at 
the recruiting stations to fill a state quota of 3,000.  Pennsylvania and Ohio had to turn away 
whole companies of men because they could not arm them fast enough.  Even anti-expansionist 
Whigs complained that their young men had been caught up in a Democratic war.  Historians of 
the war have long noted with surprise the incredible enthusiasm of the volunteers and have 
offered a variety of explanations for it.  Most, like Richard Winders, list a sense of patriotism, 
hope of excitement, and some form of social or material advancement.291 
 It bears remembering how closely each of those reasons for enlistment were tied into the 
glorious war narratives woven by Scott and other Napoleon biographers during the two decades 
leading up to the war.  Love of nation, for example, was held out by Scott as Bonaparte’s 
greatest virtue, and American youths had largely gotten their notions of war being an exciting 
adventure from military histories of Napoleon.  Only months before war was declared, 
Americans were treated to J.T. Headley’s best-selling, Napoleon and his Marshals. Headley 
readily admitted that his critics would "object to books of this kind as fostering the spirit of war 
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by stimulating a love of glory.”  But, he shrugged, if history was to be “abjured of battles” it 
would be very boring indeed. 292 
Watching the Massachusetts regiments marching off to the war, the editor of the Boston 
Evening Transcript tried to understand their motivation.  Many of them, he concluded, 
“remember the campaigns of Napoleon, and the honors bestowed upon his brave soldiery, may 
be expecting promotion according to their fearlessness in the war, their daring exploits, and what 
might seem to be their dauntless courage in defying death.”   “The romantic and chivalrous 
among them,” the editor went on, are “filled with ideas of glory” and “expect to rise…from rank 
to rank crowned in each affray with new distinctions—a brilliant rise from a short battle!”  The 
editor was not wrong—he was seeing the results of reading countless Napoleonic biographies 
and military histories.  As they marched off to invade a sovereign republic, the volunteers carried 
muskets on their shoulders and dreams of Napoleonic greatness in their hearts.  The fact that so 
many of them did so itself was a pro-war argument by enlistment.293 
As the war intensified, the arguments on the home-front that surrounded it shifted their 
focus to matters of national expansion policy rather than simple military strategy.  Both sides 
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used continued to use the bifurcated Napoleon as their standard for national conduct, and both 
continued to come to different conclusions about the legacy of Bonaparte and what it meant to 
the future of the United States.  The great debate began shortly after war was declared and was 
powerfully illustrated by an article in the New Bedford Mercury. 
On June 5, 1846, the Mercury printed a letter to the editor together with the editor’s 
reply.  The unnamed correspondent wrote passionately in favor of both the annexation of Texas 
and the war with Mexico.  He briefly cited international law to justify American actions on the 
border.  Yet, he doubted that the editors would take that authority and so he quoted an even 
higher authority:  God—and Bonaparte.  “When Napoleon was crowned King of Italy,” he 
wrote, “upon putting on the iron crown of Charlemagne, he is purported as saying emphatically, 
‘God has placed his crown upon my head, and woe to the man that touches it.’”  “God,” the 
correspondent continued, “has given us Texas to the Del Norte, and woe to the foreign nation, 
prince, or potentate that should interfere with it.”294 
The Mercury’s editor quickly responded.  “How unhappy the illustration drawn from 
Napoleon,” he wrote back, apparently shocked that that his correspondent did not rightly 
understand the history of Bonaparte.  “That iron crown of Lombardy was to him a crown of 
thorns—it bore him to the ground and crushed him.  So will this Texas be a thorn in the side of 
the union.”  The editor continued with a condemnation of invoking God into a debate on national 
expansion.  “Impious and shortsighted man,” he wrote, as if to Bonaparte directly, “how short 
was the time you wore that crown…you died in exile without crown or hope.”  The editor 
concluded forcefully, “we are told that God has given Texas to the Rio Bravo as he gave Italy to 
Napoleon!  Sad parallel!  May it never be carried out.”  Both men brought Bonaparte into the 
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debate on expansion expecting the other to acknowledge his authority, yet they could not agree 
on what the legacy of Napoleon actually meant.295 
A similar exchange took place a little over a year later.  This time, an anti-expansionist 
writing as “an Old Famer” fired the first shots in the National Intelligencer.  “An Old Farmer” 
was gravely concerned about the phrase “Manifest Destiny,” which, since 1845, had come to 
epitomize the ideology of the American expansionist.  Even the iconic phrase itself had 
Napoleonic overtones when one considers how closely “destiny” was associated with Bonaparte 
through the work of Scott.  The Old Farmer admitted that might have been “the 'manifest destiny' 
of Bonaparte to conquer half of Europe,” however, he continued, “it was also his 'manifest 
destiny' to die a miserable exile on the rock of St. Helena.”  Instead of national delusions, he 
continued, it would be far better for the United States to adopt the policy of the San Marino.  
This tiny, ancient republic nestled in the mountains of Italy had, when offered additional territory 
and artillery by Napoleon, politely accepted the cannons but refused the territory because they 
did not wish to “engage in the miserable folly of attempting to govern people without their 
consent.”296 
Three days later, a delightfully sarcastic reply by an author only identified as “X” 
appeared in the Baltimore Sun.  “We are told,” he began, “Napoleon had a great respect for the 
Republic of San Marino.”  That may have been true, he continued, but this was so only because 
it was such a small and insignificant place that it probably did not even appear on most French 
maps.  It was really a silly notion, “X” snorted, to expect the United States, a great nation to 
draw lessons from a republic with an army of “twenty-four soldiers commanded by a Lieutenant, 
Captain by brevet, and two corporals.”  Indeed, “X” concluded, “I have strong doubts whether 
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the army of San Marino will ever cross the Alps…[as] they were crossed by Napoleon unless 
they are provided with Austrian or French passports.”  In other words, for “X” the lesson of the 
story of San Marino was to be more like the great Napoleon and less like the insignificant San 
Marino.   Both the “Old Farmer” and “X” took the exact same story of Napoleon and came to 
completely opposite conclusions about what it meant to American foreign policy.297 
While Americans fought each other in the papers, the war dragged on.  In September 
1846, American forces under Zachary Taylor seized Monterrey.  In early 1847, another 
American army under Winfield Scott took the port of Vera Cruz, and, by June, they had fought 
their way inland to the outskirts of Mexico City.  Despite losing every battle, Santa Anna’s 
government steadfastly refused to come to the negotiating table.  With the end result still in 
doubt, some anti-expansionist Whigs continued to make their arguments using the political 
image of Bonaparte.  In one particularly amusing example, one wrote dourly, “we might mourn 
over the violation and destruction of our constitution by a Napoleon whose right hand was 
destiny—but it would be too much—too much to see it destroyed by a Polk.”  Showing their 
increasing adeptness with Napoleonic rhetoric, however, many others looked for ways to force a 
conclusion to the war by appealing to the military authority of Bonaparte.  Like William Ladd 
had done ten years earlier, they did this most successfully when they asked their audience to 
consider the less glorious aspects of Bonaparte’s military career.298 
The first such articles appeared in the summer of 1846, but gathered strength in October 
of that year as Americans learned of the tenacious Mexican resistance in Monterrey.  “A war 
with a Government and a war with a People are two very different things,” warned the editor of 
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the North American.  He cited Bonaparte’s early successes in Italy as an example of the former, 
and his disastrous occupation of Spain as an example of the latter.  Six months later, the National 
Intelligencer elaborated on this basic theme.  “In Europe, Napoleon conquered other countries 
because the population made no resistance after the regular army was defeated,” the editor 
explained.  “The two hostile armies met as prizefighters, and the country was the stake which 
belonged to the victors.”  On the other hand, “an invading army is unable to conquer any nation 
where all the people are hostile and opposed to them.  Spain is a memorable example of this.”  In 
America’s present war, he wrote grimly, it was important to remember that in the case of Spain, 
“Napoleon had possession of her capital and all her strongholds, with 300,000 veteran troops, the 
country compact and not one fifth the extent of what we propose to overrun.”299 
Some of Napoleon’s other campaigns offered similar opportunities for anti-expansionists 
to score rhetorical points.  In a speech to the Lowell Institute, one anti-expansionist asked his 
audience to consider seriously the “natural difficulties to be overcome in our war against 
Mexico.”  It was protected by impenetrable mountains, deadly diseases, and unbearable heat.  
“Man cannot war against nature,” he stated flatly, and not even the greatest general of them all 
was exempt from this maxim.  “Napoleon could scatter the Mamelukes like chaff before the 
wind, but fled from the burning sands of Egypt and from the desolation of the pestilence” he 
argued.  “Of the 500,000 men who went to war with him against the climate of Russia,” he went 
on, “but 40,000 came staggering back.”  He left his audience with a sobering thought.  “Mexico 
has the mountains of Switzerland, the snows of Russia, and a sicklier sunshine than ever bathed 
Napoleon’s banners.”300 
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Even the eventual taking of Mexico City in the fall of 1847 did little to mollify the basic 
anti-expansionist argument.  Why should it have?  As the anti-expansionists pointed out, Joseph 
Bonaparte had sat on the Spanish throne in Madrid for years without ending the insurgency.  In 
the most famous anti-expansionist speech of the conflict, a weary and saddened Henry Clay—he 
had lost a son in the war—pointed out that even Napoleon and his “colossal power,” had been 
unable to subjugate the Spanish people into a foreign system of rule.  Others reminded anyone 
who would listen that Napoleon, after all, had taken Moscow in 1812 before encountering the 
Russian winter and the Russian Cossacks.  Amy Greenberg argues in her book, A Wicked War, 
that while anti-expansionists were unable to prevent the war, they were ultimately successful in 
forcing Polk to accept a more moderate peace treaty than he would have liked.  If so, it was their 
appropriation of the military Napoleon that was largely responsible for the victory.  If Greenberg 
is correct, by 1848, anti-expansionists had managed to convince a significant number of 
Americans that while they had gone to war in search of a glorious Austerlitz victory, they were 
on the brink of a falling into an interminable, bloody, Spanish insurgency.301 
On the other hand, claiming victory for the anti-expansionists is probably taking things 
too far.  A look at the evidence shows that anti-expansionists were probably hurt by their own 
dire rhetoric because none of their grim prophecies came to fruition.  The Mexicans did not burn 
their capital and start a guerilla war, and though some guerilla bands did form they did not prove 
as effective as the anti-expansionists had led Americans to believe.  Disease and desertion did 
plague the American forces, but in the end, a smaller United States army marched hundreds of 
miles into Mexico across sun-burned deserts and treacherous mountains to take an enemy capital 
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without losing a battle.  This almost certainly had as much to do with Mexican political and 
economic chaos as it did with the prowess of the American soldier, but expansionists did not 
realize that, nor did they care.  After all, the war was not only about territorial expansion.  It was 
also about taking up the mantel of Napoleonic glory.  In both cases, the expansionists had much 
to celebrate.  By the closing months of the war, even the anti-expansionists had to appropriate the 
neo-greatness argument.302 
Thanks to the proliferation of Napoleonic literature in the 1820s and 1830s, a significant 
number of Americans were in awe of the military exploits of Napoleon and expansionists found 
that favorably comparing American victories to those of the great hero was an easy way to score 
rhetorical points.  At one 1847 Independence Day gathering in Virginia, an orator gave a speech 
that was typical of hundreds more given on the same day across the nation.  “The daring and 
impetuous charge at Palo Alto, the dreadful storming of Monterey, and the heady fight along the 
terrible pass of the Cerro Gordo,” he began, “bring forcibly to mind the desperate valor displayed 
at Jena, Saragossa, Wagram, and Areola.”  “Yet, when the disparity of troops and other 
disadvantages are considered,” he continued, “the impartial judgment of the world must decide 
that the fame of the imperial eagles of Napoleon, splendid as it is, must yield to the far reflected 
luster and dazzling glories of American arms acquired in these memorable and brilliant fields of 
victory.”  Put simply, Napoleon’s legions had passed on the mantel of military greatness on to 
the United States.303 
Other expansionists celebrated the victory of the United States as a triumph of American 
military humanitarianism.  One correspondent to the Baltimore Sun likened the American 
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invasion to Bonaparte’s reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire.  Those who decried the 
American invasion, he wrote, had apparently “never read of the French campaign in Germany, 
which was a terrible infliction upon the country, but at the same time a means of spreading 
liberal principles and improvements in every branch of social life.”  If the Mexico lost half her 
territory in the war, but gained a republican education from their conquerors, he maintained, “she 
would have paid a low price of tuition.”  Another expansionist took a slightly different approach 
when he asked his audience to contrast the American invasion of Mexico with those of Napoleon 
thirty years prior.  Whereas Bonaparte had turned the continent into a “charnel house,” and 
created an “ocean of blood, rapine, murder and monstrosity from Moscow to Gibraltar,” the 
American invasion of Mexico, “illuminated the minds of her people, long held in military 
bondage and civil tyranny.”  Both writers used different images of Bonaparte to come to the 
same conclusion about the American way of war.304 
Perhaps nothing illustrates the success of the neo-greatness argument presented by the 
expansionists than the fact that even the anti-expansionists finally made an attempted to make it 
their own.  One anti-expansionist pleaded with an “immense gathering” of Whigs in New York.  
Sounding like countless expansionists, he told the cheering crowd, “our troops have fought 
bravely—none ever fought better—they have achieved victories that would have conferred honor 
on Napoleon Bonaparte.”  He then, however, added an anti-expansionist element by insisting, 
“we need no more battles to prove the valor of American soldiers.”  The fact that this speech was 
made to a crowd of presumably anti-expansionist Whigs is revealing and shows what a difficult 
position the anti-expansionists were in by the closing months of the war.  Even the bulk of anti-
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expansionists appear to have been comfortable with the United States assuming the military 
greatness of Napoleon so long as the physical expansion of the nation was constrained.305 
On May 30, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo went into effect.  Mexico 
surrendered her northern provinces, at last giving the United States a claim to having fulfilled 
Napoleon’s dream of building a great North American empire.  Anti-expansionists had to admit 
that they had lost the argument.  Perhaps what galled them more than losing was that so many of 
the people of the United States did not even seem repentant about their aggressive imperialism.  
In fact, they celebrated it.  As the volunteers from the Mexican War returned home, they were 
feted and honored as the glorious Napoleonic heroes that they had set out to be.  It was all too 
much for a wag in writing in The Berkshire County Whig who bitterly tried to find humor in the 
situation.  “The Mexican battles surpass even the famous fights of Napoleon in the opportunities 
they furnish for the sudden manufacture of fame, to order,” he quipped.  “If half the swords 
which have been presented to men who have seen the elephant in Mexico, as a reward for their 
deeds of prowess shall be beaten into plowshares at the termination of the war, we may look for 
great things in agriculture.”306 
Starting in 1815, the common American understanding of Napoleon as a treacherous, 
ambitious despot broke down.  Starting with his abdication and exile in 1814, Americans began 
to separate the political Bonaparte from the military Bonaparte.  The tidal wave of printed 
material on the Emperor that flooded the American market place solidified this bifurcation of 
Bonaparte.  The result of this separation of the Napoleonic image was that a large portion of 
American population could celebrate Bonaparte as a brilliant military genius and the ultimate 
democratic success story, while increasingly ignoring the more unsavory aspects of his reign.  
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The debates over the annexation of Texas and the resulting Mexican American War 
demonstrated the practical effects of such thinking.  Aggressive expansion became increasingly 
palatable to the American public as attitudes toward warfare and national greatness were 
“Napoleonized” by the work of Barry O’Meara, Walter Scott, and their American successors.  
By the time of the Mexican War, even anti-expansionists found that their most effective rhetoric 
had to focus on accepting Napoleon as the great authority on military expansion and national 
greatness.  That they did this with some limited success was remarkable, but their ultimate 
failure showed just how far American attitudes about expansion had shifted in just one 
generation. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION:  THE GLORY THAT WAS NAPOLEON 
During the 1850s, Bonapartism reached its peak in the United States.  After 1855, visitors 
to American bookshops could purchase John S. Abbott’s two-volume History of Napoleon 
Bonaparte.  This wildly popular biography written by the Yankee minister turned biographer 
ended with the revealing sentence, “Napoleon, in death has become the victor over all his foes.  
Every generous heart now does homage to his lofty character...His noble fame is every day 
extending.”  Abbott was only the last of a long tradition of antebellum Bonaparte biographers 
who had turned the emperor into a popular military hero.  Even more, however, Abbott’s 
biography represented Napoleon’s final triumph over William Channing.  Not only did Abbott 
hold up Bonaparte as a military hero, but he also held up his “lofty character” as worthy of 
emulation.307   
If they had looked hard enough, a visitor to the shop could also have bought a copy of a 
little book called the The Deck and Port Songster, which was an entire volume of laudatory tunes 
about the French emperor.  Upon opening the book to page sixty-five, they would have found 
one ditty titled “Napoleon’s Dream.”  The song’s narrator described falling asleep and visiting 
St. Helena where he is welcomed by Napoleon.  When he finds that the dreamer is an American, 
Bonaparte brightens and reminds his visitor of his glorious victories in defense of freedom, 
On the plains of Marengo I tyranny hurl’d 
And wherever my banner the eagle unfurrl’d  
Twas the standard of freedom all over the world! 
As the dreamer awakens, he hears Bonaparte’s final words ringing in his, “Liberty soon ov’r the 
world shall be seen.” 
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The message of this dream could not have clearer to American readers.  Napoleon had passed on 
his dream of an empire of liberty to the United States.308 
Yet, before the United States could expand further, the nation tore itself apart over the 
issue of slavery.  In mid-1862, the biographer Abbott wrote a letter to his publisher with an offer 
to capitalize on the ongoing military conflict.  “At the close of this war there will be a million 
and a half of young men, who, from their life in the camp, will be particularly interested in 
Military History,” he told his publisher.  “The Life of Napoleon, in that respect, stands 
preeminent.”  Abbott wanted to publish a one-volume edition of his previous work that would be 
cheaper for young men just home from the war to read.  After all, he reminded the publisher, 
“Napoleon is popular with the masses.”309 
 Abbott was not wrong.  Like their fathers before them, Americans north and south 
continued to talk about the conquest of the Confederacy in terms of Napoleon.  During the first 
eighteen months of the war, for example, numerous promising officers like P.G.T. Beauregard 
and George B. McClellan found themselves heralded as the next Napoleon by the media and by 
their soldiers.  Similarly, one officer explained to his local newspaper that the duty of an army 
officer was to lead from the front.  “Napoleon in person was obliged to lead his bravest men over 
the bridge of Lodi, and again at Arcola, and at Waterloo,” he explained in an argument by 
anecdote.  Furthermore, he claimed, “at the last grand charge of the Old Guard he felt the dire 
necessity of leading them himself, and he rushed to their head, but his officers seized him and 
forced him back.”  “Had they left him to follow his instinct,” the officer mused, “he might have 
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turned the fortune of the day.”  At the onset of the war, at least, Civil War soldiers expected their 
officers to be the Napoleon they had read about in Scott and Abbott’s biographies.310 
They also expected their Napoleonic campaigns to be like those they had read about in 
countless military histories.  Upon reading about a massive Union army closing on Richmond in 
early 1862, a Confederate diplomat in Brussels wrote an encouraging letter to his Secretary of 
State that drew on a familiar figure.  “If any of our fellow citizens…should be disposed to 
entertain anxiety toward the final result,” he began, “let them fresh courage in recalling to mind 
the disasters incurred at Moscow by the greatest captain of modern times.”  His letter went on for 
another three pages describing in detail the awful calamities that had befallen the French army in 
Russia, which he had learned from a recently published memoir.  Sounding like an anti-
expansionist of ten years earlier, he finally concluded, “It is daily becoming more and more 
evident…that a fate yet more terrible is awaiting the would-be conquerors of the Confederate 
States, under the burning sun and in the death bringing swamps of the South.”311 
 Yet, by mid-point of the war, references to Napoleon had lessened considerably.  As 
Gerald Lindermann has described in his seminal work, Embattled Courage, a variety of factors 
were to blame.  Probably the biggest cause was that the romantic ideas about military life that 
young men had learned from Scott and others did not hold up to the reality they experienced 
during the war.  During the winter of 1864-65, one soldier woke up to eighteen inches of snow 
and noted in his diary, “Wading through the deep snow reminds me of a picture that I have often 
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seen, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte before Moscow.’”  Yet, he continued wearily, “duty must be attended 
to, no matter what the weather may be.”  This soldier, and many more like him found that the 
reality of military life was not as grand as they had been led to believe.312 
 It was not just camp life that did not live up to expectations.  Virtually all of the officers 
who had been labeled as the new Napoleon fell woefully short of expectations.  George 
McClellan, whose campaign against Richmond in 1862 had occasioned the letter to the 
Confederate Secretary of State mentioned above, was turned back and he was eventually relieved 
of his command.  Despite initial success at the First Battle of Bull Run, P.T.G Beauregard was 
defeated nine months later at the Battle of Shiloh, and then personal conflicts with Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis relegated him to backwater theaters for the remainder of the war.  
Additionally, the generals who did the most to bring the war to a successful conclusion seemed 
to have little to do with the popular perceptions of Bonaparte.  Ulysses S. Grant and William T. 
Sherman won their victories through a dogged determination not to lose rather than by a 
glorious, nation-shattering, Austerlitz-style victory.  Indeed, those generals who attempted such 
things usually ended up simply destroying lives for no good cause.  By the end of the war, 
Americans had created a new pantheon of their own military heroes who had little to do with 
Bonaparte.  Americans had, in a sense, outgrown the need to measure their military greatness 
against Napoleon.313 
 The civilians at home, especially in the defeated South, also found a divergence between 
their Napoleonic rhetoric and the reality of their war.  One chaplain from Sherman’s army 
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explained the disconnect in a letter written shortly after the famous “march to the sea.”  
“Everybody recollects how summarily General Sherman and his handful of invading Yankees 
were to be disposed of, after leaving Atlanta,” he wrote.  “Trees were to be cut down, bridges 
were to be burned, all forage for man and beast was to be destroyed, the country was to be 
desolated and the difficulties that beset Bonaparte on his famous and disastrous visit to Moscow, 
were to have been repeated in the State of Georgia in the year of grace 1864.”  Such, he said, was 
the program espoused by so many, “Governors, Generals, editors and all.”  Yet, none of the dire 
rhetoric had come to pass.  In fact, he concluded, the march had been a quite “agreeable 
journey.”  Overblown Napoleonic rhetoric forced southern civilians to recognize that the reality 
of Union conquest was much different than what they had read in their books about Napoleon.  
Despite their rhetoric, Southerners had not proven themselves greater than Bonaparte.314 
 The other reason that the expansionist rhetoric of Bonaparte fell out of favor was that 
there was no military expansion between 1850 and 1898.  The Gadsden Purchase was obtained 
from Mexico through treaty in 1853 and Alaska bought from the Russians in 1867, but that was 
no conquest.  That was simply a business transaction.  From the view point of the twenty-first 
century, historians now see the destruction of the plains Indian tribes as a conquest, but this was 
not how nineteenth century Americans looked at it.  There was little martial glory in conquering 
native peoples, unless you lost spectacularly—as George Custer found in 1876.  It was not until 
the Spanish American War of 1898 that another “real” war of conquest broke out which again 
allowed Americans to prove their valor.  By then, however, most young American men 
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compared their valor to their fathers’ fights at Gettysburg and Antietam and not to Napoleon’s 
Italian campaigns.315 
The curtailment of Napoleonic rhetoric was truly the end of an era for the United 
States—indeed, in some ways it signaled the end of the first phase of American expansion.  
Between 1800 and 1850, Napoleon, the ultimate symbol of imperialism, had become a dominant 
political and social measure of aggressive American expansion.  He first entered the lexicon of 
expansion in 1802 when Americans found that Spain had retroceded their territory of Louisiana 
to France.  Most Americans saw having an aggressive France on their western border as an 
unacceptable national security risk.  They appropriated the language of natural and ancient 
boundaries, which Napoleon had popularized during his initial campaigns in Italy, to discuss 
their own national expansion.  Many Americans argued that a preemptive military strike on New 
Orleans was justified to prevent Napoleon from obtaining a geographic position from which he 
could strangle western commerce or, even worse, use economic persuasion to dismember the 
union.  Other Americans, however, warned that a theory of expansion based on natural borders 
or a preemptive military campaign would make the United States no better than Bonaparte’s 
France.  Congress ultimately passed a bill authorizing President Jefferson to use military force to 
take New Orleans, but fate intervened in April 1803. 
The failure of France to quell the slave revolt on the island of Saint-Domingue and 
anticipation of another war in Europe led Bonaparte to try and sell the entire territory of 
Louisiana to the United States.  This touched off a new round of debates about the legitimacy of 
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republican expansion and military occupation.  Anti-expansionists argued that signing a treaty 
with the ambitious and aggressive Bonaparte was not only unwise and compromising the 
national integrity, but also probably illegitimate.  Despite the anti-expansionist rhetoric, 
Congress approved treaty by large margins.  This, however, led to new questions about how the 
territory was to be administered.  Many Jeffersonians and some Federalists argued that an 
uncompromising military occupation was justified to alleviate the dangers posed by a hostile 
Louisiana population still loyal to Bonaparte’s France.  Federalists pointed out that this type of 
occupation was no better than how Napoleon treated his “sister republics” in Europe.  Once 
again, the pro-expansionists were successful in their arguments.  With the Louisiana question 
settled, they contented themselves by celebrating the differences between the allegedly peaceful 
expansion of the United States and the aggressive conquests of Napoleon. 
Between 1805 and 1815, the anti-expansionists regrouped and struck back on the 
unresolved issue of Florida.  They found an effective rhetorical tool in painting the Jeffersonians 
as stooges, or, worse, allies of the Emperor Napoleon.  This was particularly effective due to the 
general American distaste for Napoleon’s imperial aggrandizement in Europe, as well as concern 
over a possible Bonaparte connection to the Aaron Burr conspiracy closer to home.  Americans 
were particularly disturbed by Napoleon’s usurpation of the Spanish monarchy in 1808.  Using 
this rhetorical device, anti-expansionists were able to block passage of the $2 million act in 1805.  
In 1811, they cast great doubt on the Madison administration’s occupation of the West Florida 
republic and a year later, they forced the administration to call off its attempts to start a coup in 
Spanish East Florida.  Though they were unable to prevent the War of 1812, rhetoric that tied 
Madison to Bonaparte and aggressive expansion in Florida helped create a unified, national anti-
expansionist—though not anti-war—movement which greatly hampered the conduct of the war. 
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In 1815, Napoleon abdicated and almost immediately Americans began to bifurcate his 
legacy.  They separated the political image of the emperor from the military image of the 
general.  This allowed them to celebrate the democratic, military hero, while claiming to detest 
the ambitious and treacherous despot.  These images were so powerful that anti-expansionists 
proved unable to mount an effective argument to counter Andrew Jackson’s aggressive invasion 
of Florida in 1818.  Following Bonaparte’s death in 1821, Americans read a tidal wave of printed 
materials about the emperor that largely reinforced this bifurcation.  Best-selling sympathetic 
works written by Barry O’Meara and Walter Scott simultaneously softened the emperor’s image 
and turned him into the standard of martial and national greatness.  Some Americans, led by 
William Ellery Channing, responded to these books by calling attention to the difference 
between greatness and goodness and questioning their romantic image of war, but the tide had 
clearly shifted.  When the questions of Texas annexation and then the Mexican War came to the 
fore of American expansion debate between 1835 and 1848, anti-expansionists found themselves 
on the defensive.  Ultimately, they were able to put together an argument that may have helped 
to prevent the conquest of all Mexico.  However, they were only able to do this by working 
within the new framework of Napoleonic greatness established by their opponents.  By the end 
of the war, the image of Napoleon stood triumphant as the accepted American measure of 
national and military greatness. 
In 2003, President George W. Bush ordered the American military to invade Iraq to 
prevent the government of Iraq from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction.  This so-
called “Bush Doctrine” of preemptive war was lambasted by commentators as being a radically 
new shift in foreign policy.  While the wisdom of the policy can certainly be questioned, it was 
not new.  In fact, it was virtually the same rational given by militant expansionists two-hundred 
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years earlier for seizing New Orleans before Napoleon could take possession.  Even opposition 
to the war was also virtually the same as it had been in 1803.  Some pleaded for time to give 
diplomacy a chance to work, while others decried the creation of an American empire and asked 
where such aggressive imperialism would end.  In 1803, war had been adverted, but the United 
States was not so lucky in 2003.  Four years later, the American military remained engaged in 
frustrating counterinsurgency operations as they attempted to rebuild a war-torn Iraq amid bitter 
sectarian violence.  In August of 2007, historian Richard Bulliet published an opinion piece of 
the New York Times.  In the article, he suggested that the president might take a lesson from one 
of the great military captains in history and abandon his middle eastern campaign before it 
proved disastrous.  The title of his essay was, “Bush and Napoleon.”  Even after two-hundred 
years, Americans still compared their expansion to that of Napoleon Bonaparte.316 
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